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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Aim of the study 
The aim of this study is to examine the environmental impacts of the different systems 
for allocation and transfer of milk quota under the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) in individual Member States of the European Union (EU). In particular, it 
seeks to identify the ways in which differences in the implementation of milk quota 
regimes can impact on various sectoral and farm management trends and the 
environmental implications of these. This report is intended to complement a previous 
study1, henceforth referred to as the main study, which evaluated the impact of market 
support measures in the EU dairy sector as well as the effect of applying reference 
quantities of milk quota at national level. In contrast, the main policy impacts 
considered in this study arise from national implementation of the following aspects 
of milk quota policy within Member States: 
 
• Transfers of quota with land (including rural leases); 
• Permanent transfers of quota without land (via market or administrative 
mechanisms); 
• Temporary transfers of quota without land; 
• Temporary redistribution of unused quota; and 
• Management of the National Reserve.  
 
The study has sought to assess the environmental effects of milk quota 
implementation at national level following a two-step approach. Firstly, there is an 
analysis of the causal link, leading from implementation of the milk quotas regime to 
likely impacts on farmers’ decisions, including effects on both farm structures and 
management practices. Second is consideration of the effects that these outcomes are 
likely to have had on the environment.  
 
The linkages between milk quota implementation and environmental impacts are not 
straightforward. The environmental effects are various and can be either positive or 
negative, or both. For example, some structural changes linked to milk quota 
implementation may be beneficial in terms of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions but 
negative in terms of water pollution or vice versa. The impact of some structural 
changes will also vary significantly depending both on local agro-climatic conditions 
and the extent to which production is concentrated in a particular region. Furthermore, 
in order to consider the overall environmental impact of milk quota implementation at 
farm level and regionally, it is necessary to take into account both increases and 
decreases in dairy production. Finally, since a number of other policy measures and 
market trends will influence structural and environmental impacts of dairying, 
isolating the impact of the quota regime is quite difficult.     
 
                                                 
1 Evaluation of the environmental impacts of CAP measures related to the beef and veal sector and the 
milk sector (Alliance Environnement, 2007) 
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1.2 Scope of the evaluation 
Within the overall evaluation exercise specific consideration is given to the effects of 
different quota regimes on the regional distribution of milk production. Since there 
has been no possibility of transferring milk quota between Member States, each 
Member State is treated as a self-contained unit and regional quota movements are 
analysed within national boundaries. 
 
In terms of geographical scope the main focus of the evaluation is on the EU 15. In 
addition, it also provides a provisional overview of the implementation of milk quotas 
in the 10 new Member States which acceded to the EU in 2004 (henceforth referred to 
as the NMS 10). Detailed analysis based on data provided through case studies is 
provided in relation to seven Member States which account for nearly 85 per cent of 
milk production in the EU 15 distributed over a range of production systems and agro-
climatic zones. Case studies were conducted in France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. Analysis of the remaining EU 15 
Member States is based on supplementary data sources.    
 
The evaluation covers the same period as the main study, namely from 19882 until the 
present day, taking into account data availability. The analysis focuses on the medium 
to long term impacts of milk quota implementation throughout the period. Particular 
attention is given to changes in national implementation resulting from the 1992 and 
Agenda 2000 reforms of the CAP.    
 
1.3 Structure of the report 
The report consists of nine main chapters, a number of supplementary Annexes as 
well as an Executive Summary and a Short Summary. These are: 
   
• Chapter 1: Introduction to the Evaluation giving an overview of the objectives 
and the structure of the report evaluation and the approach set out in 
subsequent sections of the study;  
• Chapter 2: The EU Dairy Sector. This chapter gives a summary of structural 
developments during the evaluation period, including the regional 
distributions of milk production, dairy cows and dairy holdings;  
• Chapter 3: Implementation of Milk Quotas in the EU. This chapter sets out an 
overview of the EU milk quota regime, its intervention logic and the different 
approaches adopted by Member States in respect to the transfer and allocation 
of milk quotas within their territory; 
• Chapter 4: Farm Level and Environmental Impacts. This chapter identifies 
aspects of dairy production which may be affected by national milk quota 
implementation. The subsequent potential for environmental impacts on soils, 
water, biodiversity, landscape, air and climate change is then outlined;  
• Chapter 5: Methodology. This chapter outlines the methodological approach 
used to address the two key evaluation questions addressed in the study 
including data considerations, an outline of the counterfactual and an 
                                                 
2 In some cases, where data are available, the analysis dates back to 1984 when EU milk quotas were 
first introduced. 
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assessment of the degree of market orientation of Member State milk quota 
regimes;    
• Chapter 6: Hypotheses linking milk quota implementation and environmental 
consequences. This chapter outlines the key hypotheses to be examined in the 
study; 
• Chapter 7: Environmental Impact of Milk Quota Implementation at Member 
State Level. This chapter provides a detailed analysis of available evidence 
relevant to a series of hypotheses in order to evaluate the overall 
environmental impact of national milk quota implementations. This is the first 
major evaluation question; 
• Chapter 8: Effectiveness of national Measures with Environmental Objectives.  
This Chapter provides a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of aspects of 
national milk quota regimes where an environmental objective has been 
specified either explicitly or implicitly. This is the second major evaluation 
question; 
• Chapter 9: Conclusions and Recommendations. This chapter identifies the 
main findings of the evaluation and sets out some recommendations in relation 
to future dairy policy based on the study’s conclusions; 
    
A number of annexes are also included, mostly comprising detailed tables of Member 
State implementation in relation to transfers and allocations of milk quotas.   
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2 THE EU DAIRY SECTOR 
2.1  Introduction 
Milk production in the EU has been subject to the CAP milk quota regime throughout 
the period covered by this study. As a result, production levels have been 
characterised by relative stability at national level, particularly in the largest 
producing Member States, but with significant fluctuations in some regions. Cows’ 
milk production in the EU 15 Member States was 129.6 million tons3 in 1984 falling 
to around 121 million tons in the 1990s due to cuts in milk quota (DG Agri, 1997). 
Milk production in the EU 15 remained at around this level until 2003, but had 
declined to 120 million tons by 2005. Production at EU 25 level was 143 million tons 
in 2005, with the 10 new Member States (NMS 10)4 accounting for just over 15 per 
cent of total EU production.  
 
In 2005 the largest producers in the EU 25 were Germany (20.0 per cent), France 
(17.3 per cent), the UK (10.2 per cent), Poland (8.4 per cent), Italy (7.7 per cent), the 
Netherlands (7.6 per cent), Spain (4.6 per cent), and Ireland (3.6 per cent). Together, 
these eight Member States account for 79 per cent of total EU production. Excluding 
Poland, the seven EU 15 Member States account for 71 per cent of production in the 
EU 25 and 84 per cent of production in the EU 15. For a breakdown of production in 
all Member States please refer to Annex 1. Deliveries of cows’ milk to dairies 
accounted for more than 95 per cent of milk production in the EU 15 in 2005, with 
direct sales and on-farm use accounting for the rest. In the EU 25 direct sales 
accounted for 8 per cent of total production, reflecting the relative importance of this 
form of sales in the NMS 10. 
 
Whilst overall production of cows’ milk has remained relatively stable during the 
evaluation period, the EU dairy sector has been subject to a great deal of structural 
change. The number of dairy cows has decreased, compensated to a large degree by 
increases in average milk yields per cow as a result of increased efficiencies of scale 
linked to increasing herd sizes in all Member States. Some of the principle trends in 
the EU-15 are considered in the next section. The history in the NMS 10 has been 
rather different and is the subject of the final section of this chapter.   
 
                                                 
3 1984 figures are the EU 12 plus Austria, Finland and Sweden. 
4 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
Bulgaria and Romania acceded to the EU in 2007 and are therefore not included within the scope of 
this evaluation study.   
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2.2 Developments in the EU 15 dairy sector 
2.2.1 Milk Production in the EU 15 Member States 
Between 1983/84 and 1993/945 milk production declined in the majority of Member 
States by between 10 and 16 per cent as a result of cuts in milk quota. The period 
between 1993/94 and 2003/04 was, in contrast, subject to much greater stability with 
most Member States experiencing only minor changes to their national levels of milk 
production. There were, however, exceptions to this pattern in a few mainly 
Mediterranean Member States where significant increases in production occurred, 
namely Austria (+16 per cent), Greece (+12 per cent), Italy (+9 per cent), Portugal 
(+23 per cent), and Spain (+10 per cent). Relatively small decreases in production 
occurred in a few Member States during this period, including Belgium (-5 per cent), 
Finland (-2 per cent) and Sweden (-1 per cent).  
 
In recent years (2003/04 to 2006/07) milk production has remained relatively stable 
with no more than a one per cent change in the majority of EU 15 Member States. 
Exceptions include Greece (+10 per cent), the UK (-6 per cent), Finland (-3 per cent), 
and Germany, Spain and Sweden (all -2 per cent). For further details please refer to 
Table 2.1 below.  
 
Table 2.1 Milk deliveries in the EU 15 between 1983/84 and 2006/07 (1,000 t) 
Member 
State  1983/84 1993/94 2003/04 2006/07 
Percentage 
change (%) 
1983/84 - 
1993/94 
Percentage 
change (%) 
1993/94 - 
2003/04 
Percentage 
change (%) 
2003/04 - 
2006/07 
Austria1    2,290 2,645 2,672   15.5 1.0 
Belgium  3,821 3,329 3,176 3,155 -12.9 -4.6 -0.7 
Denmark  5,280 4,433 4,489 4,506 -16.0 1.3 0.4 
Finland  3,229 2,457 2,408 2,343 -23.9 -2.0 -2.7 
France  25,320 22,188 22,449 22,229 -12.4 1.2 -1.0 
Germany2  32,338 28,098 28,533 27,995 -13.1 1.5 -1.9 
Greece    601 672 739   11.8 10.0 
Ireland  5,341 5,213 5,418 5,393 -2.4 3.9 -0.5 
Italy6    10,119 11,018 11,141   8.9 1.1 
Luxembourg  293 258 257 258 -11.9 -0.4 0.4 
Netherlands3  12,181 10,997 11,065 11,123 -9.7 0.6 0.5 
Portugal    1,501 1,841 1,838   22.7 -0.2 
Spain4    5,352 5,893 5,759   10.1 -2.3 
Sweden1   3,241 3,203 3,123   -1.2 -2.5 
United 
Kingdom  15,957 13,986 14,658 13,839 -12.4 4.8 -5.6 
Source: Member State responses to DG Agriculture questionnaire (2007) 
1 Data correspond to following years: 1995, 2003, & 2006 (Eurostat) 
2 Data correspond to following years: 1983/84, 1993, 2003 & 2006. 1983/84 figures include former 
GDR figures from 1990/01. 
3 Data for 1983/84 based on year 1984/85. 
4 Data correspond to following years: 1993, 2003, & 2006 (Eurostat) 
5 Data for 1993/94 is based on year 1995 (Eurostat).  
6 Deliveries and direct sales production. No data provided for 1983/84. 
                                                 
5 All figures in this section were obtained in response to a questionnaire sent by DG Agriculture to 
Member State administrations in 2007. 
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2.2.2 Scale of production 
Increased scale of production at the level of the farm holding has been observed in all 
Member States6. This can be observed through a decline in the number of dairy 
holdings at Member State level, with those holdings which remain in production 
increasing in size and milk output. Between 1983/84 and 1993/94 the number of dairy 
holdings declined by between 40 and 60 per cent in the majority of Member States, 
but by around 30 per cent or less in the Netherlands, and the UK. Between 1993/94 
and 2003/04 average declines were typically in the region of 30 to 50 per cent. 
However, rates of decline in the number of holdings in Mediterranean countries were 
significantly greater, particularly in Greece (-69 per cent), Portugal (-80 per cent) and 
Spain (-70 per cent). Between 2003/04 and 2006/07 rates of decline were typically 
between 10 and 20 per cent with the exception of the Mediterranean countries as well 
as the Netherlands and Denmark, where higher rates of decline were observed (see 
Table 2.2 for more details). 
 
Table 2.2 Number of dairy holdings in the EU 15 (1983/94-2006/07) 
Member 
State  
1983/84 1993/94 2003/04 2006/07 Percentage 
change (%) 
1983/84 - 
1993/94 
Percentage 
change (%) 
1993/94 - 
2003/04 
Percentage 
change (%) 
2003/04 - 
2006/07 
Austria1    78,441 54,344 45,847   -30.7 -15.6 
Belgium  47,053 24,272 15,817 14,311 -48.4 -34.8 -9.5 
Denmark  32,679 16,390 7,332 5,364 -49.8 -55.3 -26.8 
Finland  73,766 36,187 18,401 14,897 -50.9 -49.2 -19.0 
France  384,945 162,384 107,971 94,332 -57.8 -33.5 -12.6 
Germany2 383,369 220,679 121,524 105,800 -42.4 -44.9 -12.9 
Greece    27,805 8,669 6,294   -68.8 -27.4 
Ireland  67,981 41,390 25,212 21,872 -39.1 -39.1 -13.2 
Italy    140,878 60,198 48,020   -57.3 -20.2 
Luxembourg  2,226 1,524 1,022 923 -31.5 -32.9 -9.7 
Netherlands3  54,013 43,928 28,389 21,172 -18.7 -35.4 -25.4 
Portugal    87,254 17,616 12,461   -79.8 -29.3 
Spain4    137,330 41,612 29,341   -69.7 -29.5 
Sweden5    17,640 10,030 8,369   -43.1 -16.6 
United 
Kingdom  
50,625 36,709 21,553 18,499 -27.5 -41.3 -14.2 
Source: Member State responses to DG Agriculture questionnaire (2007) 
1 Data for 1993/94 is based on year 1995/96. Figures from presentation on Austrian Milk Sector 
(Lebensministerium 2007).  
2 Data correspond to following years: 1983, 1993, 2003 & 2006.  
3 Data for 1983/84 based on year 1984/85. 
4 Data for 2006/07 based on year 22005/06. Figures from Spanish case study report (COAG, 2006 
based on data from MAPA) 
5 Data for 1993/94 is based on year 1995 (Eurostat).  
 
Trends in the number of dairy cows and average number of dairy cows per holding are 
shown below in Table 2.3. Figures are based on Eurostat data and presented at 
                                                 
6 Similar trends in terms of number of cows, dairy holdings and their size distributions have been 
reported throughout the OECD. Please refer to their 2004 report on ‘The Dairy Sector’ for more 
details.    
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Member State, EU 15 and EC 127 level between 1990 and 2005. The figures indicate 
that between 1995 and 2005 the average annual decline in the number of dairy cows 
per Member State was 1.8 per cent for the EU 15. Four Member States experienced 
declines below the EU average including France (-1.6 per cent), Greece (-0.9 per 
cent), Italy (-1.4 per cent) and the Netherlands (-1.6 per cent). In contrast, nine 
Member States experienced declines above the EU average, including Austria (-2.4 
per cent), Germany (-2.0 per cent), Portugal (-2.5 per cent), Spain (-2.6 per cent), the 
UK (-1.9 per cent).  
 
In terms of the average number of dairy cows per holding, the largest holdings in the 
EU 15 are located in Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK, whilst the smallest 
holdings can be found in Austria, Finland, Greece, Portugal and Spain. The greatest 
average annual increases in dairy cows per holding between 1995 and 2005 have 
occurred in Denmark (9.3 per cent), Greece (16.1 per cent), Italy (6.0 per cent), 
Portugal (17.7 per cent), and Spain (11.4 per cent). In contrast, the lowest annual 
increases have occurred in Austria (2.5 per cent), Belgium (1.5 per cent), France (3.1 
per cent), Luxembourg (1.7 per cent), the Netherlands (3.4 per cent), and the UK (1.8 
per cent). 
 
Table 2.3 Number of dairy cows and average number of cows per holding in 
the EU 15 (1990-2005) 
Number of dairy cows Average number of dairy  cows per holding Member 
State 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Annual 
Change 
(%)  
1995-
2005 
1990 1995 2000 2005 
Annual  
Change (%) 
1995- 
2005 
Austria  705,680 697,310 535,790 -2.4  7.8 9.0 9.8 2.5 
Belgium  841,860 688,380 615,860 549,330 -2.0 26.9 31.5 33.9 36.2 1.5 
Denmark 761,930 702,470 640,190 564,270 -2.0 32.9 44.0 57.4 85.1 9.3 
Finland  396,050 364,120 318,760 -2.0  12.1 15.2 18.8 5.6 
France 5,304,390 4,624,350 4,193,270 3,877,620 -1.6 23.4 28.7 32.7 37.5 3.1 
Germany  5,271,000 4,765,140 4,235,960 -2.0  25.2 31.2 38.4 5.2 
Greece 204,760 183,600 153,790 167,920 -0.9 5.4 6.6 12.8 17.2 16.1 
Ireland 1,330,810 1,312,080 1,177,450 1,081,960 -1.8 27.1 30.9 37.0 45.4 4.7 
Italy 2,641,760 2,173,310 1,896,050 1,860,180 -1.4 12.8 18.9 23.2 30.5 6.1 
Luxembourg 60,530 48,600 45,140 39,340 -1.9 32.0 34.7 36.7 40.6 1.7 
Netherlands 1,877,870 1,707,880 1,649,730 1,433,200 -1.6 39.9 45.6 47.1 60.9 3.4 
Portugal 405,600 381,760 355,730 287,290 -2.5 4.1 6.5 10.8 18.1 17.7 
Spain 1,597,840 1,356,840 1,242,310 1,001,920 -2.6 7.7 11.1 16.0 23.6 11.4 
Sweden  481,390 448,520 393,260 -1.8  27.3 32.1 46.0 6.9 
United 
Kingdom 2,844,910 2,555,370 2,334,840 2,065,070 -1.9 63.5 66.6 73.3 78.5 1.8 
EC 12  21,005,640 19,069,500 17,164,060 -1.8  24.7 31.0 39.1 5.8 
EU 15   22,588,760 20,579,450 18,411,870 -1.8   22.8 28.2 35.4 5.6 
Source: Eurostat 
Note: Average number of cows per holding based on own calculations using Eurostat data. Data for the 
former West Germany prior to reunification with the ex-GDR are not publicly available for 1990. 
                                                 
7 The 12 Member States of the European Community, as the EU was known prior to the Maastricht 
agreement in 1991 and the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the Union in 1995. 
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Although the national average number of dairy cows per holding can be a useful 
indicator of the scale of production, the figures can hide potentially significant 
variations in the size of holdings. Therefore it can be useful to examine the extent to 
which dairy production takes place on larger holdings. Table 2.4 presents data for the 
EU 15 on the proportion of dairy holdings with more than dairy 100 cows as well as 
the proportion of dairy cows kept on these holdings. The data indicates that in both 
categories the percentage distributions have increased in all Member States. The 
Member States with the largest proportion of herds with at least 100 dairy cows in 
2005 are Denmark (38 per cent) and the UK (28 per cent) followed the Netherlands 
(11 per cent). The increase is Denmark is notable for having risen from 2 per cent in 
1990 (the same as Ireland) to 38 per cent in 2005 (compared with 5 per cent in 
Ireland). The Member States with the fewest holdings of this scale in 2005 include 
Austria (<1 per cent), Finland (<1 per cent), France (1 per cent), Greece (2 per cent), 
Luxembourg (2 per cent), Portugal (2 per cent), and Spain (3 per cent). Austria and 
Finland are notable for having had no holdings with more than 100 dairy cows in 
1995, whilst in Luxembourg the same was true in 1990.  
    
Table 2.4 Share of dairy holdings and dairy cows on holdings with more 
than 100 cows in the EU 15 (1990-2005)  
Share of dairy holdings  
with > 100 cows (%) 
Share of dairy cows  
on holdings with > 100 cows (%) Member State 
1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Austria  0 <1 <1  0 <1 <1 
Belgium <1 1 2 2 3 5 6 7 
Denmark 2 4 12 38 7 13 27 66 
Finland  0 <1 <1  0 <1 1 
France <1 <1 <1 1 1 3 3 4 
Germany 1 2 3 4 22 19 21 26 
Greece <1 <1 1 2 4 5 14 18 
Ireland 2 2 3 5 8 11 11 13 
Italy 1 3 4 7 17 26 31 39 
Luxembourg 0 <1 2 2 0 2 4 7 
Netherlands 3 4 6 11 10 13 16 25 
Portugal <1 <1 <1 2 6 8 14 21 
Spain <1 <1 2 3 7 12 15 22 
Sweden  1 2 7  7 11 25 
United Kingdom 18 20 25 28 42 45 53 58 
Source: Adapted and updated from OECD (2004) using data from Eurostat. 
 
2.2.3 Regional distribution of dairy cows and holdings 
Nearly 85 per cent of the EU 15’s milk production and dairy cows can be found in the 
seven Member States8 in which case studies were conducted as part of this study. A 
detailed summary of data indicating regional structural changes within these Member 
States in relation to average number of dairy cows, number of dairy holdings, and 
                                                 
8 Case studies were conducted as part of this study in France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain, and the UK with regional analysis in Auvergne and Brittany, Bavaria, Emilia-Romagna, Galicia 
and the Southwest of England. 
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number of dairy cows per holding is included in Annex 2. Data are for selected 
regions within these Member States and cover the period between 1990 and 2005. A 
brief summary of the keys points is highlighted below. 
 
In France the regional distribution of dairy cows does not appear to have changed 
significantly between 1990 and 1995. In terms of regional shares of dairy holdings 
there are some differences though, with some regions gaining slightly (Pays de la 
Loire, Auvergne) and some losing slightly (Lower Normandy, Rhône-Alpes). The 
largest region, in terms of dairy production (Brittany), appears to have maintained 
both its share of dairy cows and dairy holdings during this period. Average herd sizes 
in the more extensive dairy regions (Auvergne and Rhône-Alpes) are consistently 
below those found in regions typically associated with more intensive production 
methods. 
 
In Ireland there is a clear difference between the relatively productive areas in the 
South and East, and the rest of country where the majority of the LFA is located. No 
changes in the distribution of dairy cow numbers occurred between 2000 and 2005, 
although the rate of increase in herd sizes was quicker in the Border, Midlands and 
Western regions (albeit from a lower base) resulting in a decreased share of national 
holdings.   
 
In Germany the distribution of dairy cows between the main production regions does 
not change much between 1990 and 2005. However, variations between regions in the 
structure of dairy holdings alter over this period, notably with respect to Bavaria 
where the rate of increase in herd size is significantly slower than in other regions. 
Subsequently, the divergence between regions with larger average herd sizes, such as 
Lower Saxony, and those with smaller average herd sizes, such as Bavaria, has 
become more pronounced.  
 
In Italy significant changes in the regional distribution of dairy cows have taken place 
in Lombardy (mainly before and after 1995), Veneto (-2 per cent), and Campania (+6 
per cent). Regional shares of both dairy cows and holdings have remained stable in 
Emilia Romagna. In terms of share of holdings, Lombardy gained significantly (+4 
per cent), whilst Veneto lost regional share (-4 per cent). The largest holdings on 
average are located in Lombardy and all regions have experienced significant 
increases in herd size, but have been particularly pronounced in regions where herd 
sizes were relatively low in 1990 i.e. Campania and to a lesser extent Veneto. 
 
In Spain the national share of dairy cows in Galicia increased from 30 per cent in 
1990 to 39 per cent in 2005. Average holding sizes in Galicia remained below the 
national average during this period and are amongst the lowest in the seven case study 
Member States.  
 
In the Netherlands the dairy herd is relatively evenly distributed between the four 
regions, with the highest regional share of dairy cows in the East and the lowest in the 
South and the West. Between 1990 and 2005 the North experienced significant (3 per 
cent) increases in both the share of dairy cow and holding numbers, mainly at the 
expense of the South and to a lesser extent the East. The largest herd sizes are located 
in the North.     
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In the UK the main dairy production is the South West of England accounting for 
nearly a quarter of the UK dairy herd and number of holdings. Dairy production in the 
UK has consistently moved to west with increases in the proportion of dairy cow 
numbers between 1990 and 2005 in Scotland (+1 per cent), Wales (+2 per cent) and 
most noticeably Northern Ireland (+4 per cent), but not in the South West of England 
(- 2 per cent). Dairy holdings in Northern Ireland are significant smaller on average 
than in the rest of the UK. The largest holdings on average can be found in Scotland 
followed by England. 
 
2.2.4 Regional distribution of dairy production systems 
There is a significant amount of variation in dairy production systems in the EU 15 
from predominantly grass based systems to systems where cereals and maize account 
for a significant proportion of feed produced on the holding or bought in. CEAS et al 
(2000) identify ten types of dairy production (summarised in Table 2.5), classified 
according to their geographical location, input intensity (high/low input/output) and 
feed resources (such as semi-natural pastures, permanent and temporary grassland, 
crops and grain mixed, crops and grain maize, and relative importance of grazing). 
The types of dairy production identified by CEAS et al (2000) can be grouped as 
follows: 
 
• grassland (temporary and permanent) based systems (‘intensive grassland’, 
‘permanent grassland lowland’, and ‘permanent grassland mountain’); 
• production based on grazing of semi-natural pastures (‘transhumant’); 
• mixed cropping systems (‘conventional mixed’, ‘low-input and organic        
mixed’, and ‘Mediterranean mixed’); 
• maize based production systems (‘intensive maize silage’); and  
• limited-grazing systems (‘industrial’ and ‘Mediterranean commercial’). 
 
At the end of the 1990s, CEAS et al (2000) estimated that three types of dairy 
production were responsible for about 77 per cent of milk production in the EU 15 – 
‘intensive grassland’ (64 per cent), ‘conventional mixed’ (10 per cent) and ‘intensive 
maize silage’ (7 per cent). However, they noted that some of the smaller categories of 
production, such as permanent grassland (lowland and mountain), low-input and 
organic mixed and Mediterranean mixed, although responsible for only about 5 per 
cent, 4 per cent, 3 per cent and 1 per cent of milk production respectively, were 
potentially important for their environmental value. Table 2.5 summarises the main 
features of these production systems, and indicates the EU regions where they 
predominate. 
 
It was not possible to update the CEAS et al figures for this study due to the complex 
data requirements needed to do so. However, it is clear that the three main production 
categories outlined above, namely ‘intensive grassland’, ‘conventional mixed’ and 
‘intensive maize silage’, will still account for the majority of milk production in the 
EU 15, possibly with an increased share since 2000. ‘Industrial’ and ‘Mediterranean 
commercial’ are also likely to have retained or increased their share of milk 
production. Share of milk production attributed to more extensive systems such as 
‘transhumant’, ‘permanent grassland mountain’ and ‘Mediterranean mixed’ (see Table 
2.5) is likely to have declined or, at best, been maintained since 2000. 
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Table 2.5 CEAS et al typology of dairy production systems in the EU 15 based on the situation in 2000 
Production system Location (main regions) Forage and Feed system  Comments 
Intensive 
grassland 
 
Estimated share of 
milk production: 
64% 
Netherlands, SW England and SW Scotland, 
Western France (e.g., La Mayenne), Sweden 
and Finland, North Spain, parts of the Azores. 
Main winter fodder: grass silage/cereals/ 
beet/maize silage 
Feeding system: more than 60% of the farmland 
is grass and crops. Concentrate use can exceed 
1,500kg/cow/year. 
Relatively high input/output  
Wetter and cooler parts of the Continental and 
Atlantic regions where conditions are poor for 
maize cultivation, and in the Boreal 
(Scandinavian) zone, Holstein-Friesian breeds;  
Permanent 
grassland lowland 
 
Estimated share of 
milk production: 
5% 
Northern and eastern France, Ireland, north and 
west of UK, parts of the Azores 
Main winter fodder: grass silage/hay/cereals/ 
maize silage 
Feeding system: mostly permanent grassland. 
Cereals occupy less than 30% of UAA often in 
rotation with maize, wheat and brassicas. Some 
concentrate use. 
Relatively low input/output 
Summer grazing. in Atlantic regions, Holstein-
Friesian breeds; . 
Permanent 
grassland 
mountain   
 
Estimated share of 
milk production: 
4% 
In uplands, high plateaux and mountain 
foothills in the Atlantic, Continental and Alpine 
regions, for example, the Massif Central, 
Auvergne, the Black Forest and the foothills of 
the Alps, Pyrenees and Cantabrian mountains 
Main winter fodder: hay/grass silage 
Feeding system: virtually all grassland. 
Concentrate use on more intensive farms. 
Low input/output 
Alpine, Atlantic, Continental and Boreal 
regions. Red & White, regional and dual 
purpose breeds. 
 
Transhumant 
 
Estimated share of 
milk production: 
1% 
Mountain regions including Alps, Pyrenees, and 
Cantabrian mountains 
Main winter fodder: hay, restricted use of 
concentrate feeds and silage 
Feeding system: spring and autumn grazing in 
valley and mid altitude meadows, summer 
grazing of pasture on rotation. 
Very low input/output. 
Grazing in higher Alpine pastures in summer 
and housed in lower valleys in winter. Very low 
mineral and manure inputs, regional breeds. 
Conventional 
mixed 
 
Estimated share of 
milk production: 
10% 
Throughout the lowlands of the Atlantic and 
Continental regions including Denmark, UK, 
Western Germany. 
Main winter fodder: grass and arable 
silage/cereals/beet 
Feeding system: rotational arable cropping with 
cereals, fodder beets and cash crops in 
combination with temporary grassland but 
limited area of permanent pasture. Variable use 
of concentrates. 
Relatively high input/output  
Throughout the lowlands of the Atlantic and 
Continental regions where soils make crop 
cultivation viable but where temperature 
restricts intensive maize cultivation. Holstein-
Friesian breeds. 
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Production system Location (main regions) Forage and Feed system  Comments 
Low-input and 
organic        mixed 
 
Estimated share of 
milk production: 
3% 
Throughout the lowlands of the Atlantic and 
Continental regions including Denmark, UK, 
Western Germany. 
Main winter fodder: grass and arable 
silage/cereals/beet. 
Feeding system: based on rotational arable 
cropping system with similar areas of 
permanent and temporary grassland. Greater use 
of rapeseed cake and grain due to concentrate 
restrictions. 
Relatively low input/output  
Throughout the lowlands of the Atlantic and 
Continental regions wherever conventional 
mixed cropping systems occur. No mineral 
inputs; Jersey, Guernsey, Red & White, breeds 
in addition to Holstein-Friesian. 
 
Mediterranean 
mixed 
 
Estimated share of 
milk production: 
1% 
Wetter parts of northern Portugal, the less 
fertile and arid areas of Spain, southern Italy 
and Greece. 
Main winter fodder: cereals (rye, maize, oats, 
triticale, lucerne)/dryland rye grass silage and 
hay. 
Feeding system: grazed on poor pastures and 
stubbles, low concentrate use (300-
600kgs/cow/year) combined with 
supplementary green fodder. 
Small-scale, low input/output. 
Occurs where irrigated maize cultivation is not 
possible. Wide variety of breeds. 
 
Intensive maize 
silage 
 
Estimated share of 
milk production: 
7% 
Includes parts of western France, south-west 
France, northern Italy, the Rhine valley and 
some areas of southern England. More than 
45% of French output from this system (mostly 
in western France including Bretagne).  
Main winter fodder: maize silage. 
Feeding system: maize represents 25-60% UAA 
(sometimes more). Arable land not under maize 
is usually under rotational grass based on rye 
grass. Concentrate use typically 1,300-
1,800kg/cow/year. 
High input/output 
Lowland parts of the Atlantic and Continental 
regions where climate and soils favour the 
growing of early to semi-early maize. Farms 
where over 80% of the UAA is normally 
suitable for cultivation. Holstein-Friesian breeds. 
Industrial 
 
Estimated share of 
milk production: 
3% 
Germany (new Länder), North European 
lowlands (e.g. Netherlands and UK) 
Main winter fodder: maize silage and bi-
products. 
Feeding system: Zero grazing. Fed ration of 
concentrates, roughage and minerals. 
High input/output 
Housed units, detached from land with high 
concentrate use. Holstein-Friesian breeds;  
Mediterranean 
commercial 
 
Estimated share of 
milk production: 
4% 
Throughout the Mediterranean region: central 
and northern Greece, northern Italy, Spain and 
Portugal. 
Main winter fodder: maize silage/rye grass 
silage. 
Feeding system: grazed for less than 3 months 
(if at all). Irrigated maize silage and dry-land 
ryegrass. Large amounts of concentrates (over 
2,000kg/cow/year). 
High input/output 
Zero grazing, housed units with high concentrate 
use. Holstein-Friesian breeds.  
Source: Based on CEAS et al. (2000). Note: Figures for share of milk production are for indicative purposes only. 
 
Alliance Environnement: Evaluation of the Environmental Impacts of Milk Quotas  
Final Deliverable Report – 30/07/2008 
 13
2.2.5 Production in Less Favoured Areas (LFAs) 
A significant amount of dairy production in the EU 15 takes place in less favoured 
areas (LFAs) both within mountain areas (Article 18) and ‘Other’ LFAs (Article 19)9. 
Criteria for designating LFAs vary between Member States (IEEP 2006) with areas 
designated as mountain LFAs typically, but not exclusively, being subject to the 
greatest level of handicap (natural and socio-economic). In some Member States, 
areas with mountainous characteristics have been designated under Article 19 as 
‘Other’ LFAs (e.g. Germany and the UK).  
 
Member States characterised as having a high proportion of Mountain LFAs (Article 
18) include Greece, Italy, and Austria. Members States which have predominantly 
designated ‘other’ LFAs (Article 19) include Belgium, Germany, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, and the UK. The Netherlands and Denmark and Finland (partially) have 
designated their LFAs in relation to ‘specific handicaps’ (Article 20).  
 
In terms of proportion of utilised agricultural area (UAA) designated as LFA (under 
all four Articles), then the Member States with the highest designations of LFA10, not 
necessarily an indicator of greatest natural handicap, are Finland, Luxembourg,  
Portugal, Greece, Spain, and Austria. Other Member States with significant areas of 
LFA linked to dairy production include France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and the UK 
(in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales but not England). Denmark and the 
Netherlands are notable for having small proportions of UAA designated as LFA.   
 
It is worth noting that degrees of handicap may vary significantly within LFAs, with 
dairy holdings often located in the least marginal areas. In some Member States, such 
as the UK, dairy production is explicitly excluded from the eligibility criteria for LFA 
payments, with preference given to more extensive forms of production such as 
suckler cows or sheep rearing.  
 
Dairy production systems likely to occur in LFAs (as defined by CEAS et al; see 
Table 2.5) are ‘transhumant’ and ‘permanent grassland mountain’ and ‘Mediterranean 
mixed’. Localised environmental impacts (e.g. to soil and water resources and farm 
biodiversity) are likely to be positive where such systems result in the maintenance of 
traditional extensive grazing or cropping practices. However, where dairy production 
has become increasingly intensive over time, the potential for negative environmental 
impacts is likely to increase linked to the degree of natural handicap (i.e. fragility) of 
the LFA in question - more likely to be an issue for ‘permanent grassland mountain’ 
rather than ‘transhumant’ and ‘Mediterranean mixed’ systems (where LFA production 
remains consistent with criteria set out in Table 2.5).  
 
                                                 
9 Articles 18 and 19 as defined in Council Regulation 1257/1999. Classifications are also possible 
under Article 16 (areas subject to environmental restrictions) and 20 (areas affected by specific 
handicaps) are also possible but account for a much smaller proportion of LFA in the EU as a whole. 
This applies particularly to designations under Article 16 (IEEP 2006).  
10 Based on figures in ‘Evaluation Of The Less Favoured Area Measure In The 25 Member States Of 
The European Union’ (IEEP 2006).  
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In general, more intensive forms of production are unlikely to be associated with 
LFAs and this is reinforced by an EU wide trend for migration of dairy production 
from marginal to more productive areas both within regions and between regions 
(where permitted by national milk quota administration). Such migration is likely to 
contribute to an on-going decline in the share of milk production taking place in the 
LFAs, particular the most marginal parts.      
 
2.2.6 Trends in intensity 
In addition to significant variations in the scale of production between Member States 
there is also a great deal of variation in the intensity of production between Member 
States, between regions within Member States and sometimes even within regions. 
Milk yield per cow is a common indicator of production intensity with a generally 
positive correlation between inputs (i.e. feedstuffs, concentrates, etc), milk yield, and 
nitrogen excretions per cow (OECD 2004). Other potential indicators include number 
of dairy cows per forage hectare and milk production per forage hectare.  
 
Table 2.6 shows trends in milk yield per cow between 1990 and 2005. Increasing milk 
yields per cow have been observed in all EU 15 Member States over this period, with 
the highest annual increases observed in Spain (5.6 per cent), Austria (4.1 per cent), 
Greece (3.1 per cent), Portugal (3.1 per cent) and Italy (3.0 per cent). The lowest rates 
of annual increase have occurred in France (1.8 per cent), the UK (1 .7 per cent), the 
Netherlands (1.5 per cent) and Ireland (1.3 per cent). The highest milk yields per cow 
on average are found in Denmark, Finland, Netherlands and Sweden. In recent years 
average milk yields per cow have been lowest in Ireland followed by Greece and then 
Austria. In 1990 milk yields in Spain were the lowest in the EU but have increased 
rapidly since then.  
 
Table 2.6 Average milk yields per cow in the EU 15 (1990-2005) 
milk yield per cow (kg/cow) Member State 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Annual percentage change (%) 
1990-2005 
Austria  4,178 4,785 5,871 4.1 
Belgium 4,288 4,903 5,465 5,692 2.2 
Denmark 6,224 6,652 6,927 8,187 2.1 
Finland  6,231 6,749 7,825 2.6 
France 4,949 5,495 5,600 6,277 1.8 
Germany 4,787 5,483 6,034 6,784 2.8 
Greece 3,498 4,158 4,583 5,120 3.1 
Ireland 4,054 4,075 4,175 4,820 1.3 
Italy 4,036 4,830 5,349 5,824 3.0 
Luxembourg 4,795 5,527 5,933 6,761 2.7 
Netherlands 6,009 6,613 7,105 7,338 1.5 
Portugal 4,177 4,610 5,440 6,090 3.1 
Spain 3,600 4,532 5,010 6,607 5.6 
Sweden  6,863 7,494 8,383 2.2 
United Kingdom 5,366 5,746 5,933 6,719 1.7 
Source: Adapted and updated from OECD (2004) using data from Eurostat. 
Percentage annual change for Austria, Finland and Sweden is calculated for the period 1995-2005.  
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Table 2.7 give an indication of trends which have taken place in terms of the number 
of dairy cows per forage hectare between 1990 and 200011. The figures indicate a 
mixed picture, with increases in some Member States (for example Greece, Ireland, 
Italy and Spain) and declines in others (for example Austria, Denmark, Germany, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands). The highest numbers of dairy cows per forage 
hectare are found in Greece followed by Belgium and the Netherlands. The lowest 
stocking rates can be found in Austria, Finland, and Sweden.    
 
Table 2.7 Dairy cows per forage hectare in the EU 15 (1990-2000) 
Cows per forage hectare (cows/ha)Member State  
1990 1995 2000 
Annual percentage 
change 
1990-2000 
Austria   1.57 1.47 -1.3 
Belgium  4.06 4.05 3.89 -0.4 
Denmark  3.47 3.08 3.12 -1.0 
Finland   1.28 1.31 0.5 
France  1.71 1.76 1.77 0.4 
Germany  2.32 2.21 2.20 -0.5 
Greece  7.25 6.93 8.68 2.0 
Ireland  1.90 1.99 2.15 1.3 
Italy  2.61 3.13 3.10 1.9 
Luxembourg  2.01 1.88 1.83 -0.9 
Netherlands  3.98 3.79 3.44 -1.4 
Portugal  2.51 2.47 2.52 0.0 
Spain  2.37 2.38 2.79 1.8 
Sweden   1.38 1.40 0.3 
United Kingdom  2.11 2.10 2.16 0.2 
Source OECD (2004) using data from Eurostat. 
Annual percentage change for Austria, Finland and Sweden is calculated for the period 1995-2000.  
Note: Comparable data for a more a more recent year requested from Eurostat but unavailable. 
 
Table 2.8 provides a rough estimate of milk production per forage hectare between 
1990 and 200012. Increases can be observed in all Member States, albeit slight in 
Denmark and the Netherlands13 where average yields per forage hectare were already 
                                                 
11 Data from OECD (2004) provided for 1990-2000 based on multiplication of average milk yield per 
cow by the average number of dairy cows per forage hectare. Equivalent data from Eurostat on 
forage area not available for more recent years. 
12 Data from OECD (2004) provided for 1990-2000. Equivalent data from Eurostat on forage area not 
available for more recent years. 
13 The figures in Table 2.8 are shown in this report to provide an indicative picture of the relative 
intensity of production between Member States only. The figures provided for the Netherlands, 
Denmark and Belgium in particular have been disputed by national case study experts as being too 
high (as result of the method of calculation) and are not thought to represent the actual situation on 
the ground. The issue of national measures relating to milk production per hectare is discussed in 
Chapter 8.   
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high. Yields per forage hectare in Greece14 have consistently been the highest in the 
EU. The lowest yields per forage hectare can be observed in Austria, Finland, France, 
and Ireland. 
 
Table 2.8 Milk per forage hectare in the EU 15 (1990-2000) 
Milk per forage hectare 
(kg/ha) 
Member State 
1990 1995 2000 
Annual percentage change (%) 
1990-2000 
Austria  6,559 7,034 1.4 
Belgium 17,409 19,857 21,259 2.2 
Denmark 21,597 20,488 21,612 0.0 
Finland  7,976 8,841 2.2 
France 8,463 9,671 9,912 1.7 
Germany 11,106 12,117 13,275 2.0 
Greece 25,361 28,815 39,780 5.7 
Ireland 7,703 8,109 8,976 1.7 
Italy 10,534 15,118 16,582 5.7 
Luxembourg 9,638 10,391 10,857 1.3 
Netherlands 23,916 25,063 24,441 0.2 
Portugal 10,484 11,387 13,709 3.1 
Spain 8,532 10,786 13,978 6.4 
Sweden  9,471 10,492 2.2 
United 
Kingdom 
11,322 12,067 12,815 1.3 
Source: Adapted and updated from OECD (2004) using data from Eurostat. 
Percentage annual change for Austria, Finland and Sweden is calculated for the period 1995-2000.  
Note: Comparable data for a more a more recent year requested from Eurostat but unavailable. 
 
2.3 Dairy production in the 10 New Member States (NMS 10) 
With the generally liberal approach taken by the New Member States (NMS 10) to the 
implementation of milk quotas, and the opening up of these countries to free trade and 
market forces,  one might expect relatively unimpeded dairy sector restructuring to 
take place including:  
 
• Concentration of milk production with fewer, very small dairy farms and more,  
larger dairy farms; 
• Intensification of milk production, including fewer dairy cows and higher average 
yields;  
• Geographic concentration of milk production to the most competitive dairying 
areas (in terms of productivity, skills and markets). 
 
                                                 
14 This likely to be due to the prevalence of ‘Mediterranean commercial’ production systems as 
outlined in Table 2.5. The issue of whether common land is included within a farm’s forage area may 
also be relevant in some areas including ‘Mediterranean mixed’ production systems. 
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These changes are also likely to be supported by other key influences such as EU 
dairy hygiene regulation requirements, EU financial support for modernisation, the 
loss of labour from rural areas and increasing fuel and labour costs. 
 
Preliminary evidence gathered from DG Agriculture’s recent survey supports some of 
these trends for the two year period 2004/05 to 2006/07 (see Table 2.9). There has 
been an average 20 per cent reduction in the number of dairy farms in the NMS 10 
(excluding Malta) and an 8 per cent increase in milk production. The Baltic States all 
experienced a 20-30 per cent reduction in the number of dairy producers, although 
other countries experienced lesser decreases. The greatest increases in milk 
production occurred in Latvia and Lithuania. 
 
Table 2.9 Milk producers and production structure in the NMS 10 
* Slovenia figures relate to 2005/6 
Na = data not available 
Source: EC Survey of Member States 2007 
 
The restructuring of production can also be seen from trends in quota size15. In 
2004/5, 89 per cent of milk producers in the NMS 10 (excluding Malta) held quota of 
under 50 tons, 6.7 per cent had 50-100 tons, and 2.6 per cent had 100-200 tons. Two 
years later, in 2006/7, 84 per cent of milk producers in the EU 10 (excluding Malta) 
held quota of under 50 tons, 9.5 per cent had 50-100 tons, and 4.2 per cent had 100-
200 tons. These averages hide considerable variation. Over 95 per cent of dairy farms 
in Lithuania have under 50 tons of milk quota, compared to 6.4 per cent in Slovakia 
and 81 per cent in Poland (the NMS 10’s largest milk producer). By contrast, almost 
50 per cent of Slovakia’s dairy farms and 30 per cent of the Czech Republic’s dairy 
farms have quotas of over 1,000 tons (with some having 10,000 tons and more); the 
proportions in this largest size category have increased over the past three years. 
 
Despite recent changes, the structure of milk producing farms in many of the NMS 10 
countries is very fragmented, with a large proportion of small farms which 
individually produce insignificant amounts of milk. Most national authorities are 
                                                 
15 Figures based on data obtained from Member State responses to a questionnaire submitted by DG 
Agri. 
Milk producers Milk Production (tons)  Member 
States 2004/5 2006/7 
Percentage change 
(%)2004/5-2006/7 2004/5 2006/7 
Percentage 
change (%) 
2004/5-2006/7 
Cyprus 241 224 -7.1 150,198 150,519 0.2 
Czech Rep.  2,982 2,727 -8.6 2,609,951 2,684,069 2.8 
Estonia 2,147 1,494 -30.4 529,651 600,427 13.4 
Hungary 6,422 8,014 24.8 1,480,625 1,597,994 7.9 
Latvia 31,269 23,756 -24.0 455,300 620,791 36.3 
Lithuania 119,949 85,096 -29.1 1,153,234 1,369,379 18.7 
Malta 150 152 1.3 41,872 41,237 -1.5 
Poland 311,113 255,786 -17.8 8,269,434 8,899,613 7.6 
Slovakia 814 729 -10.4 944,044 970,943 2.8 
Slovenia 10,060 9,598 -4.6 528,999 536,150 1.4 
Total 485,147 387,576 -20.1 16,163,308 17,471,122 8.1 
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seeking improvements in economic efficiency and expect that a number of costs, 
including feed and energy, will continue to grow. Strong co-operation between milk 
producers is starting to address the problem of fragmentation (which affects both 
production volumes and quality). Feedback from DG Agriculture’s survey also 
suggests that amalgamations between milk purchasers and processors are taking place 
on a significant scale, altering the structure of the sector. 
 
Dairy cow numbers in 2005 based on Eurostat data for the NMS 10 are shown in 
Table 2.10. Poland dominates with 60 per cent of dairy cows and 70 per cent of 
holdings. Lithuania is the next largest producer with 10 per cent of the NMS 10’s 
dairy herd and 17 per cent of holdings.  
 
Table 2.10 Dairy farm characteristics in the 10 New Member States (2005) 
Member State 
milk 
yield 
per 
cow 
number of  
dairy cows 
Number of  
dairy holdings 
Average number 
of dairy cows  
per holding 
Percentage 
of dairy  
holdings 
with  
> 100 cows 
(%) 
Percentage 
of dairy  
cows on  
holdings 
with  
> 100 cows 
(%) 
Cyprus 6,151 24,250 240 101.0 38 65 
Czech 
Republic 6,120 440,500 6,780 65.0 16 88 
Estonia 5,764 115,230 9,210 12.5 3 67 
Hungary 6,648 286,830 16,250 17.7 3 69 
Latvia 4,233 172,360 50,900 3.4 >1 17 
Lithuania 4,422 493,890 170,790 2.9 >1 9 
Malta 5,361 7,270 180 40.4 6 26 
Poland 4,291 2853,740 727,100 3.9 >1 6 
Slovakia 5,434 193,200 13,460 14.4 4 87 
Slovenia 5,408 130,680 19,710 6.6 >1 3 
EU 10  4,717,950 1,014,620 4.6   
Source: Eurostat 
Note: Average number of dairy cows per holding based on own calculations using Eurostat data. 
 
In terms of average herd size the largest herds are found in Cyprus (101) followed by 
Czech Republic (65), whilst the smallest in Lithuania (2.9) and Poland (3.9). The 
picture changes somewhat through, when looking at the percentage share of dairy 
cows held on holdings with more than 100 cows. In Slovakia, for example, 87 per 
cent of dairy cows are held on holdings with more than 100 dairy cows even though 
the average is less than 15 cows per holding. This reflects the relatively small number 
of very large holdings at one end of the scale and a large number of very small 
holdings at the other end. Other Member States where at least 65 per cent of dairy 
cows are kept on large holdings are Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, and Hungary.  
 
Average milk yields in the NMS 10 vary with three Member States exceeding 6,000 
kg per cow (Cyprus, Czech Republic, and Hungary). Member States with average 
milk yields of less than 4,500 kg per cow are Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.  
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Summary for the NMS 10  
• Milk production has increased since accession in 2004. 
• Concentration of production is occurring with a 20 per cent decrease in the total 
number of dairy farms over the short period of 2004/05 to 2006/07. Many of these 
will have been the smallest dairy farms. 
• Restructuring is resulting in fewer very small farms and more larger farms, or 
fewer of both types  
• Even so, 89 per cent of all dairy farms still produce less than 50 tons milk per year 
and the structure of dairy farming is still fragmented. Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic are unusual in having a significant proportion of very large farms.    
• The number of dairy cows has decreased by an average of 5 per cent over the 
period 2004-06. 
• Average milk yields are expected to have improved over 2004/06, although they 
are still likely to be well below EU averages. 
• Geographic concentration of production is likely to be occurring, particularly 
given readily available quota and relatively unrestricted national quota markets. 
Polish data provides some evidence of this. 
• However the quota system is only one influence on the development of dairy 
farming in the NMS 10. Other factors include free trade within the EU, new 
markets, the need to secure economic efficiencies, EU support for modernisation, 
EU dairy hygiene regulations, changing consumer requirement, loss of labour 
from the sector and increasing costs.  
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3 IMPLEMENTATION OF MILK QUOTAS IN THE EU 
3.1  The development of the milk quota system at EU level 
 
The EU milk quota system was introduced in 1984 and has been in operation by 
Member States ever since. Under the terms of the 2003 Mid-Term Review, the milk 
quota regime was extended until 2015. The main objective of the regime, in 
combination with price support measures to the dairy sector, is to regulate milk 
production below a specified reference quantity. In particular, milk quotas were 
intended to limit the substantial and increasing surplus of milk production which had 
existed prior to their introduction. For a summary of the events which led up to the 
introduction of milk quotas, please refer to the text box on the next page. 
 
Originally established for a five year period starting from 1984, the milk quota system 
was extended until 1992 as part of the ‘agricultural stabilisers’ package in April 1988, 
and extended further until the year 2000 as part of the 1992 CAP Reform. Under the 
Agenda 2000 reforms the system was extended until 2008 with a further extension 
granted under the 2003 Mid-Term Review until 2015.  
 
As part of the milk quota regime Member States are allocated national reference 
quantities which are set out in the Council Regulations. No transfers of quota can take 
place across national borders. The reference quantity is fixed for each Member State 
at a determined milk fat content. The national quota is then divided between deliveries 
and direct sales quota, although these can be converted on the basis of duly justified 
producer requests. For deliveries the fat content of actual deliveries is compared with 
the reference fat content and if a difference is observed then the producer’s delivery 
volume is adjusted to take account of this.  
 
Deliveries are measured against deliveries quota for the quota year which runs from 1 
April until 31 March during the following year. If milk deliveries in a Member State 
exceed national quota in a given quota 12 month period, taking into account 
adjustments made for fat content, then those individual producers who have overrun 
their individual quota are liable for a punitive levy (or superlevy). A similar process is 
operated in respect of direct sales, except there is no adjustment in respect of fat 
content. Calculation of the levy is made separately for deliveries and direct sales 
quota. 
 
The system of milk quotas has been reformed on several occasions since it was 
introduced in 1984. In particular a number of measures have been introduced in order 
to permit structural development and adjustment to take place within the dairy sector. 
Notably, rules permitting permanent transfers of milk quota with land to take place 
between producers were introduced shortly after the regime’s introduction. This was 
followed by the introduction of temporary transfers of quota between producers which 
were optional at Member State level. During the late 1980s a number of permanent 
cuts in national quota levels were introduced across the board. A major outcome of 
the 1992 CAP reforms was the potential for Member States to specify rules permitting 
the permanent transfer of milk quota without land.  An overview of key developments 
is provided  
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Table 3.1. 
 
Issues and proposals leading to the introduction of milk quotas in 1984 
 
Rising surpluses of EEC dairy products and budgetary costs first became evident in 
the late 1960s. In 1968 Sicco Mansholt, European Commissioner for Agriculture, first 
published proposals for CAP policy reform in what is commonly known as the 
Mansholt Plan. The main aim of this plan was to achieve a reduction in price support, 
accompanied by assistance to a large number of small farmers in what was still at that 
time the EEC-6 to leave the industry. Following opposition, the initial proposals in the 
Mansholt Plan were scaled down resulting in the implementation of three Directives 
in 1972 concerning the modernisation of agricultural holdings, the abandonment of 
farming and the training of farmers.  
 
Various steps were taken in the early 1980s to introduce measures to curb surpluses, 
such as co-responsibility levies and guarantee thresholds. In 1981 the EC introduced a 
system of maximum guarantee thresholds intended to operate in such a way that, 
should milk deliveries in any year exceed the (pre fixed) quantitative threshold, action 
would be triggered to offset the additional costs of the regime caused by the excess 
production. As early as 1983 the guarantee threshold was exceeded by 6.5 per cent. 
The reduction in intervention price for dairy products which should have been 
triggered by this surplus was estimated by the Commission to have been in the order 
of 12 per cent - too large to be politically feasible (Colman in Artis and Nixson, 
2007).  
 
There was debate in Member States about the use of quotas to curb milk production, 
as an alternative to reducing price support. At the end of March 1984, the decision 
was made to maintain the level of price support at its existing level and adopt a 
system of marketing quotas made effective by charging a very high tax, or super levy, 
on excess deliveries beyond the quota (Colman in Artis and Nixson, 2007).  
 
Initially, each Member State was allocated a national quota or ‘reference quantity’, set 
equal to its 1983 milk sales (deliveries and direct sales), plus 1 per cent. However, it 
possible for Member States to receive dispensation to use a different reference year’s 
milk sales, as happened in the UK where quota was based on 1981 milk sales on the 
basis that its 1983 production had been unusually low due to very poor weather 
conditions. Quotas were then allocated to individual farmers, again on the basis of 
their historical production levels (Colman in Artis and Nixson, 2007). 
 
 
 
Alliance Environnement: Evaluation of the Environmental Impacts of Milk Quotas  
Final Deliverable Report – 30/07/2008 
 22
Table 3.1 Developments of the EU Milk Quota System 
Period Measures: 
Milk quotas introduced16 − The milk quota system was introduced in 1984, initially for 5 years 
and then extended to 1992 
− Permanent transfer of milk quota with land introduced in 1985 
− Temporary transfer of quota permitted at Member State level from 
1986/87 
− 1988: 2% permanent cut in milk quota  
− 1989: 1% permanent cut in milk quota 
CAP Reform 199217 − Milk quotas extended until March 2000 
− Permanent transfer of quota without land (‘special transfers’) 
permitted at Member State level 
Agenda 2000 Reform18 
 
− Milk quotas extended until 2008 
− Increased milk quotas (IT, EL, ES, IE, NI for 2000/1 and 2001/2, 
other Member States by 1.5% from 2005/6 to 2007/8). 
2003 CAP Mid term 
Review19 
− Milk quotas extended until 2015; 
− Increases in milk quota scheduled for 2005 deferred to 2006. 
− Inactive producers no longer able to continue holding quota (Thomsen 
case) 
− Strict limits on temporary transfers 
 
 
Arrangements and rules for quota transfer vary considerably from one Member State 
to another. Figure 3.1 below shows a diagram of the intervention logic for the milk 
quota system. 
 
                                                 
16 Council Regulation (EEC) No 856/84 of 31 March 1984 amending Regulation (EEC) No 804/68 on 
the common organisation of the market in milk and milk products 
17 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 of 28 December 1992 establishing an additional levy in the 
milk and milk products sector 
18 Council Regulation (EC) No 1256/1999 of 17 May 1999 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 
establishing an additional levy in the milk and milk products sector 
19 Council Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003 of 29 September 2003 establishing a levy in the milk and 
milk products sector 
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Figure 3.1 Intervention logic for milk quota system 
  
3.2 Overview of rules for allocation and transfer of milk quota 
Member States are able to determine rules for the allocation and transfer of milk quota 
according to the framework set out in EU legislation. The current system is defined by 
Council Regulation (EC) Regulation 1234/200720 which recently replaced Regulation 
1788/2003. A brief summary of the main aspects of the legislation relevant to this 
evaluation study is provided below.  
Transfers of quota with land 
Permanent transfers of milk quota with land have been permitted since the early days 
of the milk quota system. Under current legislation permanent transfers of quota are 
permitted under Article 74 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 (previously 
Article 17 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003 and Article 7 of Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92). Transfers take place between producers when land, to 
which quota is attached, is sold, leased, or inherited in accordance with detailed rules 
determined at Member State level. Under Article 74(2) Member States may decide 
that quota transferred by means of a rural lease is not transferred with the holding in 
order to ensure that reference quantities are solely attributed to producers.  
Permanent transfers of quota without land  
Permanent transfers of quota without land (referred to as ‘Special Transfers’ in the 
legislation) were first permitted at Member State level in 1987 and subsequently 
expanded in 1993 under Article 8 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 and 
Article 18 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003. Under current legislation such 
transfers are permitted under Article 75 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007. 
                                                 
20 Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of 
agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (Single CMO 
Regulation). 
MILK and DAIRY- QUOTA SYSTEM
 Measures General objectives 
Long-term/diffuse effects 
Intermediate objectives 
Medium-term results 
Specific objectives 
Short-term results 
Operational objectives 
What  is directly produced/supplied? 
National 
Reference 
quantity 
Additional 
levy  
Quota 
transfer  
Limit 
production 
Improve Market 
stability 
Insuring 
adequate farm 
revenue 
Utilisation of 
available 
quota 
Rigidity 
reduction and 
structural 
improvement 
More 
stable milk 
prices 
Decrease 
surplus 
Keep supply at  
predictable 
level 
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Member States are able to determine detailed rules aimed at ‘successfully 
restructuring milk production or improving the environment’. The following 
possibilities are permitted: 
 
• Abandonment programmes whereby producers, who abandon milk 
production permanently, receive financial compensation for their quota, which 
is then redistributed to other producers via the national reserve; 
• Reallocation of quota to specific producers in return for payment by them 
equal to compensation to those producers who have released the quota; 
objective criteria for such reallocations may be determined by national 
administrations; 
• Centralised transfers of reference quantities without land e.g. via a quota 
exchange (national or regional); 
• Permanent transfer of quota without land with the aim of improving the 
structure of milk production within regions or collection areas; 
• Permanent transfer of quota without land with the aim of improving the 
structure of milk production at the level of the holding or to allow for 
extensification of production; and 
• Permanent transfers without land with a view to improving the environment. 
 
Such transfers may take place via a variety of administrative and market-based 
mechanisms including private sales and quota exchanges. Member States are able to 
determine whether transfers take place at national, regional or purchaser level and 
whether transfers are continuous or periodic.  
Temporary transfers of quota without land 
Temporary transfers of quota without associated land are permitted under Article 73 
of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 (previously Article 16 of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003 and Article 6 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3950/92). Member States have been able to authorise temporary transfers of part of an 
individual producer’s unused reference quantity in a given quota year since at least 
1987. Members States are able to regulate transfers to certain groups of producers, 
and can limit transfers to the level of the purchaser or within regions and can 
determine to what extent the transferor can repeat transfer operations. Transfers may 
take place via an administrative or a market based mechanism (e.g. leasing).  
 
A Member State may decide not to permit temporary transfers of quota in order to 
facilitate structural changes and adjustments, or on the basis of overriding 
administrative needs. The extent to which quota holders can transfer their quotas to 
other producers has changed over the duration of the regime. Between 1993 and 2003 
it was possible for Member States to allow quota holders to repeatedly transfer their 
entire quota, whereas the changes introduced in 2003 limit such transfers to part of a 
producer’s quota, although entire quotas can be temporarily transferred without land 
in circumstances of force majeure. 
 
Accordingly in some Member States, the use of the National Reserve both in the 
acquisition and allocation of quota is central to the quota mobility and restructuring 
process. 
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National Reserve 
Member States are obliged to set up a national reserve and determine rules for the 
allocation of milk quota to producers according to objective criteria under Articles 71 
and 68 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 respectively (previously Articles 7 
and 14 of Council Regulation (EC) 1788/2003). National reserves are fed by: 
• National allocations from the EU, such as those linked to the Agenda 2000 
reforms; and subsequently to 2003 reform 
• Confiscation of quota from inactive producers (complete inactivity). 
 
In addition, Member States can add quota to the reserve through the application of 
discretionary powers relating to: 
• Quota purchased through abandonment or buying programmes; 
• The application of an across-the-board linear reduction to all producers’ 
individual reference quantities; 
• The application of a siphon or ‘clawback’ to permanent transfers with or 
without land; and 
• Confiscation of quota from inactive producers (partial inactivity); 
 
Member States have significant discretion available to them as regards the way in 
which they manage quota in the national reserve. In some Member States, quota in the 
national reserve is kept to a minimum, and allocated in very limited situations. In 
other Member States a policy of actively acquiring quota for redistribution through 
the national reserve is pursued (through the optional methods referred to above). The 
quota is then reallocated to producers on the basis of specified objective criteria. 
Quota is not sold from the reserve, but such allocations result in an indirect transfer of 
quota without land.     
Siphons or ‘clawback’ 
Member States are able to retain part of a quota transfer (with or without land), on the 
basis of objective criteria, under Article 76 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 
(previously Article 19 of Council Regulation (EC) 1788/2003). Quota which is 
‘siphoned off’ in this way is permanently lost by both parties to the transfer and is 
transferred to the national reserve. Member States can vary siphon rates in order to 
encourage or discourage certain types of quota mobility. For example, higher rates 
can be applied to transfers out of regions, whilst lower rates might be applied to 
transfers to certain groups of producers, such as young producers, etc. 
Inactive producers 
As referred to in the previous section quota can be confiscated from producers on the 
basis of inactivity. Under Article 72 (1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 
(previously Article 15 (1) of Council Regulation (EC) 1788/2003), when a quota 
holder ceases production during a twelve-month period, the quota is transferred to the 
national reserve. However, if the quota holder restarts production within a certain 
period (up to two years following confiscation of the quota), then all or part of the 
confiscated quota is returned. Quota may not be confiscated in recognised cases of 
force majeure. Following the Thomsen ruling at the European Court of Justice in 
2002, it has not been possible for Member States to allow non-producing quota 
holders (NPQHs) to retain quota and lease it indefinitely to active producers. 
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In addition, Member States have the option of applying Article 72 (2) of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 which relates to partial inactivity (previously Article 
15 (2) of Council Regulation (EC) 1788/2003). If a quota holder’s production is less 
than 70 per cent, relative to quota held in a given a year, then a Member State may 
decide to confiscate unused quota to the national reserve. Member States may then 
determine on what conditions a reference quantity shall be reallocated to the producer 
concerned should they resume production. 
 
There can be an important relationship between choices made by producers in relation 
to national rules for quota inactivity and temporary transfers (see above). The 
temporary transfer of a substantial proportion of a producer’s quota can reduce the 
lessor’s delivery rate to the level at which they may be designated as partially inactive 
and thus risk the loss of quota to the national reserve. 
Reallocation of unused quota 
In the event that an individual producer exceeds their quota then a levy will be paid, 
unless a Member State chooses to temporarily reallocate unused quota under Article 
80 (3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 (previously Article 10 (3) of 
Council Regulation (EC) 1788/2003). In the event that national production exceeds 
quota in a given reference year, then those individual producers who exceed their 
quota will be subject to a levy, although this may be offset to a degree, on the basis of 
objective criteria, by temporary reallocations of unused quota originating from 
individual producers whose production did not exceed their reference quantity. 
Temporary reallocations may take place either at national level or at producer group 
level and then subsequently at national level. 
 
Furthermore, when the contribution collected is higher than the total levy due, 
Member States are able to temporarily redistribute the excess quota in respect of that 
quota year to producers who fall within specified priority categories or to producers 
who are affected by an exceptional situation unconnected to the milk quota regime 
according to Article 84 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007. Alternatively 
Member States may use some, or all, of the levy to finance abandonment 
programmes, where these have been implemented.  
 
3.3 Implementation of milk quotas at Member State level 
The following sections set out the ways in which Member States have applied the 
various options for the transfer and allocation of milk quota as set out in the previous 
section. An overall summary of application can be found at the end of this chapter. 
Detailed tables of milk quota implementation for the EU 25 are included in Annex 3 - 
Annex 7 of this report. 
 
Information on the implementation of milk quotas in different Member States is 
provided from two primary sources. Firstly, from national reports undertaken in seven 
case study Member States21, and secondly, from responses to a questionnaire sent to 
administrations by DG Agriculture in 2007. 
                                                 
21 France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK.  
Alliance Environnement: Evaluation of the Environmental Impacts of Milk Quotas  
Final Deliverable Report – 30/07/2008 
 27
3.3.1 Transfers of quota with land (including rural leases) 
Several Member States specify limits to the amount of quota which may be 
transferred per hectare of land including Belgium (20,000 kg per forage hectare), 
Denmark (10,000 kg until 2002), Finland (12,000 litres per hectare including transfer 
of arable land), and the Netherlands (20,000 kg).  
 
Rules favouring certain priority groups of producers, such as transfers between 
relatives and married couples, are specified in Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, and Ireland. In the Netherlands transfers to family members are not subject to 
the 20,000 kg per hectare limit. In the remaining eight EU 15 Member States there do 
not appear to be rules to prioritise transfers with land between specific groups.  
 
In a number of Member States, a siphon has been used to deduct a fixed proportion of 
quota when transferred permanently with land, with the siphoned quota being made 
available to the national reserve for administrative redistribution. Siphons have been 
applied at rates ranging from 5 per cent in Greece to 50 per cent in France22. In 
Denmark a 50 per cent siphon applies to transfers with land, whilst in Portugal a 7.5 
per cent siphon, is applied except to transfers out of Nitrate Vulnerable Zones 
(NVZs), in which case no siphon is applied. In Germany a 30 per cent siphon was 
operated on transfers greater than 350,000 tons until 1993, whilst in Ireland a 
clawback of up to 20 per cent was in operation until 2000.  It should be noted, 
however, that in Ireland various exemptions existed such as transfers between family 
members, transfers to young producers or producers in the LFA. 
 
In several Member States reference is made regional restrictions which prevent 
transfers of quota with land between producers based in different regions. In Belgium, 
for example, no transfers can take place between holdings more than 30 km apart or 
between Wallonia and Flanders. In Germany transfers were not possible between 
producers based in different Länder or Regierungsbezirke23 until 2007, whilst in 
Finland seven trading regions are specified. In Ireland producers in the LFA have not 
been able to transfer quota with land to holdings located more than 48 km away since 
1995. In Portugal, preference is given to transfers out of Nitrate Vulnerable Zones 
(NVZs). In the UK ring-fenced quota transfer areas in the Scottish Islands have been 
in operation since 1994. Prior to this quota transfers with land were not permitted 
between five large regions24, based on the now disbanded Milk Marketing Boards.  
 
Rural leasing arrangements of quota with land have been a common feature of 
transfers with land in some Member States. Specific arrangements include: minimum 
six year leases for arable land attached to quota (Finland), long term land and lease 
arrangements (common in the late 1980s and 1990s in Ireland), leasing of land for one 
year before purchase (since 1989 until 2007 in the Netherlands), whilst in the UK a 
stipulation exists that quota must be transferred to the new occupiers unless the lease 
                                                 
22 10% clawback is normal, although regional rules apply. An additional siphon of up to 40% may be 
applied to larger producers.   
23 A Regierungsbezirk is a type of government region in Germany which occurs within certain Länder. 
24 One region covering the whole of England and Wales; one region covering Northern Ireland; and 
three in Scotland. 
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is less than a specified period of time25. In Germany ‘old land lease contracts’ entered 
into before 1984 have implications for quota ownership and transfers.  
Situation in the 10 New Member States  
• No permanent transfers of milk quota with land are permitted in Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic or Latvia (subject to likely future rules in respect of early 
retirement);  
• Permanent transfers of milk quota with land are permitted in Estonia, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Slovenia and Slovakia, subject to various conditions. These include 
retention of quota for a specified period prior to transfer (Estonia, Hungary and 
Lithuania), limits on the amount of quota transferred per hectare (Lithuania (10 
tons per hectare) and Slovenia (15 tons per hectare), and transfer only to new 
producer/owner with land (Slovakia); 
• Land and quota leasing is permitted in Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia. 
3.3.2 Permanent transfer of quota without land  
Member States first had the option of introducing permanent transfers without land 
under Council Regulations in 1987. Direct transfers without land between producers 
at a market price, determined via negotiations between buyers and sellers, have been 
permitted during at least a part of the evaluation period of this study in a number of 
Member States including: Austria, Belgium (Flanders), Germany26, Greece, Spain, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden  and the UK.  
 
Permanent transfers of quota without land via centralised quota exchanges have been 
operated in Denmark (since 1997), Germany (since 2000), and Ireland (since 
2007/08). Sales at quota exchanges usually take place by auction with bids being 
made on fixed dates.  
 
Some Member States operate hybrid systems which allow part of the quota to be sold 
at a market price, and the other part to be sold at an administratively determined price. 
In Finland, 50 per cent of available quota is transferred directly between producers at 
market prices and 50 per cent via the administration at a nationally determined price. 
In Ireland the quota exchange is administered through the Milk Quota Trading 
Scheme which allows producers to sell 70 per cent of quota via the quota exchange at 
market prices, provided the other 30 per cent is sold at an administratively determined 
price to priority groups. In Belgium, 40 per cent of the quota is sold into a quota fund 
for sale at the same price to producers according to their priority status and the 
remaining 60 per cent of the quota is sold at a price negotiated between the buyer and 
seller. Some transfers are exempt from the 40 per cent condition. In Flanders free 
market transfers were permitted until 1996. 
 
Administrative mechanisms which facilitate permanent transfers of quota without land 
have been operated in a number of Member States including Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland (see above) France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, and Spain. Restructuring 
                                                 
25 8 months (Scotland), 10 months (England and Wales), or 12 months (Northern Ireland).  
26 Direct transfers of quota without land have been very limited since the introduction of quota 
exchanges in 2000 and are only allowed in cases of transfers of whole farms or parts thereof, 
between direct relatives, and by inheritance.  
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programmes have been operated in Denmark (1989-1997), Germany (early 1990s 
with the objective of reducing the amount of national excess quota) and Ireland (1988-
2006).  
 
Abandonment programmes, whereby producers abandoning milk production are 
compensated by the administration were EU financed between 1986 and 1992, 
primarily to reduce total quota but with part made available for reallocation to other 
priority producers via the national reserve. Other abandonment programmes have 
been operated in France (throughout the evaluation period via ACAL27 programmes), 
Italy and Spain (since the 1990s with distribution via the national Quota Fund and 
National Quota Bank since 2003). In France an administrative mechanism allowing 
resale of quota to other producers within the same Département has been in place 
alongside the ACAL programmes since 2006.  
Geographical restrictions 
In several Member States, no or minimal, restrictions have been applied on the 
regional movement of permanent transfers of quota with land. These include Austria 
(with the exception of alpine pastures) Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, and 
Portugal (except for transfers into Nitrate Vulnerable Zones) and the UK (with the 
exception of ring-fenced regions in the Scottish Islands which account for a very 
small proportion of UK milk production).  
 
In contrast, restrictions preventing the mobility of quota between regions have been 
implemented in Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain and 
Sweden. In Belgium no transfers are permitted between Flanders and Wallonia or 
more than 30 km zone from a holding. In France transfers between Départements are 
not permitted, although in principle up to 20 per cent of the national reserve 
allocations may be managed at national level. In Germany transfers were not 
permitted between Länder28 until 2007, when two trading zones were established 
(‘East’ and ‘West’).  In Finland and Sweden transfers are restricted to seven and two 
trading areas respectively.  
 
In Ireland, permanent transfers of quota without land can only take place within 
individual milk purchaser pools. Restrictions at purchaser level also apply in 
Luxembourg. In Italy transfers between regions or autonomous provinces were not 
permitted until 2003. Since then transfers of quota out of mountain regions and LFAs 
have been ring-fenced, whilst transfers between lowland holdings are subject to a 
limit of 70 per cent of a holding’s quota. In Spain, there has been a requirement since 
1998 for producers to demonstrate that the transfers between regions will improve 
production structures or extensify production29. Between 1998 and 2003 transfers out 
of the LFA into another administrative region were subject to restrictions. 
                                                 
27 Aide à la Cessation de l'Activité Laitière. 
28   Regierungsbezirke in Lower Saxony (1993-96), Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg. 
29 Extensification of production required a stocking density of less than two livestock units per forage 
hectare. The requirement was dropped in 2003.  
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Other conditions relating to quota transfers 
Per hectare limits of quota applying to the recipient holding have been specified in 
Belgium (20,000 litres30), Finland (12,000 litres), Italy (30 tons per hectare of UAA), 
Luxembourg (12,000kg per forage hectare), the Netherlands (20,000kg), Sweden 
(16,000kg per arable hectare for large holdings, previously 12,000kg). In the UK a 
recommended limit of 20,000 litres per hectare has been set.  
 
Several Member States or regions have applied minimum or maximum limits to the 
amount of quota which can be transferred including: Denmark (the maximum of 
300,000 kg per one man farm was lifted in 2005), Greece (minimum of five tons), 
Spain (minimum of 50,000 kg), Finland (minimum of 15,000 litres for administrative 
transfers, maximum of 78,000-117,000 litres for private transfers), and Ireland 
(maximum of 60,000 litres from 2007). A maximum limit of 800,000 kg is set on the 
buying producer's new total quota in the Flanders region of Belgium. In the 
Netherlands a producer may only acquire an additional 10 per cent of quota, unless he 
can prove that the holding will remain within the 20,000 kg per hectare limit.   
 
Deductions to the national reserve through siphon mechanisms have been applied to 
permanent transfers without land in the following Member States: Denmark (1 per 
cent); Germany (5-15 per cent deduction for unsuccessful quota exchange bids 2000-
2002), Greece (5 per cent deduction), France (10 per cent, higher rate for larger 
holdings), Luxembourg (15 per cent deduction except to relatives or other certain 
transfers), and Portugal (7.5 per cent except to relatives or other specific transfers). 
 
In several Member States, priority groups have been specified in terms of quota 
transfers without land including: Belgium, Finland, Ireland, and Spain. In Belgium, 
young farmers receive up to 50 per cent of quota allocations.  In Finland, producers 
with spare capacity and ‘other’ producers, including organic or rare breeds, are 
guaranteed up to 50 per cent of administrative allocations at the expense of investing 
producers. In France, criteria for allocations of quota to specified groups are 
determined regionally but include young producers, small producers, producers with 
investment plans and producers undergoing financial difficulties. In Ireland, priority 
groups include young farmers, successors, small producers, and producers who have 
lost land and quota leases. In Spain these include young farmers, LFA holdings, and 
full-time producers. 
Situation in the 10 New Member States 
• The majority of the NMS 10 operates a market based system for permanent 
transfers of quota without land, with prices fixed privately between buyer and 
seller (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia). Lithuania has 
recently launched a centralised quota auction.  Latvia also permits the sale of 
quota directly back into the national reserve. 
• Permanent transfers without land are also permitted on a market basis in Estonia 
(from 2006/7) and Slovakia, but only where cows are also being transferred from 
one producer to another. In Lithuania, quota may now only be transferred with 
cows, land and buildings.   
                                                 
30 Variation in units between litres, tons and kilograms are expressed in the original format provided in 
Member State responses to the questionnaire submitted by DG Agri. 
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• Permanent transfers of quota without land are subject to various conditions. These 
include a deduction to national reserves (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Lithuania), limits on the amount transferred based on cow numbers/yields 
(Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia), limits on the amount of quota transferred per 
hectare (Lithuania (10 tons per hectare). 
3.3.3 Temporary transfer of quota without land 
A number of Member States have chosen not to implement temporary transfers 
between producers during the evaluation period, including: Denmark, Greece, France, 
Luxembourg and Sweden. A number of other Member States do not currently permit 
temporary transfers but have allowed them during the evaluation period. For example, 
temporary transfers have not been permitted in Flanders since 2007, whilst in 
Germany temporary transfers have been limited to certain specific circumstances 
since 2000, having been first introduced with land in 1990 and without land in 1993. 
 
In some Member States temporary transfers have been in operation throughout the 
evaluation including Austria, the Netherlands, and the UK. Other Member States 
which currently operate temporary transfers include Spain (since 1994), Finland 
(since 2006), Ireland (since at least 1990), and Italy (since 1993). Temporary transfers 
are negotiated directly between producers in all Member States except Ireland where 
transfers take place via the administrative Temporary Leasing Scheme. 
Geographical restrictions 
Member States which have implemented restrictions on the regional movement of 
temporary transfers of quota include Belgium, Germany, Spain (1994-1998), Finland, 
and Italy (between non-‘homogeneous’ areas since 2003). In Ireland temporary 
transfers of quota operate at purchaser level and were of particular importance prior to 
the introduction of geographical restrictions linked to the LFAs in 1995. In the UK 
temporary transfers of quota were operated within five large Milk Marketing Board 
regions31 until 1994 but have been permitted throughout the UK since then (with the 
exception of minor ‘ring-fencing’ in the Scottish Islands). In the Netherlands there 
have never been any regional restrictions.  
Other conditions relating to temporary transfer of quotas  
A number of Member States have specified rules for minimum quantities of unused 
quota per transaction including Finland (10,000 litres), Spain (5,000 kg since 1998) 
and the Netherlands (10,000 kg). Limits on the maximum amount of quota transferred 
have been specified in Austria (up to 100,000 kg per holding in 2005; less in 
subsequent years), Belgium (20,000 litres) and Finland (12,000 litres per hectare of 
arable land).  
 
In some Member States limits have been specified on the percentage of quota which 
may be leased out by a holding. For example, in Spain a producer cannot lease out 
more than 25 per cent of quota for more than two consecutive years. Since 2004 
producers in the Netherlands have been unable to lease out more than 30 per cent of 
their quota in a given quota year. In Portugal, producers on the mainland cannot lease 
out more than 10 per cent of their quota or more than 30 per cent in the Azores. In 
                                                 
31 One region consisted of the whole of England and Wales. 
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Austria, producers are limited may lease out quota for up to two consecutive years 
with a limit of 30 per cent of a holding’s quota in the second year. 
 
Rules limiting the number of consecutive years in which a holding may lease out 
quota have been specified in Austria, Spain, Finland, and Italy. In the UK, a producer 
may lease out some (but not all) of their quota on consecutive years not to the same 
lessee. Prior to 2002, it was possible for non-producing quota holders to lease out 
their entire quota. During the 1990s leasing arrangements between producers could be 
renewed annually.  
 
Situation in the 10 New Member States 
• No temporary transfers of milk quota are permitted in the majority of NMS 10 
countries (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia (since 2006), Slovenia and 
Slovakia).  
• Temporary transfers are permitted as private transactions in Hungary, Latvia 
(prior to 2006) and Lithuania. Conditions relate to the percentage of total quota 
being leased (30 per cent in Hungary and Lithuania) and minimum amounts being 
leased (Latvia, prior to 2006). 
 
3.3.4 Temporary redistribution of unused quota  
Member States are able to temporarily redistribute unused quota to producers who 
have exceeded their quota level in order to offset the application of the levy. In the 
majority of EU 15 Member States this is done at the end of the quota year at a 
national level (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Spain since 2005, Finland, Italy, 
Portugal, Sweden and the UK). In the remaining EU 15 Member States, temporary 
redistributions are undertaken at purchaser level first, then remaining quota are 
allocated at national level (Germany, Spain until 2005, Ireland, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands). In France unused quota is redistributed at purchaser level during the 
year with allocations at the end of the quota year taking place at national level. 
 
Allocations are generally in line with either the producer's quota size or related to 
their share of the total surplus production. However limits on the maximum amount of 
unused quota which an individual holding may receive in the event of exceeding their 
quota have been specified in Belgium (15,000 litres), Germany (10 per cent of a 
holding’s quota since 2006), France (typically 10 per cent but up to 20 per cent in 
recent years), and Italy (holdings which exceed 100 per cent of quota held are 
excluded from certain redistribution categories). In some Member States preference is 
given to certain types of producers such as small producers in Ireland, and producers 
in mountain areas and LFAs in Italy. 
3.3.5 Management of the national reserve 
Member States have discretion over a number of aspects of national reserve 
management relating to transfer of quota into the national reserve and allocation of 
national reserve quota to producers. The main options for transferring quota into the 
national reserve are through quota holder inactivity, the application of siphons to 
transfers of quota between producers, and through the administrative purchase of 
quota through abandonment programmes. Member State approaches to these aspects 
are outlined below. Some Member States have actively used the national reserve as an 
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integral component of their quota allocation and transfer strategy, whereas others 
(notably the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) have aimed to keep the size and 
role of the national reserve to a minimum. 
Quota holder inactivity 
While Article 72(1) on inactivity is mandatory for all Member States, Article 72(2) in 
relation to partial (less than 70 per cent) quota inactivity is not and a number of 
Member States have chosen not to implement it. These include Belgium (Flanders), 
Germany, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, Sweden and the UK.  
 
Quota may be confiscated from producers in relation to partial inactivity in the 
following Member States: Austria, Belgium (Wallonia), Greece, France, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
Application of siphons 
A number of Member States do not apply siphons to milk quota transfers either with 
or without land. These include Finland, Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. In 
Germany no siphons are currently operated, although a 30 per cent siphon was 
applicable on large transfers with land until 1993, whilst unsuccessful bids on the 
regional quota exchanges were subject to incremental siphons of 5 per cent up to a 
total of 15 per cent. In Denmark a 50 per cent siphon is applied to permanent transfers 
of quota with land between producers. However, the majority of transfers in Denmark 
are undertaken via the national quota exchange, to which a siphon of only 1 per cent is 
applied.  
 
In Greece a 5 per cent siphon applies to all permanent transfers. In Ireland ‘clawback’ 
of up to 20 per cent was applied to permanent transfers with land until the 1990s, 
although transactions between family members and certain other groups were exempt. 
In Luxembourg a 15 per cent siphon is applied to transfer with land. In Italy quota 
transfers until 2003 were subject to a siphon of 10 per cent for amounts under 60,000 
kg and 15 per cent for larger transfers. In Portugal a 7.5 per cent siphon is applied to 
transfers except when quota is transferred out of a Nitrate Vulnerable Zone or certain 
business or family transfers.  
 
In France, a 10 per cent siphon can be applied on transfers between producers. An 
additional siphon (up to 40 per cent) based on quota size can also be applied. In 
Belgium accumulation transfers are subject to a siphon of 40 per cent. In Spain a 
siphon has applied to transfers between regions since 2003, initially at 20 per cent but 
reduced to 15 per cent since 2004.   
Abandonment programmes 
The purchase of quota through abandonment or restructuring programmes has been a 
feature of quota management in a number of Member States. In addition to the EU-
financed schemes which were in place in the 1980s and early 1990s, nationally 
financed schemes have been operated in France (ACAL), Belgium, Denmark 
restructuring scheme 1989-1997), Germany (restructuring schemes in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s), Greece (early retirement schemes), Ireland (restructuring scheme 
1994-1996), Italy and Spain (since 1991).  
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Quota transfers via abandonment programmes have been the main mechanism for 
quota transfer without land in France throughout the evaluation period. In Ireland and 
Denmark, producer self financing rather than nationally financed restructuring 
programmes have been the primary mechanism used to enable the redistribution of 
quota between producers. In Spain quota allocations, resulting from abandonment 
programmes, have become increasingly significant since 2005 as a result of new 
restrictions on private transactions. 
Allocation of quota from the national reserve 
Several Member States make linear allocations to all producers based on quota size 
including Belgium (up to 500,000 litres per holding), the Netherlands, Sweden and the 
UK32. Quota allocations from the national reserve are linked to production in the 
current or previous quota years in Italy (prioritising young producers and limiting 
overproduction are also specified). In Germany national reserve has been reallocated 
in proportion to the number of successful bids at the quota auctions since their 
introduction in 2000. 
 
In other Member States, a number of priority groups are specified. For example, in 
Ireland priority is given to small scale farmers with a high rate of dependency on dairy 
farming, whilst in Portugal a producer’s age, current quota size and location (priority 
given to holdings not located in Nitrate Vulnerable Zones) are all taken into account. 
In France quota allocations at departmental level prioritise young farmers, farmers in 
financial difficulties, and small producers. In Spain quota is allocated to producers 
according to a points system agreed in each region based on objective criteria. In 
Denmark young farmers are prioritised for administrative redistributions of quota 
through the national reserve. In Greece quota allocations are determined according to 
objective criteria determined in view of the current market situation. In Finland 
priority is given to producers with free capacity and ‘other’ producers (e.g. organic or 
rare breed producers). In Luxembourg allocation criteria include young producers, 
structural improvements, development plans and hardship cases where these have 
been proposed or have taken place.  
 
New producers receive quota allocations from the national reserve in a number of 
Member States including Denmark, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Sweden. Restrictions 
on future transfers of quota allocated from the national reserve exist in Austria, 
Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain.   
Situation in the 10 New Member States 
• In the majority of the NMS 10, unused quota is distributed at national level either 
on the basis of a common allocation to all producers (Czech Republic, Lithuania, 
Latvia) or in proportion to the size of eligible producers’ excess production 
(Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Slovenia) or quota (Slovakia). In Cyprus, unused 
quota is distributed at purchaser level initially.  
• Unused quota is confiscated to the national reserve if production is less than 70 
per cent of quota in most NMS 10 countries.  
• Allocations from the national reserve are distributed on the basis of ‘objective 
criteria’. The main one is the producer’s supply record in the current or previous 
                                                 
32 Currently based on net quota held at end of year, previously permanent quota held. 
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year relative to quota.  Other criteria include the producer’s age, the producer’s 
existing quota and recent quota transfers out. New producers also receive 
allocations from the national reserve.    
• The national reserve benefits from siphons in most NMS 10 countries. Siphons are 
generally based on a percentage of quota transferred (mainly 5-10 per cent of 
quota transferred, although the percentage is as much as 30 per cent in Slovenia 
for transfers between regions and as low as 1 per cent in Latvia) but also on quota 
transferred in excess average dairy cow yield when cows are also sold (Estonia, 
Slovakia).  
  
3.3.6 Overall summary of Member State application 
The main points relating to milk quota application in the EU 15 during the evaluation 
period can be summarised as follows33: 
 
• Transfers with land (including rural leases): siphons applied in 7 Member 
States (BE, DE,  DK, EL, FR, IE, PT); regional restrictions on location of 
holding in 7 Member States (BE; DE; FI; FR, IE, PT, UK); 
• Permanent transfers without land; direct transfers between producers in 11 
Member States (AT, DE, EL, ES, FI, IT, LU, NL, PT, SV, UK); quota 
exchanges in 3 Member States (DK, DE, IE); administrative transfers in  7 
Member States (BE, DK, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT); geographical restrictions on 
movement of quota in 12 Member States (AT, BE, DE, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, LU, 
PT, SV, UK); siphons applied in 6 Member States (DE, DK, EL, ES, LU, PT); 
priority groups in 5 Member States (BE, ES, FR, IE, PT) 
• Temporary transfers without land in 10 Member States (AT, BE, DE, ES, FI, 
IE, IT, NL, PT, UK);   
• Temporary redistribution of unused quota at national level in 11 Member 
States (AT, BE, DK, EL, ES, FI, FR, IT, PT, SV, UK), at purchaser level in 6 
Member States (DE, ES, FR, IE, LU, NL)34; 
• National reserve management: partial quota inactivity enforced in 9 Member 
States (AT, BE, EL, ES, FR, IE, IT, NL, PT); siphons to feed the national 
reserve applied in 10 Member States (BE, DE, DK, El, ES, FR, IE, IT, LU, 
PT); abandonment or restructuring programmes in 8 Member States (BE, DE, 
DK, EL, ES, FR, IE, IT); priority groups for national reserve allocations 
including new producers in 11 Member States (BE, DK, EL, ES, FI, FR, IE, 
IT, LU, PT, SV). 
 
A synthetic summary of Member State milk quota regimes is set out Table 3.2 with 
more detailed tables in Annex 3 to Annex 7. A visual representation of Member State 
application in regards to quota mobility and transfer mechanism is set out in Figure 
3.2.  
 
                                                 
33 The points listed are for indicative purposes only and do not provide an indication of how the 
various aspects of milk quota allocation and transfer have been operated.    
34 Spain is listed in both categories due to a change from purchaser to national level, whilst in France 
purchaser level redistributions occur during the quota year with national level reallocations taking 
place at the end of the quota year.   
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In the NMS 10, milk quota regimes are generally based on the essential requirements 
of the EU regulations without adding many further requirements. Quota transfers tend 
to be conducted privately between buyers and sellers and are not subject to 
geographical restrictions within the Member States concerned. Unused quota tends to 
be distributed at a national level.  
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Table 3.2 Synthetic summary of key aspects of recent milk quota implementation in the EU 1535 
Member 
State 
Quota mobility 
between regions 
Market transactions 
(without land) 
Administrative 
reallocations 
Comments 
AT Yes Yes No Transfers without land since 1996. Geographical restrictions on alpine pasture quota.  
BE 
No Yes  for 60% Yes for 40% Hybrid (market and administrative) system. 40% of quota sold at administrative price 
(strong preference for young farmers). Private sale of 60% for transfers with land and 
without land. 1st installations & family exempt from 40% siphon. 30km restriction. 
DE No (Yes since 2007) 
Yes (quota exchange 
since 2000) 
No Most transfers without land via regional quota exchanges since 2000. Market transfers 
and temporary transfers before 2000. 2 trading regions since 2007. 
DK Yes Yes (quota exchange since 1997) 
Yes until 1997 Most transfers without land via the national quota exchange since 1997. Restructuring 
schemes before 1997. Transfers with land subject to 50% siphon.  
EL Yes Yes Some Most transfers without land. Limited transfers with land since at least 2004/05. 5% siphon. 
ES 
Yes since 1998 
(some restrictions) 
Yes (until 2005) Yes (main transfer 
mechanism from 
2005) 
Milk quota regime not applied in Spain until 1992. Only transfers with land until 1994. 
LFA restrictions 1998-2003. Administrative reallocations at regional level. 15-20% 
siphon between regions since 2003. 
FI No Yes (50%) Yes (50%) Majority of transfers without land. 7 Trading regions. 
FR 
No No Yes Main transfer mechanism is national reserve allocations (up to 20% managed at 
national level) from abandonment (ACAL) programmes. Administrative transfers since 
2006. Siphon (10% + additional 0-40% possible). 
IE 
Not since 1995 
(LFA ring fencing) 
Yes (70% quota 
exchange since 2007) 
Yes Long term ‘land and quota’ leases common in late 1980s and 1990s. Land and quota 
transfers subject to ring fencing within LFA. Most transfers without land since 2000 
(via restructuring programmes and quota exchange).  These are restricted to milk 
purchaser. Siphon until 2000 (up to 20%) 
IT Yes since 2003 (some restrictions) 
Yes Yes Regional restrictions on transfers without land 1992-2003. Restrictions on LFA 
transfers since 2003. Siphon until 2003. 
LU Yes (at purchaser level) 
Yes (since 2000) Yes Most transfers without land since 2000. 15% siphon. 
NL Yes Yes No Liberal approach to quota transfers with land (leasing arrangements) and temporary transfers.  Most transfers without land since 2006  
PT Yes (some restrictions) 
Yes No Generally liberal approach to quota transfer. Restrictions on transfers into NVZs.  
(7.5% siphon) 
SV No (within 2 regions) 
Yes No Most transfers without land until 2006. Leasing arrangements with land also 
significant. More than 80% of milk production in one region. 
UK Yes (except Scottish Islands) 
Yes No Liberal approach to quota transfers with land (leasing arrangements) and temporary 
transfers. Most transfers without land since 2002. Minimal regional restrictions. 
                                                 
35 Details in the table for the most part represent current implementation and do not necessarily reflect the conditions prevailing throughout the evaluation period of this 
study. 
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Figure 3.2 Visual summary of Member State milk quota mobility vs. transfer mechanism 
 
Source: Modified and adapted from data provided by DG Agriculture (2007) 
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4 FARM LEVEL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to identify the farm structural issues, farm systems and farm 
management practices associated with dairy production that are most likely to be 
affected by the milk quota regimes operated in different Member States and their 
potential environmental effects. It informs the development of the environmental 
hypotheses for this study and the subsequent evaluation of environmental impacts.  
 
The analysis here is derived from the literature, data assembled for the project, the 
case studies and experience of the project team.  
 
4.2 Farm management structures, systems and practices of relevance to the 
environment  
The potential impacts on farm structures of the operation of milk quota regimes, 
which are of particular relevance to the study, are summarised here, along with those 
relating to farming systems and practices. The environmental implications of these 
potential impacts are explored in the following sections.  
 
4.2.1 Farm management structures 
Four structural parameters are of particular interest to an analysis of environmental 
outcomes. These are:  
a) Scale of production; 
b) Regional distribution / concentration of production; 
c) Intensity of production; and 
d) Specialisation of production 
 
a) Scale of production 
The scale of dairy production can be measured in different ways, several of which 
have environmental implications. These include 
• Total volume of milk production, measured in kilograms of milk produced per 
cow in a year, broadly indicates the level of resources deployed in production 
(i.e. feed, energy, etc). In environmental terms, output of milk is also an 
indicator of the volume of livestock wastes that are generated in the course of 
production and hence of overall nutrient levels associated with the sector. 
• The size of dairy herd is also an indicator of certain environmental pressures. 
While cattle breeds will vary in size and other attributes, there is a strong 
relationship between the number of animals, methane emissions from enteric 
fermentation and the volume of livestock manure that enters the environment. 
Other pollutants, such as ammonia, are also related to the number of cattle 
kept for production, although the housing conditions and technologies 
employed for indoor production will also play a role here. 
• The area of land devoted to dairy production is also significant 
environmentally. It is more difficult to establish precisely however, since this 
needs to take account of the area of land under different types of fodder 
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production, including temporary and permanent grass. Both the area grazed by 
cattle and the area devoted to fodder crops, such as silage maize, are of 
environmental interest with respect to landscape management, biodiversity, 
nutrient management and other inputs on cropped land. Different patterns of 
fodder production affect the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the milk 
production process. The use of imported feed can also have environmental 
impacts depending on type, origin, etc. (Garnett 2007). 
• Average farm size is also of interest, although its relationship with 
environmental outcomes is less direct. On-going trends of increasing area of 
land within individual dairy holdings leading to fewer farm holdings will 
result in fewer potential point sources for pollution of fresh water i.e. slurry 
stores and dairy washings. However, increased farm size may result in greater 
concentrations of potential pollutants (although this will depend on the  
relative intensity of production) which will require careful management as 
well as investment in appropriate infrastructure in order to reduce the potential 
for point source and diffuse pollution. 
 
b) Regional distribution/concentration of production 
The change in spatial distribution of dairy production is also potentially important in 
determining environmental outcomes. This is relevant in at least three respects: 
 
• The regional concentration of production, as measured by the number of cattle 
in a watershed, can indicate the amount of land needed, or other measures 
required to absorb nutrients. Hence it points to potential environmental 
pressures, which may be managed successfully or otherwise, depending on the 
farming practices adopted. 
• The distribution of dairy farms in relation to land with different environmental 
characteristics is also of relevance. For example, the presence of dairy farms 
on land that is designated as a Nitrate Vulnerable Zone (NVZ) could be a 
major factor in determining water quality. 
• Regional distribution also has implications for patterns of land use and 
landscape diversity in different areas. 
 
c) Intensity of production 
This can be measured in different ways, for example in relation to total output per 
hectare, taking into account: 
 
• outputs per hectare (volume of milk and the forage and feed crops produced); 
• stocking density (the number of cattle per hectare); and 
• inputs per hectare (feedstuffs, organic and inorganic fertilisers and energy 
consumption). 
 
Stocking densities are a useful indicator as they are a measure of overall intensity at 
the farm management level, reflecting a combination of management choice and 
limitations that may be imposed by the land itself. It can be measured in different 
ways, however, and care must be taken to avoid comparing data calculated on 
different bases. For this evaluation we take stocking density to be calculated by taking 
all the ruminant livestock units (LU) on the farm (including sheep and goats where 
these occur) and dividing the resulting sum by the total forage area in hectares.  
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There are, however, shortcomings to stocking density as an indicator of intensity, 
which are particularly important to recognise in terms of making judgements relating 
to environmental impacts.  For example: 
 
• The measurement of livestock units (LU) does not differentiate between the 
size and productivity of stock, for example between cattle with different milk 
production levels or different feed requirements. 
• The fodder area in hectares is not differentiated according to productivity or 
inputs - rough grassland is treated the same as silage maize, for example. 
• There can be significant inaccuracies in the measurement of forage area. 
Common or community land is not included in the conventional measurement 
of forage area although it is an important grazing resource for some farms. 
This can distort stocking density figures at the farm, regional or even national 
level.  
 
According to FADN, in 2004, the average stocking density on specialist dairy farms 
was around 1.7 LU/hectare in the EU 1536. Based on these data, only 22-30 per cent 
of dairy farms have an average of less than 1.4 LU/hectare. In particular, on specialist 
dairy farms average stocking density decreased from 1.92 LU/ha in 1989 to 1.77 in 
2004.  These changes appear to be linked more to a decrease in the number of animals 
than an increase in forage area on dairy farms.  
 
An indicator of production intensity that does take into account milk production levels 
is the amount of milk produced per hectare. This measure, to a certain extent, captures 
changes in intensity arising from both increases in stocking density, but also in milk 
yield per cow due to genetic, diet and management changes. It is also closely and 
positively correlated with nitrogen surplus per hectare (Bos et al. 2005). Milk 
production per hectare is one of the measures used by the OECD (2004) as previously 
outlined in Section 2.2.6 of this report. 
 
d) Specialisation of production 
Specialisation involves the focus of production on a single or small number of outputs 
and a move away from multiple enterprises on a farm. Mixed farms traditionally were 
widespread in the EU. On mixed farms it was common to pursue a mixture of 
livestock and cropping systems and there was a variety in the management practices 
adopted. Specialised farms can concentrate resources and management effort on a line 
of production but there may be implications for the environment. For example, 
specialist dairy enterprises will tend to be comprised of highly stocked and intensively 
managed, predominantly temporary, grassland in rotation with an area of forage 
crops. However, specialised dairy farms have the potential to be more efficient in 
                                                 
36 In FADN Stocking density is calculated at farm level as the sum of total livestock units (Dairy cows, 
Other cattle and Sheep and goats) divided by total forage area (Fodder roots and brassicas, Other 
fodder plants, Fallow land, Temporary grass, Permanent grassland, Rough grazing). The following 
data limitation has to be considered during interpretation of results: mountain pasture and other 
pasture outside the UAA of the holding it is not included in the calculation of stocking density. As a 
consequence farms with small forage crop area and uses common pastures are classified with 
intensive farms. 
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their use of resources, due to economies of scale, which may reduce pollution (e.g. 
nutrient runoff, GHG emissions, etc) per unit of output at farm level. The role of 
specialised management practices and investment in appropriate infrastructure and 
equipment at farm level is clearly important in this respect. 
 
Information on the changes in relation to these four structural characteristics as a 
result of the application of the milk quota regime within different Member States, 
alongside trends emerging from more specific indicators provide a useful foundation 
for examining the potential environmental impacts and risks in greater detail. They do 
not provide a conclusive indicator of environmental damage or benefit but they point 
to possible impacts. At farm level these will differ depending on the different agro-
climatic and topographic conditions of any given area. 
  
4.2.2 Farming systems and practices 
In addition to changes in structural characteristics, such as scale and intensity of 
production, both farm systems and practices are also important in any assessment of 
the environmental impacts of any shift or change in dairy production. Land 
management practices are of relevance on all those farms that remain in milk 
production whether or not they gain or lose quota. They are also of relevance on farm 
land that continues to be managed for other purposes where dairying has ceased. 
 
It should be noted that geographic and agronomic conditions have a considerable 
influence on the choice of system and farming practice open to individual farmers. 
Factors such as climate, altitude, soil fertility and water availability influence the 
choice of fodder crop, the period of grazing and other husbandry considerations. 
 
Farming systems can be classified in different ways: 
 
• By primary types of production on the farm (specialist dairy, suckler cows, 
etc). For example, changes from intensive dairy to beef production on a farm 
may result in environmental benefits, principally in relation to reduced slurry 
storage requirements, but also through subsequent changes to feed and 
housing regimes. Changes are likely to be less noticeable when changes 
between extensive dairy and beef production occur. 
• Within the dairy sector there are a range of systems based mainly on fodder 
supply (for example, outdoor grazing systems through to indoor, concentrate 
based feeding regimes). Each is associated with certain management practices, 
with differing environmental implications [c.f. CEAS et al (2000) typology set 
out in section 2.2.4]. 
• Similarly, farms can be classified according to stocking density (i.e. relative 
intensity of management). 
• According to whether the farm is managed organically or conventionally. 
 
In terms of farming practices, it is clear that a range of decisions linked to farm 
management have implications for the environmental impact of dairy farming. These 
impacts can often be both positive and negative. The sensitivity of the practice to 
local environmental conditions is a central issue. In many cases the impact of a 
practice can be assessed only in relation to farm circumstances. Farm practices will 
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change over time in response to technology, labour costs, policy interventions and 
other drivers. 
 
4.2.3 Other drivers  
There are a number of other factors which have the potential to influence dairy 
farming practices and management in addition to national milk quota regimes. These 
include environmental legislation (primarily the Nitrates Directive at EU level), price 
support measures and the more recent introduction of cross compliance requirements 
(see ‘main’ study). In addition, factors such as outbreaks of animal diseases and the 
structure of the dairy processing industry and purchaser groups can also be important.  
Environmental legislation impacting on producer behaviour 
The progressive implementation of the Nitrates Directive (91/676/EC)37 during the 
evaluation period of this study will have had a significant influence on the behaviour 
of dairy farmers located within areas designated as Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (NVZs). 
First adopted in 1991, 35.5 per cent of territory in the EU 15 had been designated as 
NVZs by 1999, increasing to 44 per cent by 2003 with further designations 
thereafter38. By 2003 seven Member States (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Ireland) had applied NVZ action programmes 
throughout their territories. In the UK the area designated as NVZs increased from 2.4 
per cent to 32.8 per cent, whilst other Member States (Spain, Italy, Sweden, and 
Belgium) experienced more modest increases during this period. From 2003 onwards 
further designations were made resulting in the whole of Northern Ireland being 
designated an NVZ as well additional designations in Italy, Spain, Portugal and 
Belgium.  
 
Agriculture, with dairy production making a significant contribution, accounts for 
approximately 62 per cent of the nitrogen load to surface water across the EU 15, 
ranging from 18 per cent in Portugal to 97 per cent in Denmark. Member States are 
obliged to develop an NVZ Action Programme which specifies farm level rules in 
regards to per hectare limits for nitrate applications, storage requirements for livestock 
manures and slurries, and dates restricting when these can be spread and in what 
circumstances. A number of Member States have successfully obtained derogations 
for their NVZ Action Programmes which allow nitrate applications in relation to 
livestock manure on cattle farms (principally dairy) to be higher than otherwise would 
have been the case39. Such Member States include Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria 
and Germany. Figure 4.1 provides a visual overview of NVZ designations in the EU 
from 2000 until 2006 as well as an assessment by the Commission of additional areas 
which may require designation.     
                                                 
37 Council Directive 91/676/EEC concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by 
nitrates from agricultural sources. 
38 Report from the Commission (COM(2007) 120 final) on implementation of Council Directive 
91/676/EEC concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from 
agricultural sources for the period 2000-2003 
39Up to 250 kg nitrogen per hectare per year rather than the standard limit of 170 kg nitrogen per 
hectare per year 
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The Nitrates Directive has been a Statutory Management Requirement (SMR) as part 
of cross compliance requirements in the EU 15 (plus Malta and Slovenia) since 2005. 
As a result, if farmers located within an NVZ fail to comply with the Nitrates 
Directive, then cross compliance sanctions, usually a deduction from their Single 
Payment, will be applied. This is in addition to possible legal sanctions, which remain 
in place alongside cross compliance. In the Member States which currently apply full 
cross compliance, breaches of the Nitrates Directive accounted for 10 per cent of all 
breaches in 2005, after breaches of cattle identification and registration (71 per cent) 
and all Good Agricultural and Environmental Condition (GAEC) standards combined 
(13 per cent)40.  
 
Other environmental legislation included as SMRs within the cross compliance  with 
potential relevance to the dairy sector includes the Groundwater Directive, the Birds 
and Habitats Directives and the Sewage Sludge Directive. Standards related to animal 
identification and registration (cattle), and the control of animal diseases (including 
BSE41, Foot and Mouth Disease and Bluetongue) will also be relevant. The Water 
Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) is also of interest and will likely be a key 
environmental legislative driver for reducing inputs at farm level in future, given that 
its objective to achieve ‘good ecological and chemical status’ for all EU surface 
waters by 2015.  
                                                 
40 Report on the application of the system of cross-compliance, COM(2007)147 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/simplification/crosscom/com147_en.pdf  
41 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy. 
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Figure 4.1 Nitrate Vulnerable Zone designation EU 25 (year 2006) and area requiring designation according to Commission 
assessment 
  
Source: Annexes to (SEC (2007) 339) Commission report on implementation of Council Directive 91/676/EEC. 
*Designated nitrates vulnerable zones after 2003 are based on information made available to the Commission in digital form. The estimate of designated area does not 
include some designations communicated in paper form only. 
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Direct payments and price support 
Another factor which will have influenced farm management decisions and practices 
during the evaluation period is EU support for the dairy sector through price support 
measures. An assessment of the environmental impact of these measures is included 
in the ‘main’ study which evaluates CAP measures related to the beef and dairy 
sectors. Price support measures such as intervention purchasing of dairy products such 
as butter and skimmed milk powder (SMP) and export refunds will have affected 
dairy producers indirectly by impacting on the farmgate milk price.  
 
Structure of the dairy processing industry 
In some regions the structure of the dairy processing industry and purchaser groups 
may have been a factor in farm level management decisions and practices during the 
evaluation period. For example, rules of origin or denomination for specific products 
including in the EU’s food labelling systems known as PDO (Protected Designation 
of Origin) and PGI (Protected Geographical Indication). These rules restrict the 
location of production and in some cases the practices permitted (for example, 
relating to forage crops used and input applications) for those foods granted the label 
and may underpin a significant price premium. This in turn, can influence the location 
of production and the viability of more traditional systems in some cases. These rules 
were cited in the ‘main’ study as a factor influencing dairy production patterns in 
parts of France and Italy, given the range of designated regional cheeses. Another 
issue, particular to milk production in Northern Ireland, is the structure of the 
processing industry in the Republic of Ireland, where demand for milk linked to the 
export of dairy products has resulted in a noticeable migration of milk production 
(and quota) from other parts of the UK to Northern Ireland.  
 
4.2.4 Summary of farm practices and environmental implications 
Some of the practices of greatest significance to the environment are shown in Table 
4.1 below and some of the impacts that these practices can have on particular aspects 
of the environment are set out in Section 4.3. 
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Table 4.1 Types of practices and environmental implications   
Type of Practice Environmental Issues 
Breed of Cattle Used in Production and size of herd • Feed requirements in relation to farm resources 
• Conservation of genetic resources (rare breeds) 
• Capacity to graze 
• Adaptation to specific conditions (alpine pastures, wetlands, rough grasslands) 
 
Grassland Management • Grazing at an appropriate stocking density and time 
• Grass conservation method for example, hay or silage making 
• Use of inputs including manure and inorganic fertilisers, herbicides 
• Carbon sequestration on unploughed permanent pasture 
• Continuous management of permanent pasture or ploughing and reseeding 
• Water level, drainage, irrigation 
• Exploitation of common land, transhumance (seasonal alpine grazing of semi-natural pastures), 
maintenance of pastures, etc. 
 
Other Crop Management  • Choice of forage crop; particular issues with forage maize which has displaced grass in sizable areas 
• Crop rotation and soil management including cover on arable soils in winter 
• Use of inputs, including fertilisers and agrichemicals 
• Disposal of slurry and other livestock manure – quantity, timing, technology for spreading 
• Crop storage and conservation (for example, silage, a potential pollution source) 
• Management of water, landscape features etc, as above 
 
Manure Management  • Design of livestock housing 
• Method and frequency of collecting livestock manure  
• Method of manure storage, design and capacity of storage facility 
• Location of manure storage and handling in relation to hazards, for example, water courses 
• Timing, frequency, quantity and methods of spreading or other disposal route 
• Management of manure other than from livestock, including silage effluent, milk 
 
Landscape Management • Field size 
• Retention and management of field boundaries and other landscape / ecological features 
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Type of Practice Environmental Issues 
• Management of semi-natural vegetation, including scrub clearance 
• Management of stock in woodland and agro-forestry systems such as ‘dehesa’ or ‘pré-verger’ 
• Maintenance of drovers’ roads  
• Management of streams and rivers 
• Maintenance of seasonal grazing (transhumance) 
 
Soil Management • Appropriate stocking densities for example, on slopes, dry areas, wet patches etc. 
• Management of grazing and feeding to avoid poaching on heavily used areas 
• Appropriate management of crops and grass (see above) 
• Appropriate spreading and management of livestock manure (see above) 
• Management of nutrients, including phosphates 
• Management leading to soil contamination for example, from heavy metals 
 
Biodiversity Management • Habitat and landscape management (c.f. sections above) 
• Management practices affecting species on cropped area, for example, timing of mowing 
• Control of wild species, for example, badgers, hunting, etc. 
 
Other • Veterinary medicine use 
• Management of noise and odours, especially from housed livestock 
• Energy efficiency 
• Bio-energy production from livestock manure , crops and crop residues for example, biogas 
generators 
• Use of renewables, for example, solar energy use (for fodder drying, or water heating) 
• Reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in addition to those accounted for above, for example, 
through changes in stock feeding regimes  
• Disposal of carcases 
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4.3 Environmental issues in relation to livestock production 
In this section the environmental pressures and impacts that arise from dairy farming 
are considered. European dairy systems span many different types of management 
practices and levels of intensity: from extensive mountain dairy systems, through 
pastoral systems of varying intensity to zero-grazing indoor systems. The 
environmental impacts associated with each type of system vary considerably in both 
type and magnitude. The key environmental issues associated with dairy farming are 
greenhouse gas (GHG) and ammonia emissions, impacts of the sector on water 
quality (i.e. pollution), water quantity, soils (principally erosion), biodiversity and 
landscape. This section has been structured according to environmental themes, 
addressing both positive and negative impacts, and considers findings of recent Life 
Cycle Assessment studies.  
 
Greenhouse Gas emissions  
Dairy production systems contribute to emissions of three greenhouse gasses through 
a variety of different pathways. These are:  
 
• Carbon dioxide (CO2) arises from energy use on the farm, including crop 
cultivation and the operation of livestock specific machinery, such as milking 
machines, refrigeration, slurry handling etc. Poor soil management can also 
result in the release of CO2. Off-farm factors such as nitrogen fertiliser 
production, overseas production of fodder crops and transport of milk should 
also be counted in a full analysis. 
• Methane (CH4) is a potent greenhouse gas with 23 times the direct global 
warming potential (GWP) of CO2.  This arises from enteric fermentation in the 
digestive systems of cattle and other ruminants. Emissions are also linked to 
manure and/or slurry management (more of an issue for indoor housing 
systems), particularly where storage or spreading of manure or slurry is poorly 
managed. 
• Nitrous Oxide (N2O) is more potent still, with a GWP 296 times that of CO2. 
Emissions are linked to manure and slurry storage and spreading, transport and 
use of machinery, the application of nitrogen fertilisers and from the 
cultivation of leguminous crops, such as alfalfa. 
 
At a global scale livestock production is responsible for 80 per cent of the emissions 
of these three greenhouse gases (GHG) from agriculture according to the FAO 
(LEAD 2006). In the EU 15, agriculture accounts for about 9 per cent of all GHG 
emissions (EEA 2007), although the sector’s share of emissions has fallen slightly 
over time from more than 10 per cent between 1990 and 2005. Cattle represent a 
significant share of this total, with methane emissions from cattle alone amounting to 
26 per cent of all EU 15 agriculture sector emissions in 2005 (EEA, 2007), 
representing 121,830Gg42 of CO2 equivalents. Emissions associated solely with dairy 
production are more difficult to isolate.  
 
                                                 
42 One gigagram (Gg) is equal to 1,000,000 kilograms (kg). 
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While emissions are closely related to the number of dairy livestock, there is not a 
simple linear relationship because the size and breed of cow, the feeding and 
management regime, and the way in which wastes are handled and disposed of, will 
affect the level of emissions. For example, while more extensive dairy production 
systems may give rise to lower emissions of some greenhouse gases per cow, as a 
result of lower inputs and less energy intensive production methods, ruminants fed on 
fibrous diets associated with more extensive systems often have a higher output of 
methane than those from more intensive systems that use feed supplements (OECD 
2004).  
 
Substantial greenhouse gas emissions are produced as a result of the collection, 
storage and transport of milk. Estimates of the emissions created during the transport 
of milk from farm to processors range from 9-12 kg CO2 equivalents per 1,000 litres 
of milk. Whilst undeniably a significant source of greenhouse gases, the emissions 
associated with transport of 1,000 litres of milk are estimated to be significantly less 
than those associated with its production (Defra 2007).  
 
Another important cause of greenhouse gas emissions associated with the dairy 
industry is the production of fodder crops principally, but not exclusively, from 
outside the EU. Currently a significant proportion of the soya used for feeding dairy 
cattle is produced outside the EU, particularly in Brazil, the world’s second largest 
producer of soya. One estimate suggests that the production of crops such as soya and 
maize to feed dairy cattle accounts for as much as 15 per cent of the primary energy 
used in milk production in the UK (Defra 2007). Not only does this fodder crop 
production give rise to all the greenhouse gas emissions normally associated with crop 
cultivation and transport, but where forest, savannah and other natural habitats have 
been cleared to provide land, fodder crop production can be accompanied by the 
release of vast quantities of carbon previously stored in the habitats and their soils. 
Few studies have attempted to quantify the carbon emissions associated with 
clearance of natural habitats for soya cultivation in the tropics, but for areas like 
Brazil, where 27 per cent of the country’s soya crop area is located in Amazonia, the 
emissions are likely to be considerable (Garnett 2007).  
 
Since greenhouse gas emissions have the same impact on global warming wherever 
they take place, environmental benefits can be secured only if overall emissions fall. 
Changes in the location of production within the EU are relevant only if they are 
associated with a change in production characteristics that affect emissions of 
greenhouse gases per litre of milk. In this sense the efficiency (in terms of inputs per 
unit of output i.e. inputs per litre of milk) of production systems is of particular 
concern for agricultural policy and not simply the number of animals maintained in 
one production area. 
 
Ammonia emissions 
Ammonia (NH3) can also have serious environmental implications for localised air 
and water pollution and is emitted in large quantities by the dairy sector. From the 
information available at a global level, agricultural emissions account for 90 per cent 
of ammonia emissions from all sources. Ammonia emissions into the air depend on 
farm level management in relation to housing, and storage and spreading of manures 
and slurries produced by the dairy sector. Much of the ammonia will be deposited 
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locally which can cause soil acidification and eutrophication resulting in a decline in 
biodiversity as nitrophilic and acid tolerant species become dominant (Bobbink et al. 
1998). Ammonia emissions from dairy systems are a particular issue as emissions 
from manure applied to grassland are 1.5 times higher than for manure applied to 
arable43 land (Marschiner et al (1995) in CEAS et al 2000). 
 
Water Quality 
Pollution of ground water by nitrates, phosphates and sedimentation resulting in 
eutrophication of surface water is an issue associated with the dairy sector. The main 
sources of nitrogen and phosphates are inorganic fertilisers, organic manures and 
slurries, livestock feed and silage effluent. Other potential pollutants include fertilisers 
and pesticides used for feedcrops, veterinary medicines and pathogens associated with 
cattle. The degree to which water quality is affected will depend on a range of factors 
including soil and weather characteristics, the intensity, frequency and period of 
grazing, the timing and the rate at which manure is applied.  Water pollution can be 
divided into two main types: point source (emanating from a specific, observable 
source) and diffuse (where pollutants are being dispersed over a wide area). Dairy 
livestock, therefore, have a complex relationship with water pollution as not only are 
they direct and indirect contributors through the production of pollutants but they also 
influence the natural processes that can control and mitigate pollution loads.   
 
The livestock sector in general has been a major contributor to the increase in 
fertiliser use over the past 50 years. Figures from the FAO from 200644 show that, 
within Europe, (particularly France, Germany and the UK), livestock and associated 
production of feed are responsible for more than 50 per cent of mineral nitrogen and 
phosphorous applied on agricultural land. Losses to freshwater ecosystems are also 
high within these Member States.  
 
The risk of point source pollution from intensive dairy systems is particularly high 
due to the large volumes of slurry and silage stored on the average unit and the large 
number of housed cattle. For example, in England and Wales, dairy systems were 
responsible for between 37 and 59 per cent of all serious water pollution incidents45 
from agriculture recorded annually by the Environment Agency between 2002 and 
2006. In 2002 the dairy industry was responsible for more than four times more 
serious water pollution incidents than any other agricultural sector in England and 
Wales (Defra 2007). Data from other Member States is not readily available but the 
large volumes of slurry generated on dairy farms are a characteristic of all systems 
where housing is involved. 
                                                 
43 The source does not indicate whether maize production would be classified as ‘arable’ in this 
context. 
44 The contribution of livestock to agricultural N and P consumption in the form of mineral fertiliser 
for France, Germany and the UK was as follows: France N: 52%, P: 52%; Germany N:62%, P: 51% 
and UK N: 70%, P: 58%.   
45 Category 1 and 2 water pollution incidents. Category 1 is defined by the Environment Agency as 
resulting in ‘persistent and extensive effects on water quality’ and ‘major damage to the ecosystem’. 
Category 2 incidents are defined as resulting in ‘significant effects on quality’ and ‘significant 
damage to the ecosystem’. 
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In general, the risk of nitrate pollution is higher where cattle production systems have 
intensified, whilst extensive and low intensity production systems are at lower risk. 
However, whilst large intensive cattle units can increase the severity of pollution 
incidents, farm management practices are crucial when determining the environmental 
impact of an individual farm. 
 
The storage and application of organic manures and slurries is of particular 
significance for water quality. For example, the likelihood of a pollution incident from 
a point source can be minimised by appropriate management and investment in 
infrastructure – anecdotally more widespread on larger farms, particularly where 
significant financial investment is required. Diffuse pollution can also be reduced by 
appropriate management practices. Phosphate pollution is closely linked to soil 
erosion and sedimentation. Overgrazing and unsuitable supplementary feeding 
practices can have a negative impact on water quality, as can cropping practices. In 
some areas, fodder maize crops, involving higher risks of soil erosion than grass can 
cause pollution through soil movement, transporting phosphate into water courses. 
The trend towards increased silage production also has implications for water quality 
as silage effluent is a potential pollutant. 
 
The risk of nitrate pollution from dairy systems for different countries has been 
assessed by the OECD (2004), using indicators of the level of dairy cow nitrogen 
manure production, the share of this in total nitrogen input and the overall nitrogen 
soil balance for the country. This assessment classified Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom as 
high risk (nitrogen balance ≥ 50kg N/ha and more than 10 per cent of the nitrogen 
from the dairy industry) and Spain and Italy as low risk (nitrogen balance ≤50kgN/ha 
and less than 10 per cent of nitrogen from the dairy industry), although this hides 
significant regional variations within Member States. 
 
Water resources 
The management of grassland and land used to grow forage crops for cattle can have 
a significant impact on water resources. In some areas irrigation is used to grow 
forage crops such as maize. This can put pressure on the availability of water in drier 
regions where water is a scarce resource. The use of water for irrigation can also have 
negative implications for natural watercourses and groundwater systems.  
 
Drainage is also an important issue in terms of water resource management. 
Historically, large areas of natural and semi-natural habitats have been drained in 
order to ‘improve’ grassland for cattle production or to convert it to forage crop 
production although this is a less common practice now. Natural and semi-natural 
habitats such as wetlands and marshes can mitigate the effect of high rainfall events 
and maintain a more constant supply of water. Drainage of such areas for cattle 
production can have negative implications for the soil’s water storage capacity, whilst 
maintenance of these systems through extensive grazing practices can be beneficial in 
terms of water resource management.   
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Soils 
Dairy production systems can have a variety of impacts on soils. Intensive production 
systems are often associated with negative impacts in terms of soil erosion, 
compaction, which can increase susceptibility of the land to flooding, and nutrient 
contamination. High stocking rates can result in negative impacts on soil quality as a 
result of increased poaching, although this will clearly not apply to cattle in indoor 
housed units.  
 
The production of forage crops for cattle also has implications for soil management. 
Land growing maize is particularly vulnerable to soil erosion due to the extended 
period with low ground cover and late harvesting (often in wet conditions) leaving 
bare and potentially compacted soil at times of high rainfall. Practices such as 
unsuitable supplementary feeding and over wintering of cattle outdoors can have 
negative impacts on soil quality, although negative impacts are largely dependent on 
stocking densities. Management practices as well as soil type and rainfall are also 
critical determinants of the likely environmental impact. 
 
Some of the management practices associated with dairy production can cause high 
levels of heavy metals to build up in agricultural soils. Feed supplements can cause 
manure from intensive dairy systems to be high in heavy metals such as copper, zinc 
and cadmium. Application of such manure to land can result in the accumulation of 
these metals in soils, which can in turn lead to impaired soil function and 
contaminated crops, with implications for human health (OECD 2004). 
 
Biodiversity 
Many practices associated with dairy production systems have resulted in long-term 
declines in biodiversity. These include:  
 
• The effects of intensification resulting in higher inputs of fertilisers, organic 
manure and pesticides and leading to a loss of grassland diversity, both flora 
and fauna – high yield ryegrass swards, for example, are of little benefit to 
biodiversity, in contrast to more botanically diverse permanent pasture;  
• Higher stocking rates, leading to overgrazing and an increased risk of 
trampling of the nests of ground-nesting birds;  
• An increase in the cultivation of forage maize; 
• Early cutting dates for silage, leading to a loss of grassland diversity and 
potential disturbance to ground nesting birds; 
• Loss of permanent pasture to temporary grassland, with resulting losses of 
species diversity; 
• A general decline from mixed livestock farming systems towards more 
specialised systems;  
• Cattle breeds can also have an impact on biodiversity depending on their 
suitability for a particular regime. Feed regimes may also have negative 
environmental impacts such as habitat damage caused by unsuitable 
supplementary feeding;  
• Intensive and specialist housed cattle production systems, in particular, are 
likely to have an adverse impact on biodiversity as a result of increased forage 
crop production, whilst more extensive cattle grazing is often associated with 
positive impacts on biodiversity;  
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• Diffuse water pollution can have a deleterious effect on aquatic flora and 
fauna; and 
• Abandonment or undergrazing of semi-natural habitats will result in scrub 
encroachment which will reduce species diversity. 
 
Some extensive dairy systems maintain habitats and landscapes of high biodiversity 
value. This is particularly true of extensive mountain dairy systems, such as those 
found in Italy, Austria and France. A study in Switzerland (Schmid 2001) found a 
wider range of flora and fauna species on extensive dairy cattle grazing areas 
compared to extensively managed conservation areas where the grass is cut. 
Permanent grassland has higher associated biodiversity and carbon sequestration 
potential than temporary leys or arable cultivation, and associated boundary features 
such as hedgerows form important refuge habitats in agricultural landscapes and 
provide corridors for the movement of mammals, birds, reptiles and invertebrates. 
 
Cattle grazing can be an important management tool particularly in natural and semi-
natural habitats where extensive grazing has traditionally taken place. However, the 
implications of cattle grazing on biodiversity are complex and much will depend on 
the habitat being grazed, stocking density and relative proportion of grazing by cattle 
compared with other types of livestock. Many grazed habitats with a high nature value 
will require a specific management regime in order to maintain biodiversity.  
 
Cattle graze in a distinct way in comparison to other livestock, such as sheep and 
goats. Mixed grazing is usually the most beneficial system to conserve and improve 
biodiversity, although this not commonly associated with dairy systems. Cattle do not 
graze vegetation too close to the ground, often leaving tussocks of grass which are 
used by insects and small mammals and do not graze selectively which is important 
for botanically diverse habitats. Trampling by cattle can also be an important means 
of controlling scrub, although high stocking levels can result in overgrazing. 
 
In some cases biodiversity benefits could result from increasing the proportion of 
livestock grazing by cattle, although this does not tend to be the case in dairy systems. 
In other habitats, biodiversity benefits could result from reductions in cattle grazing 
relative to other livestock. Undergrazing, or the withdrawal of grazing, can have 
negative implications for biodiversity, although limited scrub development may be 
beneficial in some areas.  
 
Soil erosion related to overgrazing, including the trampling of stream banks, can have 
an adverse impact on aquatic biodiversity, including damage to or destruction of 
invertebrate habitats and fish spawning areas. 
Landscape 
Dairy production systems can have a significant impact on landscape. Dairy systems 
which maintain permanent grassland and hedged landscapes such as the pastoral 
landscapes of South West England or the bocage landscapes of North West France, 
help to safeguard the benefits associated with these landscapes. Larger scale intensive 
management in productive areas, as well as abandonment in marginal areas, can both 
lead to increasing homogeneity and loss of landscape distinctiveness. In particular, 
scrub encroachment and afforestation as a result of the cessation of dairying will 
displace the traditional open mosaic landscape created by traditional livestock 
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production systems. Intensive production systems or insensitive management can 
have negative impacts on landscape character, for example, through increasing field 
sizes by removing landscape features such as boundary features or small areas of 
woodland or wetland. Where production is becoming more intensive and stock are 
housed indoors, the erection of additional buildings and associated infrastructure can 
have significant negative impacts on the landscape by giving it a more ‘industrial’ 
character. The shift from grass-based systems to the use of maize as a fodder crop can 
also detract from the traditional character of the landscape. Increased soil compaction 
and erosion resulting from intensive grassland management may adversely affect 
below ground archaeological features.   
Life Cycle Assessment of Environmental Burden from Dairy Systems 
Life Cycle Assessment46 (LCA) of dairy production systems explores the total 
environmental burden arising from the whole milk production process, not just 
impacts directly associated with the management of livestock and land. It gives a 
more representative reflection of the total environmental burdens arising from 
production systems by taking into account emissions and energy use associated with 
each part of the production process and those embodied in the machinery and inputs 
used by a system.  
 
A recent Swedish LCA study (Cederberg and Mattsson 2000, cited in Defra 2007) 
compared the environmental burdens associated with organic and conventional dairy 
systems. Organic systems were found to have lower global warming potential, as they 
produce 13.6 per cent less CO2 equivalent per ton of milk than conventional systems. 
They also have lower acidification potential as they produce 12 per cent less sulphur 
dioxide (SO2) equivalent per ton of milk than conventional systems. However, in 
eutrophication and land use terms, the study found organic systems to be worse, due 
to the types of feed used and greater reliance on grazing, leading to increased nitrate 
leaching, and greater land requirements per unit of milk produced. Another study, 
Williams et al. (2006) (cited in Defra 2007) found that organic systems in relation to 
all the above measures, scored less well than conventional ones. 
 
As discussed above, there are not only differences in the types and magnitude of 
environmental impacts arising from different types of dairy systems, but differences 
can also arise from relatively simple changes in management. An LCA model of UK 
dairy systems developed by Cranfield University (summarised in Defra 2007) 
estimated that changing from autumn to spring calving can reduce primary energy 
consumption by 354 MJ and global warming potential by 42 kg CO2 equivalent, per 
1,000 litres of milk produced. It also estimated that cows producing 10,000 litres of 
milk a year required 236 MJ more primary energy per 1,000 litres than cows 
producing 6,500 litres per year, but had lower nitrogen emissions and global warming 
potential and used less land. Environmental burden was estimated to be greater on all 
counts for cows producing 3,500 litres of milk per year than those producing 6,500, 
implying that on the criteria based score, environmental benefits can be gained by 
using moderately high yielding cows (at least 6,500 but not more than 10,000 litres 
per year).  
 
                                                 
46 Life Cycle Assessment analyses production systems systematically to account for all inputs and 
outputs that cross the boundaries of the product systems. (Defra 2007) 
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LCA analysis, which attempts to rank options using a single consistent unit, expressed 
in energy terms, must be treated with some caution, however. The performance of the 
systems in relation to energy demand and greenhouse gas emissions is easier to 
measure than impacts on land use or biodiversity. Relatively small differences in the 
performance of systems in relation to quantifiable impacts (themselves quite sensitive 
to the assumptions made) can obscure quite large differences in other respects, 
especially where site specific impacts, such as landscape management, are important. 
 
Against the background of the interrelationships between dairy production and the 
environment as set out in this chapter, the challenge is to establish the precise impact 
of national milk quota regimes on the environment - the main focus of this study (see 
Chapters 7 and 8). 
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5 METHODOLOGY 
5.1 General methodological considerations 
The methodology used in this study has been designed specifically for the questions 
addressed, and is constrained by difficulties encountered in translating certain 
conceptual elements of the research question into empirically verifiable hypotheses. 
The short duration of the research project, relative to the complexity of the issues to 
be addressed, has also been a determining factor in the design of the methodology. 
This section describes the main decisions that have shaped the methodological 
approach taken in the study. 
 
5.1.1 Articulation of the Evaluation Questions 
The objective of this study is to go beyond an evaluation of the environmental effects 
of the milk quota regime per se (i.e. the effects of limiting the volume of milk 
production in the EU) in order to examine the environmental effects of the different 
ways in which successive milk quota regulations have been applied in individual 
Member States. Differences in implementation rules relate to aspects such as quota 
transfer between producers, distribution of the superlevy burden over producers, and 
priority treatment given to particular producer groups or certain regions regarding 
quota allocations from the national reserve.  
 
These implementation characteristics can impact on the environment in two distinct 
ways:  
• The mechanisms set up to implement milk quotas influence structural change in 
the sector (including location of milk production and size structure of dairy herds), 
producers’ decisions regarding the type of farming system used and, for any given 
farming system, the degree of intensity of input use. These impacts on structure 
and production systems will in turn have environmental implications. Thus, the 
causal chain between implementation rules and environmental effects is broken 
down into two stages: the effect of implementation rules on where and how milk is 
produced (direct effects on the sector), and the consequences for these changes on 
the environment (indirect effects on the environment). These effects are analysed 
under Evaluation Question 1 (Chapter 7).   
• A provision exists in EU milk quota legislation47 for an environmental protection 
or enhancement objective to be incorporated into the national implementation 
legislation. The extent to which measures with explicit environmental objectives 
have been implemented by Member States and the evidence for any resulting 
environmental effects is explored in Evaluation Question 2 (Chapter 8). Measures 
with implicit environmental objectives are also examined, notably where Member 
State milk quota allocation and transfer rules distinguish between LFAs and non-
LFAs.   
 
 
                                                 
47 Council Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003 (Article 18) and the preceding Council Regulation (EC) No 
3950/92 (Article 8). 
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5.2 Methodology for addressing Evaluation Questions 
5.2.1 Types of evidence used and conclusions obtained 
A considerable quantity of data exists on the first stage of the causal chain. It is 
analysed in order to discover whether the different outcomes for quota mobility, 
production methods and structure of dairy farms that are hypothesised to follow from 
the differences in implementation have actually occurred. It is much more difficult to 
obtain relevant data on the second of the two linkages, since environmental effects are 
often site-specific or associated with particular local conditions. Moreover, the time 
lags between a changed farming practice or type of land use and discernible 
environmental effects are often uncertain and difficult to pin down empirically. 
Detailed studies of particular regions are often needed to establish empirically the 
causal links between particular ways of farming or changes in farming practices, and 
environmental effects. Therefore, the empirical treatment in this study of the second 
order environmental effects is inevitably more impressionistic and less conclusive 
than the first. 
 
It follows that the degree of support and the strength of evidence in favour of various 
hypotheses is variable. At one extreme, both stages of the causal link can be examined 
using appropriate empirical evidence for a number of countries, and the conclusions 
derived can be treated as relatively robust. At the other extreme, only the first stage of 
the causal link can be checked against relevant empirical evidence (and even then the 
relevant data may not exist for more than a few Member States), whilst empirical 
support for the second stage of the link is entirely missing. This could be due either to 
the non-availability of data or to the inherent difficulty of measuring the hypothesised 
effect in a scientifically rigorous way (for example effects relating to landscape 
quality or biodiversity). In these cases, our conclusions, if any, are much more 
speculative, and do not go much beyond a restatement of the original hypothesis. 
However, even in the worst case, the exercise is still a useful one in that it articulates 
and highlights questions that would be worthwhile examining in more targeted micro-
oriented research. 
Data sources 
The evaluation has drawn a on a wide range of available evidence and sources of data. 
This includes publicly available literature both at EU and national level and pan- 
European databases including Eurostat FSS48 data and FADN49. In addition the 
evaluation has drawn on national information and data gathered from case studies 
conducted in major producing Member States and regions as the main study50. 
Another significant source of information and data was provided by Member State 
responses to a questionnaire prepared by DG Agriculture in 2007. Questionnaire 
                                                 
48 Farm Structure Survey data available at Eurostat website 
49 Farm Accountancy Data Network. Public databases used and data request made to DG Agri. 
50 Case studies conducted in France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and the UK. Regional 
analysis in Bavaria, Emilia Romagna, Galicia, Brittany and Auvergne, and the South West of 
England. 
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responses contained information on milk production, size structures and details of 
milk quota implementation51   
 
5.2.2 Member State coverage 
Since Member States have taken different approaches to milk quota implementation, 
our analytical framework inevitably involves a comparison across Member States.  
 
The choice of Member States for which detailed information has been analysed in 
order to perform the study has been influenced by several considerations. First, the 
environmental effects that are hypothesised to result from different implementation 
decisions require a number of years to become manifest empirically. Therefore, it is 
inappropriate to extend the empirical investigation of environmental effects to 
countries that entered the EU recently in 2004 or 2007. Consequently, empirical 
evidence has been analysed for countries comprising EU 15 only. Second, although 
milk is produced in all Member States, 87 per cent of EU 25 milk output is produced 
in 11 Member States52, and 85 per cent of EU 15 output is produced in just seven 
countries53, each of which accounts for at least 4 per cent of EU 15 production. It was 
decided therefore to focus on these most important milk producing countries: 
Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
Together, these seven Member States provide nearly 71 per cent of total EU 25 milk 
output (see Annex 1). Case studies were commissioned for these seven Member 
States, and we draw heavily on these sources for much of the detailed information 
used in the empirical assessment. Information for other Member States is also used, 
but less often and less systematically. 
 
5.2.3 Counterfactual scenario 
In order to assess the effects of any policy intervention, a counterfactual scenario has 
to be specified. Typically, the effects of a policy are assessed by comparing outcomes 
under the policy with what would have happened in a no-policy situation. In this case, 
however, the alternative scenario of ‘no quotas on milk production’ is not an 
appropriate counterfactual since the aim is not to evaluate the effects of milk quotas 
per se.  
 
For this study, we have used the fact that Member States have differed in their 
philosophy regarding quota implementation. This has enabled individual Member 
States to be positioned along a continuum ranging from the most interventionist (or 
‘restrictive’) approach to the most liberal or market-oriented (hereafter ‘unrestrictive’) 
approach. An interventionist approach to implementing milk quotas involves the 
tightest administrative control over quota allocation and transfer, together with a 
                                                 
51 The analysis and interpretation of data and information from questionnaire responses comes from the 
research team and does not necessarily represent the views of the Commission.   
52 Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Sweden and United 
Kingdom. The remaining countries each account for less than 2% of total output, and of these, 7 
Member States each account for less than 1% of total output. 
53 Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, and United Kingdom. 
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willingness to go beyond ‘supply control’ per se in order to use quota administration 
as a means of targeting additional national structural, socio-economic or territorial 
objectives. By contrast, a market-oriented approach involves implementing the policy 
as explicitly required by the relevant EU regulations in order to limit national milk 
production effectively, whilst allowing other decisions and developments pertaining 
to quotas that are not explicitly fixed by the regulations to be governed by market 
forces.  
 
The underlying assumption is that, at the most market-oriented end of the spectrum, 
trends in location of production and in the structure of the sector are the least distorted 
from what they would have been in a situation without the quota scheme at all.  
 
Therefore, trends in Member States that are characterised as unrestrictive serve as a 
‘minimum intervention’ counterfactual with which Member States situated at other 
points of the continuum can be compared. The more interventionist the 
implementation approach is, the more it is expected that trends will diverge from this 
benchmark.  
 
This approach has the advantage that exogenous trends affecting all Member States 
regardless of whether or not milk quotas were applied (such as increasing yields due 
to continuing genetic improvements) are partly controlled for. We look for differences 
in the rate or incidence of these trends that we can attribute to differences in quota 
implementation features. A risk is that some differences that are due to other Member 
State specificities, unrelated to differences in quota implementation, might be wrongly 
attributed to quota implementation rules. Therefore, some caution is needed in 
interpreting the conclusions drawn from these comparisons.  
 
It must be stressed that the use of trends in Member States that are characterised as 
market-oriented as a counterfactual for more interventionist Member States relates 
only to the first stage of the two-stage causal chain. It does not extend to the 
environmental consequences of these trends, which are specific to each Member 
State, depending on its agro-climatic conditions and other factors such as the level of 
environmental stress already being caused by dairying at the start of the quota period. 
For example, a particular market-driven trend, which was given free rein in a market-
oriented Member State and turned out to have beneficial environmental effects in that 
Member State, may have had negative environmental consequences if it had been 
allowed to develop in another more interventionist Member State with different agri-
environment pre-conditions. 
 
Table 5.1 describes the features of national quota implementation rules that we 
consider relevant for classifying Member States according to their degree of market 
orientation. The period up to 2006 only is considered. More recent changes to national 
quota regimes are described in Chapter 3. On the basis of these features as they were 
implemented over all or most of the period of analysis, the Member States of EU 15 
have been ranked on five levels, from ‘most interventionist’ (France and Ireland) to 
‘most market-oriented’ (UK and the Netherlands). 
 
In Evaluation Question 2, an additional counterfactual is considered, that is the 
situation without quota allocation and transfer measures with explicit or implicit 
environmental objectives. 
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Table 5.1 Member States characterised according to the degree of market orientation of their quota implementation regulations 
over the evaluation period (1984-2006) 
Member State Quota transfer without land 
between regions? 
Quota transfer between 
producers 
Operation of National Reserve 
(NR) 
Restructuring programmes 
Level 1 – Least market-oriented 
 
France 
No transfers without land 
between Départements 
throughout evaluation period.  
By farm sale only. Since 2006 
producers can sell quota to 
Administration which is sold on 
to other producers within same 
region. No quota leasing. 
Administrative reallocation to 
priority groups within regions. 
20% of NR managed at national 
level since mid 1990s. Potentially 
results in transfers between 
regions, but limited in practice. 
Continuous operation since 1984, 
first the EU-funded buyout 
programmes, then nationally 
funded programmes 
 
Ireland 
No transfers without land except 
within milk purchasing pools. 
Pools vary in size and geographic 
extent. 
Land and quota leases up to 2000 
(LFA ring fencing after 1995).  
Now transfers within milk 
purchasing pools, priority groups 
favoured.  Temporary leasing on 
similar basis, but national pool 
option. 
1995-2000: NR fed by a 10% 
siphon on land and quota leases. 
Allocated to hardship cases. 
Restructuring schemes since 
early 1990s. Main method of 
acquiring quota 2000-6. 
Administrative purchase for 
allocation to priority groups.  
Level 2 – Weak market orientation 
 
Belgium 
Two trading regions. Upper limit on quantity 
transferred, distance limit, 
siphon. Administrative transfers 
(Free market transfers in 
Flanders until 1996)  
Young farmers have priority. Yes. Also confiscation of unused 
quota under certain conditions. 
Finland Seven trading regions.  Mixed market-oriented/ 
administrative transactions. 
Upper limit on size of transfer. 
Distributed to regions in 
proportion to existing quota. 
Allocated to producers in priority 
groups.  
None. 
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Table 5.1 (continued)   Member States characterised according to the degree of market orientation of their quota implementation 
     regulations over the evaluation period (1984-2006) 
Level 3 – Moderate market orientation 
 
Germany 
No transfers between trading 
regions. Until 2007, 27 trading 
regions defined at level of Länder 
or Regierungsbezirke.  
Since 1993, transfer without land 
within the same trading region 
(since 2000 in the new Länder). 
Quota exchange since 2000. 
Temporary transfers without land 
within trading zones 1993-2000.   
Until 1993 siphons used at 
different times for different types 
of transfer. Until 2002, siphon on 
unsuccessful offers on the quota 
exchange. NR quota mainly used 
to ‘equilibrate’ regional quota 
markets – some movement of 
quota between regions possible. 
National restructuring schemes 
during 1980s and early 1990s 
with the aim of reducing the 
volume of national excess quota. 
 
Italy 
National market since 2003. 
Ring-fencing of LFAs, mountain 
areas.  
1993-2003 Temporary leasing for 
max 2 consecutive years (also 
between regions).  Since 2004, 
limited to transfers within 
‘homogeneous regions’. 
Market transactions since 1992. Siphon until 2003. Inactive quota 
redistributed to priority groups 
(incl. LFAs and mountain areas). 
Since 2003 NR divided among 
regions in proportion to excess 
production during previous 2 
quota years. Distributed at 
regional level to priority groups. 
Since 1993 payments to 
encourage farmers to quit 
dairying. Payment diversified 
according to location of holding. 
 
Luxembourg Transfers permitted only between 
producers selling milk to the 
same dairy. 
Private transactions since 2000. Priority groups. None. 
 
Spain 
Since 1998 transfers between 
regions if they improve 
production structures of recipient 
holding or extensify production 
(<2LU/forage ha). Ring fencing 
of quota in LFAs 1998-2003.  
Leasing of quota for up to 2 years 
between regions since 1998. 
Market transfers until 2005. 
Transfers within regions to 
priority groups.  
Since 2006 easier for producer to 
transfer only part of quota 
 
NR quota allocated to producers 
on points system for each region.  
Since 2003, 15-20% siphon on 
transfers between regions 
(optional within regions). Bias 
towards smaller farms. 
Since 1991 abandonment 
programmes purchased quota 
which is then redistributed from 
NR to active producers  
 
Level 4 – Stronger market orientation 
 
Austria 
Alpine LFAs ring-fenced. Market transactions of permanent 
quota. Restrictions on temporary 
transfers. 
Confiscation of unused quota. 
Priority groups 
Unknown. 
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Table 5.1 (continued)   Member States characterised according to the degree of market orientation of their quota implementation 
regulations over the evaluation period (1984-2006) 
 
 
Denmark 
National market. Quota exchange since 1997, 1% 
siphon. National restructuring 
scheme 1989-1997. No 
temporary leasing.  
Priority groups young farmers 
and new entrants. 
None. 
 
Greece 
National market. Market transactions. Siphon. 
Minimum size of transfer. No 
transfers in last quarter of year. 
Allocations according to 
objective criteria according to 
circumstances. Some allocations 
to new producers. 
None. 
 
Portugal 
National market. Restrictions on 
transfers to Nitrate Vulnerable 
Zones. 
Market transactions. Siphon. Allocation to priority groups. 
Restrictions on sale after 
allocation. 
None. 
 
Sweden 
Two regions. Market transfers since 2000. 
Upper limit on size of transfer. 
No temporary leasing. 
Allocations to producers based 
on quota holding. 
None. 
Level 5 – Most market-oriented 
 
The Netherlands 
 
National market. 
Market transfers with land from 
the start of the quota regime but 
with liberal rural leasing 
arrangements. Permanent 
transfers without land introduced 
in 2006. Initially some 
restrictions on amounts 
transferred in relation to land. 
Temporary leasing. 
The aim has been to keep the NR 
as small as possible. 
Only the early EU schemes. Low 
uptake. 
 
United Kingdom 
Until 1993, transfers only within 
5 large regions (including whole 
of England and Wales). Since 
1993 only minor ring-fencing for 
Scottish Islands.  
  
Initially, permanent transfer of 
quota with land coupled with 
liberal rural leasing arrangement 
led to permanent transfer of 
quota without land after specified 
time.  Official permanent 
transfers without land since 1993 
(most common form of transfer 
since 2002).  Quota leasing 
possible since 1986. Temporary 
leasing. 
The aim has been to keep the NR 
as small as possible. No priority 
groups except producers affected 
by movement restrictions for 
temporary allocation of unused 
quota. 
Only the early EU schemes. Low 
uptake. 
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5.2.4 Time horizon, treatment of time 
Both links in the causal chain involve medium- or long-term developments. Many of 
the changes to trends in structure and location induced by quota management rules 
required some time before becoming well established. First, milk producers had to 
undergo a learning process during which they adapted their operation to the changed 
policy environment and became more aware of optimal strategies under the new 
conditions. Second, decisions to quit dairying, or to buy more land or more quota to 
expand operations, are usually not taken in a hurry and their timing can be influenced 
by other factors such as family situation, credit availability or interest rates, and 
uncertainty about further policy changes. As for the second link in the causal chain, 
some environmental effects are cumulative and a number of years are required before 
they become apparent.  
 
Our methodology therefore takes a long-term perspective, and ignores short-term, 
year-to-year changes. Where data permit, the start of the quota regime is taken as the 
benchmark situation, and trends are measured in terms of changes over subsequent 
periods of circa 10 years. This means quantifying changes between the mid 1980s and 
the mid 1990s, and again between the mid 1990s and the mid 2000s, and for the 
whole period from the mid 1980s until 2005/06 or 2006/07.  
 
5.2.5 Level of disaggregation 
Many of the hypotheses put forward in Chapter 6 can only be effectively examined at 
a level of aggregation below national level. For example, for those hypotheses based 
on the degree of quota mobility between regions, regional rather than national data are 
needed. Ideally, regional data on dairying would be associated with an environmental 
profile of each region, although this is usually not available. Where the effects of 
prioritising particular regions (such as LFAs or mountainous areas) are concerned, 
disaggregation to NUTS III would be required (under current definitions) but 
information on milk production and quota allocation is generally absent at this level 
of disaggregation. Therefore, use has to be made of data that have been produced by 
existing special studies, if any. For hypotheses relating to the effects of different 
degrees of restriction on quota mobility between producers (even if only within the 
same regions), simple averages of herd sizes, stocking rates and input use are 
insufficient. What is needed are data on herd size distributions and input rates for 
different herd sizes. Lack of data at the appropriate level of disaggregation for certain 
hypotheses has severely limited the kind of empirical results that could be obtained 
for this study. 
 
5.2.6 Summary of methodological considerations  
 
• The causal chain implicit in the research question has been decomposed into two 
stages, quota administration → economic, technical and structural effects → 
environmental effects. 
 
• The strength of the empirical evidence available on these causal links is variable 
over hypotheses, and is relatively sparse for the second order environmental 
effects. Consistent EU data sets including FADN have been used where available. 
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Data on milk production and quota allocations has been drawn from several 
sources, including recent information supplied to DG Agriculture by national 
authorities. 
 
• Evidence from the 12 most recent EU members has not been examined because 
their time frame is too short to provide useful evidence on the causal links implied 
by the research question. Seven Member States, representing 71 per cent of milk 
production in EU 25 and 85 per cent in EU 15 were selected for more detailed 
treatment, and the empirical investigation focuses mainly (but not exclusively) on 
these countries. 
 
• The counterfactual scenario adopted consists of trends in the Member State(s) 
with the least interventionist philosophy towards quota implementation. An 
additional counterfactual scenario is considered in Evaluation Question 2, the 
situation without quota measures with explicit or implicit environmental 
objectives. 
 
• A long time perspective is taken where possible (circa 20 years), as the effects 
under study are medium- or long-term phenomena. Therefore, year-to-year 
changes are not studied. 
 
• The appropriate level of disaggregation is sub-national, and data showing 
distributions (spatial or by farm size) are preferred, given the inadequacy of 
simple (national, ‘all farm’) averages. 
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6 HYPOTHESES LINKING MILK QUOTA IMPLEMENTATION AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES 
There is no simple relationship between the rules governing national quota regimes 
and environmental outcomes on the ground. This is because both the quota 
implementation rules and the possible environmental impacts are multi-dimensional 
and complex, and because the causal pathway is not a direct one. Therefore, a number 
of hypotheses have been developed as a means of analysing the relationship. These 
are explained in this chapter. 
 
When constructing the hypotheses that link differences in Member States’ quota 
implementation approaches to environmental consequences, two different kinds of 
causal pathway can be envisaged. On the one hand, the implementation rules based on 
objective criteria may explicitly seek to target a non-economic objective (such as 
equity, transparency or administrative efficiency). Where this objective is 
environmental maintenance or enhancement, then the causal pathway between the 
implementation rule and environmental effect is relatively straightforward as the 
intention is clear. These cases where an environmental effect is explicitly targeted are 
explored in Chapter 8 under Evaluation Question 2 (EQ2). 
 
More often, however, the environmental outcome will be an unintended, indirect 
consequence of the implementation rule. In this case, the causal pathway will consist 
of two stages. First, national differences in quota implementation will create different 
incentives and constraints for dairy producers, leading to differences in the outcomes 
of economic decisions taken by individual producers and markets. These economic 
decisions may in turn have their own environmental consequences, although these 
consequences will be unintended by the policy maker. In Chapter 7, under Evaluation 
Question 1 (EQ1), we consider the environmental effects that occur as indirect, 
second order, impacts of the reactions and adjustments of producers and markets to 
changed economic incentives 
6.1 Environmental impact of national milk quota implementation (Evaluation 
Question 1) 
Five hypotheses have been formulated about possible causal pathways linking 
implementation features of the quota regulation and environmental impacts. A 
necessary condition for the existence of different indirect environmental effects 
resulting from the way Member States have implemented the milk quota regime, is 
that their approaches have triggered identifiable, perhaps different trends in variables 
like regional mobility or the size distribution of dairy herds. For this reason, there is 
little value in looking for differences in environmental outcomes that might be 
attributed to differences in quota implementation rules in Member States, if there are 
no identifiable impacts of these rules on variables related to production decisions, 
structural change etc. This reasoning implies the need for a sequential procedure both 
for presenting the hypotheses, and for examining them empirically. 
 
Each hypothesis distinguishes between these two elements of the causal chain. Each 
hypothesis first states how differences in quota implementation are expected directly 
to effect outcomes such as structural change, regional location of milk production, 
farm size and producers’ choice of production methods (first order effects), followed 
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by hypotheses about the consequences of each of these outcomes for the environment 
(second order environmental effects). 
 
 Differences in the pattern of structural change and concentration (first order effects) 
are likely to have differing environmental impacts in respect of landscape, water 
quality/pollution, biodiversity, soils, greenhouse gases, air pollution, and ammonia 
pollution inter alia.   
 
The hypotheses relating to the second order environmental effects are necessarily 
more difficult to formulate because local environmental factors may determine 
whether a specific management decision or structural development impacts positively 
or negatively on the environment over time. This means that some of the hypotheses 
specified for the second order effects, are dependent on location specific factors for 
their analysis, with potentially differing outcomes in different areas. Such analysis is 
beyond the scope of this evaluation. It follows, therefore, that, regardless of the 
problem of data availability, empirically supported conclusions will be for the most 
part unavailable regarding environmental consequences. While some region-specific 
conclusions may be possible, it would be dangerous to extrapolate to general 
conclusions. Nevertheless, the hypotheses relating to the second order environmental 
effects are valuable in that they articulate explicitly the kind of environmental effects 
that could be investigated by more detailed, micro-oriented research, and because they 
provide policy makers with a wider view of possible outcomes. 
 
The following general considerations and assumptions underlie the hypotheses that 
are specified about the link between economic decisions and environmental effects: 
• There is the potential for both environmental damage and benefit to arise from 
the keeping and management of dairy cows and followers; 
• These impacts arise from fodder production wherever it occurs as well as from 
the cows themselves and the areas where they are kept; 
• A range of factors needs to be considered, including the total number of dairy 
cows, (which will affect manure production and methane emissions, for 
example) their breed, the systems and forms of management employed, the 
sources of feed and fodder, the management of fodder crops, manure handling 
facilities and management, and many other variables; 
• It is also relevant to take account of the known or likely alternative 
management of the land in cases where the economic decision is to cease dairy 
production. 
 
Hypotheses about the consequences of different quota implementation approaches are 
presented below, under three main headings. Each heading specifies a particular way 
in which differences in quota implementation might manifest themselves with respect 
to the first-round decision. Differences might show up in terms of: 
 
• Degrees of quota mobility 
o between regions (affecting regional quota shares) 
o between producers (affecting size distribution of herds)   
• Decisions to cease milk production (affecting producer exit rates, the 
number of dairy farms and land use).  
• Specific production decisions (affecting timing of production or input use) 
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In each case, the hypothesis concerning direct first order effects is linked to a 
hypothesis specifying the potential indirect second order environmental effect of the 
direct impacts. 
 
It should be pointed out that the ‘least restrictive’ (most market-oriented) case is taken 
as the base case and is in effect the counterfactual. Each hypothesis concerns how 
outcomes are expected to be different, relative to this base case, when implementation 
rules incorporate a particular kind of restriction or constraint. This follows from our 
choice of the ‘least restrictive’ case as the counterfactual – see section 5.2.3.  
 
Table 6.1 summarises the six hypotheses developed for evaluation; four in relation to 
the environmental impact of national milk quota regimes (EQ1) and two in relation to 
the effectiveness of environmental objectives associated with national quota 
implementation (EQ2). 
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Table 6.1 Summary of hypotheses  
  
Type of Restriction 
Characteristic of the 
‘least restrictive’ 
model 
First  order effects (relative to 
the ‘least restrictive’ model) 
Second order environmental effects  Comment 
1 Quota trading confined 
within regions, or 
administrative transfers 
only within regions 
Unified national market 
for quota, no 
impediments to 
transactions between 
regions or zones 
Limited shifts in regional shares 
of quota, as the only inter-
regional mobility is via the 
national reserve 
Potential environmental effects (positive 
or negative) of long-term trends in 
location of milk production are slowed 
down or stopped. May be positive or 
negative. To the extent that regional 
concentration is avoided, certain 
environmental effects will always be 
positive 
The same degree of inter-regional 
quota mobility may be 
environmentally beneficial in one 
country, but harmful in another, 
depending on conditions in the 
regions of outflow and inflow 
2 No quota trading 
between producers 
even within regions; 
administrative transfers 
only between producers 
Unified national market 
for quota, no 
impediments to 
transactions between 
regions or zones 
Slower upward shift in herd size 
distribution, slower growth in 
average herd size  → weaker 
tendency towards scale induced 
intensification of production 
method 
Various environmental consequences of 
greater intensification, nearly all 
unambiguously negative, are avoided or 
slowed down  
If herd sizes were already relatively 
large at the start of the quota 
period, the intensification effect 
will be smaller. No strong 
difference in environmental effects 
compared with the ‘no mobility’ 
situation 
3 Exiting producers 
cannot obtain ‘market 
value’ for their quota 
separate from other 
assets (farm, land) 
Exiting producers can 
sell quota detached 
from land at the ‘market 
rate’, and without 
giving up their farm  
Slower exit rate, slower decline 
in number of herd and slower 
growth in remaining herd sizes, 
quota more likely to stay on the 
farm, land less likely to go to 
alternative use or be abandoned  
Potential environmental effects vary 
depending on (a) what would have been 
the alternative land use when dairying 
ceases, or (b) the local circumstances if 
the land is abandoned 
Faster rate of dairy cessations 
means that quota is being absorbed 
elsewhere; the net environmental 
effect depends on where this freed 
quota is going, and whether or not 
it is environmentally neutral 
4 Transfers/ allocations 
of new quota linked to 
constraints or incentives 
regarding input use 
No input-related 
constraints or 
preferences govern who 
can buy, sell or receive 
quota 
Substitution amongst inputs will 
occur, against (in favour of) 
inputs linked to constraints 
(incentives) 
Potential environmental impact may be 
positive or negative, according to the 
particular input concerned, and whether 
it is constrained or favoured 
Will apply only to those producers 
transferring quota or receiving new 
allocations. Would require a micro 
study to verify these effects 
empirically 
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Type of Restriction 
Characteristic of the 
‘least restrictive’ 
model 
First  order effects (relative to 
the ‘least restrictive’ model) 
Second order environmental effects  Comment 
5 Milk quota regimes with 
explicit environmental 
objectives 
Not applicable Less dairying or more extensive 
dairying is expected to occur in 
certain regions relative to 
counterfactual. 
Range of environmental benefits (e.g. 
biodiversity, landscape, water quality 
etc) is expected where explicit objective 
is achieved.  
Member States allowed to specific 
‘improving the environment’ as a 
possible objective for restructuring 
programmes. Few examples in 
practice though.  
6 Milk quota regimes with 
implicit environmental 
objectives (e.g. 
retention of production 
in the LFA) 
Not applicable Depends on objective of 
measure. Maintenance of dairy 
production in LFA or other 
targeted areas expected at 
higher level than counterfactual 
(where this is the objective).  
Range of environmental benefits (e.g. 
biodiversity, landscape, water quality 
etc) expected depending on nature of 
implicit objective. 
Significant variation in 
environmental impact of dairy 
production in LFA – not all 
beneficial. Most potential for 
environmental benefits associated 
with traditional low input/output 
systems in mountain regions.  
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Two aspects of the structure of the milk-producing sector in Europe are of particular 
relevance to this study. These are the spatial distribution and the size distribution of 
dairy production units. This section elaborates hypotheses relating to these two 
dimensions.  
6.1.1 Quota mobility between regions 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Regional quota mobility 
 
First order effects 
Member States that either permit market transfers only within regions or that 
allow only administrative transfers of quota under the control of local 
administrations are subject to less mobility of quota between regions than 
Member States that permit national markets in transferable quota to operate 
(with environmental implications – see below). 
 
Second order environmental effects 
The environmental impact of constraining or preventing regional quota mobility 
will vary, depending on the consequences avoided by not allowing regional 
transfer relative to the environmental consequences of keeping quota in its 
original region. 
 
This is an important hypothesis for two reasons. First, there has been considerable 
variation in Member States’ rules for relating to the mobility of quota, over the entire 
period, both in their underlying philosophy and the detailed operation of their quota 
transfer mechanisms. Second, the extent of regional quota mobility is potentially 
significant in terms of indirect environmental consequences arising from varying 
situations.   For example, the dominant production system may differ between regions 
gaining and losing quota, and if these differences between systems apply to those 
farms affected by production transfers, they could have environmental consequences.  
Additionally, in regions gaining quota, the density of dairy farms may become 
concentrated to such a point that it causes an excessive environmental load. 
Conversely, ‘de-concentration’ may occur in other regions.  
 
For Member States that for many years have allowed national quota markets to 
operate, it is likely that the current regional distribution of milk production differs 
little from what it would have been in the absence of the quota regime, although the 
level of production will be different. Therefore, if national quota markets and higher 
regional quota mobility have led to a change in environmental conditions in certain 
regions, the decision to allow a national quota market cannot be considered the prime 
cause of this result. However, Member States that have not allowed a free market at 
national level in transferable quota, thereby reducing the degree of regional mobility, 
may have avoided harmful effects by keeping quota in its original region, or indeed 
may have foregone a net environmental improvement by doing so.  
 
One of the key environmental issues relating to the regional mobility of quota is the 
extent to which this leads to a decline of dairying in marginal areas. Dairying within 
marginal areas, generally at higher altitudes, including LFAs, tends to be 
predominantly grass-based, using permanent pasture and usually operating with 
relatively low stocking densities. In many, but not all, cases these systems support 
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more biodiversity-rich habitats than found on lowland dairy farms. The loss of dairy 
production from these areas brings with it a risk of these semi-natural habitats being 
lost and replaced by other land uses which are often of lesser environmental quality. 
 
When considering this hypothesis, it is useful to bear in mind that the larger regional 
shifts or the scaling-up of farm size that are expected for Member States with a free 
quota market are not caused by the quota market. However, because of the costs of 
acquiring quota these trends can be assumed to occur more slowly than would be the 
case without quotas at all. On the other hand, regional shifts that are small relative to 
the pre-quota period, or slower rates of growth in average herd sizes, hypothesised for 
Member States with restrictions on transfers, can be attributed to these restrictive 
features of their quota regime. 
 
6.1.2 Quota mobility between producers  
 
Hypothesis 2:  Scale increases and intensification 
 
First order effects 
Restrictions on quota mobility between producers will slow down increases in 
average herd sizes. Since intensification tends to increase with herd size, this is 
likely to slow down intensification of production methods (including higher input 
use and stocking densities). There may also be implications for the degree of 
specialisation in dairying. 
 
Second order environmental effects 
In general, more intensive production systems are associated with greater 
negative environmental impacts. Therefore, adverse environmental effects that 
are mitigated by regimes that restrict quota mobility between producers include: 
• Greater use of concentrated feeds/silage maize will often have negative 
impacts on the environment, particularly in relation to water 
quality/biodiversity/landscape. 
• More production within indoor systems although the relative environmental 
impacts of indoor versus outdoor systems depend significantly on specific 
features such as provisions for manure management and stocking densities. 
• Changes in breed of dairy cows – from local varieties to more input-
demanding breeds or dual purpose breeds – are likely to have negative 
environmental impacts on soil, air and water and possibly on traditional 
landscape values although they may be beneficial in terms of greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
• Higher stocking densities associated with greater aggregate negative 
environmental impacts unless offset by better management. 
 
Even when quota regions are ring-fenced (regardless of whether quota transfer 
involves market transactions or administrative reallocation), the extent to which quota 
transfer is permitted between producers is likely to have consequences for the 
distribution of milk production by size of herd (scale effects). Total herd numbers will 
decline, average herd size will increase and the ‘typical litre’ of milk will come from a 
larger-sized herd.  
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There are two reasons why such scale increases might not be neutral for the 
environment. First, if the same volume of milk production is concentrated on fewer 
agricultural holdings, it is likely to be less dispersed around the countryside. If so, the 
environmental load in specific local sites will be affected. Second, regardless of 
spatial concentration of milk production or regional production shifts, increases in 
scale of production can have environmental effects through changes in production 
methods. This is the focus of this hypothesis.  
 
As set out in Chapter 4, more intensive systems generally have higher inputs and 
outputs per hectare and higher stocking densities and as a result tend to be more 
harmful for the environment than the minority of genuinely extensive systems, 
particularly in relation to biodiversity and landscape. The position with greenhouse 
gas emissions is much less clear.  
 
It is also important to recognise, however, that increasing scale may also have 
environmentally positive aspects. For example, more efficient waste management 
technologies may become economically viable with larger herd sizes, and greenhouse 
gas emissions may be reduced in some intensive systems.  
 
6.1.3 Incentives to cease milk production 
 
Hypothesis 3:  Cessation of production 
 
First order effects 
In Member States where producers cannot sell their quota separately at a price 
equal to its ‘true economic value’ or where quota can only be sold in the context 
of a farm sale, it is expected that the exit rate from the dairy sector will be lower 
than in Member States where a ‘market price’ for giving up quota can be earned 
without having to sell the farm. 
 
Second order environmental effects 
• Cessation of intensive dairying systems will generally be environmentally 
beneficial in most cases. 
• Cessation of extensive dairying systems in marginal areas where milk 
production based on grazing is the sole economically viable land use, is likely 
to be environmentally negative, leading potentially to land abandonment, 
scrub encroachment, loss of biodiversity, and so on.  
 
Where quota markets do not exist, the only way of ‘selling’ quota is as one of the 
farm’s fixed assets when the whole farm is sold. The extra value the quota adds to the 
total price of the farm will be diluted by other characteristics of the farm, and will not 
be as high as if the farmer had been able to offer the quota separately from the farm 
on an open market. If producers can cash in the value of their quota on a quota 
market, there is a greater incentive for producers with marginal herds who cannot earn 
sufficient income, or those who wish to exit from dairy production for other reasons, 
to do so. If they stay in farming, the cash obtained from selling their quota can act as 
start-up money to invest in a new farming enterprise. Alternatively, it can assist their 
re-establishment outside farming or contribute to their retirement pension. Where the 
value of quota can only be realised by selling the farm, or at an administrative price 
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that does not reflect what is thought to be its true value, then the incentive to quit will 
be reduced. Even in these cases, however, a decline in producer numbers will still be 
observed since many other factors contribute to the exodus of farmers from dairying.  
 
The environmental effects of slowing down the rate of cessation are not clear cut. 
Differences in the rate of disappearance of dairy farms are likely to have 
environmental impacts. However, these will be location-specific. If the land remains 
in agriculture and is used in a more environmentally friendly way, the results will be 
beneficial. If the land is reassigned to other uses such as forestry, tourist facilities, 
urban construction or road developments, the environmental effects will depend on 
the relative environmental impact of these other uses. 
 
6.1.4 Incentives to alter production decisions  
 
Hypothesis 4:  Constraints and incentives with respect to input use 
 
First order effects 
Where constraints or incentives regarding inputs are attached to rules for quota 
allocation or transfer, producers’ decisions regarding input use will be 
influenced against or in favour of these inputs, or producers already using little 
or more of these inputs will gain quota share relative to others. 
 
Second order environmental effects 
The relative levels and proportions of various inputs used, and substitution 
between inputs, are not environmentally neutral, and have a variety of potential 
environmental impacts.  
 
This hypothesis groups together the various constraints and incentives that Member 
States have attached to their rules for quota allocation and transfer. For example, 
where administrative transfers of quota favour producers with investment plans, this 
may create positive incentives to upgrade fixed investment on the farm. By contrast, 
when quota expansion has relied on the quota market, on-farm investment competes 
for financial resources with market purchases of quota, which may lead indirectly to a 
lower level of on-farm investment in more environmentally oriented fixed equipment 
or infrastructure. Other examples involve attaching conditions on stocking densities to 
farms buying quota, fixing a quota/land maximum ratio for transfers of quota with 
land or favouring the acquisition of quota by particular groups of farmers.  
 
The environmental effects of quota-induced biases against or towards the use of 
particular inputs will depend on the nature of the inputs concerned (and those with 
which they are substituted)  
 
6.2 Effectiveness of quota measures with environmental objectives (Evaluation 
Question 2) 
The final two hypotheses concern those parts of Member States’ implementation rules 
that, as well as specifying a mechanism or a constraint relevant to the operation of the 
milk quota scheme, also have either an explicit or an implicit environmental objective. 
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6.2.1 Explicit environmental objectives 
 
Hypothesis 5: Milk quota regimes with explicit environmental objectives 
 
First order effects 
Where Member State milk quota regimes have explicit environmental objectives, 
then less dairying or more extensive dairying is expected to occur in certain 
regions of those Member States, relative to the counterfactual. 
 
Second order environmental effects 
Where Member State milk quota regimes with explicit environmental objectives 
have led to less dairying or more extensive dairying, then a range of 
environmental benefits (e.g. biodiversity, landscape, water quality etc) is 
expected to have been provided.  
 
This hypothesis is related to Hypothesis 4 above. It assumes that any explicit 
environmental objectives address key issues relating to the dairy sector in the Member 
State concerned. Measures relating to the allocation and transfer of milk quota, with 
explicit environmental protection or enhancement objectives, could be expected to 
have contributed, on certain farms and in certain areas, to the continuation of milk 
production where land has been released for the purposes of improving the 
environment, the extensification of milk production, and the abandonment of milk 
production. In practice, this would equate to some, or all, of the following impacts, in 
certain areas: a reduction in milk production; a decrease in the number of dairy cows; 
a decrease in stocking density; and a change in the type, extent and management of 
forage crops and inputs such as fertilisers, concentrates and feedstuffs.  The nature of 
environmental impacts is very dependent on the location of the dairying affected and 
the management systems used.   
 
6.2.2 Implicit environmental objectives 
 
Hypothesis 6: Milk quota regimes with implicit environmental objectives 
 
First order effects 
Where Member States have milk quota measures with implicit environmental 
objectives relating to the LFA, then milk production, dairy cows and dairy farms 
are expected to have been maintained in LFAs and/or other priority areas at a 
higher level than otherwise. Where these objectives relate to limits on milk 
production, levels of production are expected to be maintained or reduced. 
 
Second order environmental effects 
Where milk quota measures with implicit environmental objectives have led to 
reduced production or the maintenance of dairying in LFAs and/or other 
priority areas, then a range of environmental benefits (e.g. biodiversity, 
landscape etc) is expected to have been maintained.  
 
This hypothesis is related to Hypothesis 1 above, which deals with regional quota 
mobility. Milk quota regimes with implicit environmental objectives in the form of 
geographic or other priorities/rules for the allocation or transfer of milk quota can be 
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expected to have sustained milk production, dairy cows and dairy farms in LFAs and 
other priority areas at a higher level than under the counterfactual. 
 
The nature of environmental impacts is dependent on the nature on the target areas 
and management systems involved. However more extensive grass-based dairying 
systems are likely to have been maintained in LFAs potentially with biodiversity, 
landscape and other benefits.  
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7 THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF MILK QUOTA 
IMPLEMENTATION AT MEMBER STATE LEVEL  
Evaluation Question 1  
To what extent are the different systems of application of the milk quota regime in 
the individual Member States relating to allocation and transfer of milk quota in 
coherence with the obligation of integrating the environmental protection 
requirements into the CAP (Article 6 of the EC Treaty54) over the evaluation period?  
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers the extent to which the different ways of implementing the 
milk quota regime in Member States have impacted on various aspects of producer 
behaviour and, when this has occurred, the potential environmental implications of 
these behavioural changes.   
 
As discussed in Chapter 6 (Hypotheses), the mechanisms set up to implement milk 
quotas may influence structural change in the sector (including location of milk 
production and size structure of dairy herds), producers’ decisions regarding the type 
of farming system used and, for any given farming system, the degree of intensity of 
input use. These impacts on structure and production systems will in turn have 
environmental implications. Thus, the causal chain between implementation rules and 
environmental effects is broken down into two stages: the effect of implementation 
rules on where and how milk is produced (direct effects on the sector), and the 
consequences for these changes on the environment (indirect second order effects on 
the environment). 
 
In this chapter, the evidence relating to each of our hypotheses is examined, beginning 
in each case with the direct effect of different quota implementation approaches on 
producers’ decisions, followed by an analysis of the potential indirect environmental 
impacts.   
7.2 Hypotheses 1: Regional quota mobility  
First order effects 
Member States that either permit market transfers only within regions or that 
allow only administrative transfers of quota under the control of local 
administrations experience less mobility of quota between regions than Member 
States that permit national markets in transferable quota to operate. 
 
Second order environmental effects 
The environmental impact of constraining or preventing regional quota mobility 
will vary, depending on the consequences avoided by not allowing regional 
transfer relative to the environmental consequences of keeping quota in its 
original region. 
                                                 
54 Consolidated EC Treaty, Article 6: “Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into 
the definition and implementation of the Community policies and activities referred to in Article 3, in 
particular with a view to promoting sustainable development.” 
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Spatial mobility of quota can occur between sites that are rather close to each other, or 
between distinct regions. Our analysis focuses on mobility of quota between regions 
because (a) data are not available on spatial transfers within regions, and (b) transfers 
between regions generally have greater policy relevance (in terms of regional 
employment and income levels, rural depopulation and so on). Clearly, transfers 
within regions may also involve spatial relocation that is environmentally significant 
as appears in some case studies. However, the European data available to this study 
do not permit us to develop this aspect.  
 
A basic assumption of this study is that, when quota is transferred in a free market, 
and especially when that market can operate without barriers at national level, there 
will be greater mobility of quota between regions than when transfers are 
geographically restricted or when they occur by local non-market reallocation. A 
second basic assumption is that quota will flow to areas with greater comparative 
advantage in dairying. This often means that quota moves to areas that are 
intrinsically more productive for dairying and that, consequently, dairying in more 
marginal areas will decline. However, it is possible that in areas that are very 
productive for dairying, production of other higher-value commodities is even more 
profitable. In this case, an outflow of quota from areas of high productivity towards 
areas where there is less competition from alternative land uses might be observed, 
even though the latter do not offer the highest rates of technical productivity.   
 
The environmental effects of the movements in milk production will depend 
considerably on the location of new or expanded dairy enterprises and the 
management systems used. For example, if milk production moves from an area 
vulnerable to the leaching of nitrates and heavy metals to an area where there was 
greater buffering capacity, then this would be likely to have a positive environmental 
effect depending, of course, on farm management. However, the type of production 
that takes over from dairying in the area from which it has moved, as well as the 
systems that dairying has replaced within the region it has moved to, also need to be 
taken into account to assess the overall environmental impact. Although it is difficult 
to generalise as to the environmental impacts of quota mobility, it is likely that quota 
will be attracted to regions where combinations of agro-climatic, topographic and 
structural conditions favour higher-performance production systems, and the intensive 
nature of such systems tends to create environment pressures, the severity of which 
depends partly on farm management. 
 
Where dairy production moves from marginal areas to more fertile, productive land, 
the nature of the production system is likely to change from one characterised by 
extensive grazing, predominantly on permanent grassland, with low inputs to one that 
is more intensive, with higher levels of inputs, higher stocking densities, use of more 
intensive, often temporary, grassland and an increased area devoted to forage crops. 
This shift from predominantly extensive to intensive systems often will have an 
overall negative effect on the environment, although the nature and extent of these 
impacts will vary from location to location.  
 
Where dairy production becomes more concentrated in those areas that are most 
suited to high productivity, this is likely to increase the degree of environmental 
pressure on these areas, particularly in relation to water quality and quantity, air 
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quality and landscape character. For example, higher levels of nutrient loading will be 
likely within a catchment as a result of increasing volumes of manure, higher 
applications of fertilisers across an increased area of temporary grass or forage maize 
(at the expense of permanent grassland). There will also be greater potential for 
increased losses to air through greater slurry production and higher levels of nitrogen 
fertiliser use. At the same time restrictions on farm management linked to 
implementation of national or regional NVZ Action Programmes have the potential to 
mitigate such impacts, at least in areas that have been designated as Nitrate 
Vulnerable Zones under the Nitrates Directive and where implementation of the 
Directive has been pursued effectively (see Section 4.2.3 for an overview of NVZ 
implementation). Particularly in drier regions, the concentration of cattle will increase 
the competition for water resources with other agricultural and non-agricultural uses, 
adding pressure to the water table, with implications for the broader environment in 
relation to species and habitat diversity. 
 
The effects of regional deconcentration depend on the initial density of dairying 
before outflows of quota took place. If the density was high, and congestion problems 
were present, then relieving the environmental pressures by reducing density would 
be beneficial. At the other extreme, if milk production was providing positive 
environmental services in a particular region with low dairying density and, because 
of quota outflow, its density falls below the minimum level at which these services 
can be provided, then the environmental impact is negative. 
 
Quota mobility is particularly pertinent to dairy activity in marginal LFAs where it 
tends to use predominantly grass-based systems, mainly permanent pasture, with low 
stocking densities. In some cases, these systems support valuable biodiversity-rich 
habitats such as alpine pasture. The loss of dairy production from these areas brings 
with it a risk of these habitats being lost and being replaced by other land uses which 
may be of lesser environmental quality, particularly if farms are abandoned and 
pasture is replaced by scrub.  
 
Given these considerations, when examining regional mobility of quota, special 
attention has to be paid to any differential treatment applied to transfers in and out of 
LFAs, or otherwise specified vulnerable and protected areas. A liberal market-
oriented regime that ring-fences such areas could offer a good solution for balancing 
economic and environmental objectives or at least preventing one of the more 
negative potential effects of totally unrestricted market transactions in quota. Member 
States that have operated such ring-fencing have tended to use barriers that are 
permeable in one direction: that is, quota can flow into these protected areas but not 
out of them. 
 
Comparing the extent of regional quota mobility between Member States ideally 
requires long time series of quota holdings based on regional classifications at 
approximately the same level of disaggregation. Three types of data problems have 
arisen in this context. First, where regional information on quota holdings was not 
available, we have had to use regional data on milk production or deliveries. As long 
as quotas are binding, these three variables – quota, production and deliveries, or at 
least their changes over time – are reasonably good proxies for each other. Second, it 
has been impossible to obtain data on regional changes in quota distribution for all 
Member States since the start of the quota regime. Where these data have not been 
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available for the early years of the period, we have taken the longest period available. 
Third, levels of regional disaggregation are not always comparable. Clearly, the 
higher the level of regional aggregation (i.e. fewer, larger regions), the fewer transfers 
will show up as shifts between regions. For comparisons where this might be 
misleading, a comment has been included. 
 
This section begins with a detailed comparison of mobility in the UK (England and 
Wales), which offers the longest running example of a highly market-oriented 
approach (which is less true of the UK as a whole due to regional restrictions on quota 
mobility in place prior to the abolition of the Milk Marketing Boards in 1994), and 
France, where market mechanisms have not been used and administrative reallocation 
has favoured local producers. Environmental consequences, attributable to inter-
regional mobility, are also evaluated for these two countries. In the second part of the 
section, there is a more general discussion of quota mobility and its effects in a 
number of other Member States. 
 
7.2.1 Comparison of France with the UK (England and Wales) 
General developments in France and in the UK (England and Wales) 
Table 7.1 below provides some basic comparative data on the developments under 
milk quotas in France and England and Wales. 
 
Table 7.1 France, and England and Wales: basic data 
 France England & 
Wales 
Period covered 1983/4 – 2006/7 1984/5 – 2006/7 
Number of milk producers at start of period 384,945 37,815 
Reduction in number of milk producers (%) 75.5 65.6 
Reduction in national production (quota) over the 
period (%) 
12.2 12.5 
Largest regional production outflow1 (%) 17.8 (Centre) 56.9 (South East)
Largest regional production gain1 (%) 2.9 (Massif 
Central) 
18.1 (North) 
Average output per herd at start of period2 66 333 
Increase in output per herd (%) 158.0 54.7 
Largest regional average scale, 20062 375 (South West) 1162 (South 
East) 
Smallest regional average scale, 20062 183 (North) 687 (Wales) 
Ratio largest : smallest average scale, 2006 2.0 1.7 
1. Based on regional breakdowns consisting of 7 regions in France, and 10 regions in the UK 
(England and Wales). 
2.  Output measured in tons per herd for France, thousand litres per herd for the UK (England and 
Wales). 
 
These figures indicate that: 
• Producer buy-out schemes in France and the possibility for producers to cash in 
on quota value via the market in the UK (England and Wales) achieved 
comparable rates of reduction in producer numbers (and one must bear in mind 
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that the UK had fewer very small dairy farms than France at the start of the 
period). 
• Regional inflows and outflows of quota are substantially higher in the UK 
(England and Wales) than in France. It may be tempting to think that this result 
occurs because there are fewer regions in the classification for France, but this 
statistical feature cannot account for the large differences in maximum inflow and 
outflow. In fact, even when France is broken down into 22 regions, the greatest 
regional loss is only 22.9 per cent (from Poitou-Charentes) and the greatest 
regional gain is 15.3 per cent (in Languedoc-Roussillon). These changes are still 
considerably smaller than those observed for England and Wales with 11 regions. 
• Scale increases have been far greater in France than in the UK (England and 
Wales), although the much lower starting point in France must explain at least part 
of this. 
• The ratio of average scale in the regions with largest and smallest average scale of 
production is comparable in the two countries. 
 
Quota mobility in the UK 
For the first nine years of the milk quota regime, trading in permanent quota was 
permitted only within Milk Marketing Board areas, resulting in one integrated market 
for England and Wales, four separate markets in Scotland and one in Northern 
Ireland. From 1993 on, sales of permanent quota between parties anywhere the UK 
were permitted. A year later, the temporary leasing market was also freed from 
restrictions on movements within the UK.55 It is therefore interesting to consider the 
first nine years separately from the whole period. 
 
Figure 7.1 shows the regional changes in production in percentage terms during the 
first nine years of the scheme. Falls in production occurred everywhere but in 
percentage terms reductions were much higher than the England and Wales average in 
southern and eastern parts of England and relatively small in the South West, West 
and Wales. Production in the South Eastern region fell by nearly 28 per cent, but by 
only just over 3 per cent in the Far Western region which is a more important 
production region. There was less heterogeneity in the rate of reduction in the number 
of producers, which varied between 22 per cent and 37 per cent. Percentage scale 
increases are relatively large in North Wales and the Far West regions, which started 
the period with the smallest herd sizes. The greater rate of decline in producer 
numbers than in quota in every region indicates that exiting producers tended to have 
below average size quota holdings. This resulted in an increase in scale in all regions.  
  
                                                 
55 Ring-fencing was retained only for the Scottish Islands, more for economic than environmental 
reasons. 
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Figure 7.1 Regional changes in milk production, milk producers and milk 
output per herd: 1984/5-1993/4, for the UK (England and Wales)56 
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Source: Based on figures from the MMB (England and Wales) and the Milk Development Council. 
Note: The figures shown in this diagram relate to the percentage change in production over the period. 
 
                                                 
56 In the mid-1990s, the definition and composition of regions in England and Wales changed. In order 
to allow regional trends to be quantified over the long term, regional production levels for 2006/7 
have been recalculated from county data according to the old regional boundary definitions. In 
particular, what is currently the English region ‘South West’ was in the old classification broken 
down into ‘Far Western’ and ‘Mid Western’. 
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Figure 7.2 Regional changes milk production, milk producers and milk 
output per herd: 1984/5-2006/7, England and Wales 
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Source: Based on figures from the MMB (England and Wales) and the Milk Development Council. 
Note: The figures shown in this diagram relate to the percentage change in production over the period. 
 
Over the evaluation period as a whole (see Figure 7.2), regional changes in producer 
numbers and average output per herd are relatively close in percentage terms to the 
national average changes. The fall in producer numbers ranged from 54 to 82 per cent, 
whilst the growth in output per head was between 124 per cent and 158 per cent 
(except for the outliers Wales and the Far West). However, there is considerable 
divergence concerning changes in quota. The pattern of gaining and losing regions is 
very strong: milk production fell steeply in the eastern and southern parts of England, 
and increased in the North, Wales and the Far Western regions. These regions have 
comparative advantage in milk production, and by 2006/7 they were producing 42 per 
cent of milk output in the UK (England and Wales). However, they are still 
characterised by average herd sizes (measured in terms of milk output per holding) 
that are below the national average. The largest herd sizes (on average over one 
million litres per holding) are found in the three regions that have experienced the 
greatest outflow of production: East, South East and South. None of these are major 
production regions. 
 
The greater part of agricultural land in England is in Nitrate Vulnerable Zones 
(NVZs). Exceptions are in the North East and North West of England, part of the 
West Midlands near the Welsh border and large parts of the Mid West and Far West. 
Less than 3 per cent of Wales is designated as a NVZ57. At a regional level there 
therefore seems to have been some movement towards parts of the country with fewer 
designated NVZs. However, dairying may be expanding on the best land within these 
regions and within more nitrate sensitive catchments. Moreover, increasing 
concentration in Wales and the South West may well have had negative effects on a 
                                                 
57 There is current discussion about extending NVZ designations in the UK.  
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variety of other environmental indicators, for which hard empirical evidence is not 
readily available. The crucial question concerns the totality of environmental impacts 
of moving some milk production from the eastern side of the country, where it is 
likely to have been replaced predominantly by arable cropping, to the western side of 
the country where dairy cattle numbers are still falling despite the larger share of 
national milk production found there. Given the location-specific nature of some 
environmental impacts, the ‘total environmental impact’, which involves many 
diverse consequences in different locations, some of which will be positive and others 
negative, remains an attractive concept but empirically very complex to measure.  
 
It should be stressed that the structural and environmental consequences of allowing 
maximum quota mobility would almost certainly have happened without a quota 
scheme at all, and are largely the unintended by-product of economic decisions taken 
by profit-oriented agricultural producers. Therefore, all that can be said is that the 
market-oriented approach did not strongly impede these movements. Whether it 
allowed them to happen slightly more quickly or more slowly than would have 
happened without quotas in place depends on the balance of two opposing factors. On 
the one hand, allowing producers to sell quota without having to sell their farm and 
with some start-up capital for establishing other enterprises, could have accelerated 
the decision to quit dairying. On the other hand, quota buyers needed to find the 
capital not only to finance the on-farm start-up or expansion of their dairy enterprise, 
but also to purchase quota, and this could have slowed down these structural trends 
relative to the no-quota situation.      
 
Based on the evidence to hand, regional mobility is likely to have had mixed impacts 
on the environment with some areas losing a significant share of dairy in the land use 
mix, and others gaining their share of production without necessarily more dairy 
cattle. It should be borne in mind that water pollution is still a significant 
environmental issue in many areas that are not designated as NVZ, and any increase 
in pressure, whether in terms of stocking density or input use, is likely to increase 
adverse environmental effects. 
 
Quota mobility in France 
Figure 7.3 shows the regional rates of quota loss and gain in percentage terms, 
ranging between a loss of nearly 18 per cent in the Centre to a gain of about 3 per cent 
in the Massif Central. These rates are significant but the range is much narrower than 
for the UK (England and Wales), indicating less regional mobility of quota in France. 
The reduction in the number of milk producers shows less regional variation. At 
national level, the reduction was over 75 per cent. The smallest reduction (North) was 
7 per cent points lower, and the largest (South West) was 7 per cent points above the 
national average. In all regions, producers left the sector at a faster rate than the 
decline in quota, increasing the average scale of operation everywhere.  
 
Four cases can be identified. First, in the East, North and Massif Central, the decline 
in both quota and producers was smaller than the corresponding national average, 
however, average output per head increased faster than the national average in the 
Massif Central. Second, in the South West, Centre and West, production and producer 
numbers both fell more steeply than the national average and yet the average scale of 
production also rose more sharply than the national rate in the first two regions, 
because of the substantially faster decline in herd numbers. Third, in the South East, 
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production hardly changed but producers left the sector at a faster rate than for France 
as a whole, leading to above-average scale increases in percentage terms. Fourth, in 
the West the greater production fall and smaller producer exodus relative to the 
national picture reinforced each other to produce smaller changes in average scale. 
 
Figure 7.3 Regional change in milk production, milk producers and milk 
output per herd: 1983/4-2006/7, France 
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Source: Based on data provided by the French Authorities in response to DG Agri’s questionnaire. 
Note: The figures shown in this diagram relate to the percentage change in production over the period. 
 
At national level, output per holding increased by 258 per cent between 1983/4 and 
2006/7. Percentage increases in scale were largest in the two regions (South-west and 
Centre) with the greatest percentage reductions in total production. This was also true 
at sub-regional level, where the largest increases in average scale were in areas with 
the greatest reduction in production. The smallest increase in average scale occurred 
in the North, where the scale of milk production was already relatively high at the 
start of the period. For the most part, the regions with the greatest scale increases 
started the period with below-average levels of output per herd. This means that 
differential rates of increase in scale have had the result of reducing regional and sub-
regional scale differences. Average scale at regional and sub-regional level is now 
much more homogeneous across France than in 1983/4. However, production scale is 
still much smaller than the national average in Mediterranean areas (Rhône-Alpes, 
Provence, Alpes and Côte d’Azur), and in Auvergne. 
 
The regional changes shown in Figure 7.3 mask movements towards greater 
concentration that are discernible in the data at sub-regional level. For example, 
within the South East region, production in Languedoc-Roussillon grew by over 15 
per cent during the period, largely at the expense of production in Provence, Alpes 
and Côte d’Azur. Within the relatively small Massif Central area, production grew by 
about 5 per cent in Auvergne, which already produced the greater part of the region’s 
milk, but it fell by 8 per cent in Limousin. We have not been able to ascertain whether 
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these trends within regions produced concentration to a point where it was likely to 
have a significant environmental impact. 
 
A first impression from this analysis of developments in France is that the lack of a 
free quota market has not prevented substantial regional quota mobility. However, the 
three regions responsible for over 70 per cent of France’s milk production (West, 
North and East) experienced percentage changes quite close to the national average. 
The larger changes relate to less important regions. In contrast, the Massif Central, 
South and East regions, which gained or maintained production over the period, 
together account for only about 12 per cent of national production. At the same time, 
changes for the sub-regions within the most important milk-producing region (the 
West, with over 46 per cent of production) show similar individual rates of loss as the 
whole region, indicating that the net quota flows between these sub-regions were 
small. Therefore, in terms of the total volume of quota shifting between regions, 
mobility has been quite low in France.  
 
The environmental consequences of this relatively stable pattern are hard to assess. A 
crucial question is whether, in a more market-oriented setting, milk production would 
have fallen more quickly in the West. Within this region, Brittany alone produces 20 
per cent of French milk output. Thus, there is a high density of dairy cows. There is 
also strong competition from intensive livestock rearing. Nearly all of Brittany is 
designated as a Nitrate Vulnerable Zone (NVZ). The fall in milk production in 
Brittany was four percentage points higher than the national average, suggesting some 
lessening of interest in milk production. The question is whether, with a free quota 
market and presumably strong quota prices during at least part of the period, 
producers in the East and North regions (where quota fell less than the national 
average) would not have captured a greater share of Breton quota.  
 
Chatellier (2003) believes that because administrative reallocation of the national 
reserve at departmental level has kept milk production dispersed widely across the 
territory of France, this has acted to prevent further concentration of pollution and 
other environmental stress. This may well be true for some regions but must be 
assessed against the background of falling dairy cattle numbers and so reduced 
pressures in many areas, even those gaining a higher share of national production. It 
can also be argued that, in other regions, the French system of local administrative 
management may have impeded some environmentally desirable deconcentration; 
that is, it may have prevented quota movements out of areas already subject to high 
levels of environmental stress towards areas with greater capacity for environmentally 
sustainable dairy production.  
 
In order to highlight the consequences of the redistribution that has occurred, Table 
7.2 provides evidence comparing farming systems in the Auvergne (a low-intensity 
LFA that gained quota) and Brittany (a high-intensity, environmentally stressed area 
with an above-average loss of quota). On average, stocking densities are 60 per cent 
higher in Brittany, farming systems use very little pasture and the use of maize silage 
is well above the national average. Fertiliser use by dairy farmers is also much higher 
in Brittany. The production system in Auvergne, typical of LFAs, is more extensive, 
smaller scale structures prevail and there is above average potential for positive 
environmental benefits from dairying. In addition, the largely positive landscape and 
biodiversity effects of dairying in this location should be taken into account. 
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Table 7.2 Comparison of farming systems in Auvergne and Brittany, 
averages per dairy farm 
 Auvergne Brittany France 
Total production (thousand tons), 1983/4 1031 5556 25,320 
Total production (thousand tons), 2006/7 1082 4664 22,229 
Percentage change 1983/4-2006/7 +4.9 -16.2 -12.2 
Dairy cows per holding 1990 28.7 29.0 31.0 
Dairy cows per holding 2005 39.6 42.7 42.2 
Percentage increase 1990-2005 38 47 36 
Quota (litres per holding), 1984 43,913 87,669  
Quota (litres per holding) (Au: 2007; Br: 2005) 151,000 260,000  
Percentage increase 1990-2007 (1990-2005) 244 197  
Stocking density 1990 1.1 1.7 1.5 
Stocking density 2005 1.0 1.6 1.3 
Milk yield per forage hectare (litres/ha), 2007   3,304 6,174 4,612 
Land use 2005: percentage of farm area as 
Cereals
Forage (excluding grass)
Grass
 
15 
40 
45 
 
23 
68 
9 
 
21 
41 
38 
Maize forage per dairy farm (ha), 2005 2.9 15.9 11.4 
UAA on dairy specialist holdings (1990)  43.0 31.3 40.3 
UAA on dairy specialist holdings (2005) 69.8 62.5 69.7 
Maize forage as percent of farm area, 2005 4.2 25.4 16.3 
 Massif 
Central West  
Fertiliser cost (€/ha UAA), 1995 56 112  
Fertiliser cost (€/ha UAA), 2004 60 91  
Source: France case study based on FADN, Commission questionnaire. 
 
This evidence suggests that France’s non-market approach, which takes account of 
objectives other than those driving market exchanges, has helped to maintain milk 
production in LFAs58 although other factors also will have played a role. Nearly one-
fifth of total milk output is produced in the most marginal areas. In an unrestricted 
quota market, without any ring-fencing, quota probably would have been sucked out 
of these relatively less profitable areas with potentially negative environmental 
effects. 
 
The policy of favouring or protecting LFAs in terms of quota reallocation alongside 
other policies (such as LFA support) and market factors like the high value of some 
                                                 
58 The issue of LFA milk production in relation to implicit environmental objectives of national milk 
quota regimes is discussed further in Section 8.4. 
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cheeses made in the uplands and mountains has helped to keep one third of milk 
producers in these areas, which contributes to the sustainability of the local economy.  
 
At the same time, if France’s non-market approach has also restrained market forces 
that would have drawn quota out of Brittany towards regions with production systems 
closer to the national average, then some environmental improvements may have been 
foregone. Thus, it is not possible to reach an overall conclusion at national level 
regarding the environmental consequences of the constraints and incentives imposed 
on quota mobility by France’s implementation rules.  
 
7.2.2 Quota mobility in other Member States 
Having compared regional mobility of quota between two countries at opposite ends 
of the ‘market-orientation’ spectrum, we now examine evidence from the five other 
case study Member States, most of which occupy intermediate positions in the 
ranking of Member States by restrictiveness that is presented in Chapter 5, Table 5.1. 
In each case, the questions addressed are: 
 
? Is the degree of regional mobility found in line with predictions based on the 
relative restrictiveness of their implementation rules?  
? Are there country-specific characteristics of mobility patterns that provide 
additional insights into the way implementation rules have influenced mobility? 
? What are the observable, or potential, environmental effects of the shifts that have 
occurred? 
 
The Member States analysed are, in increasing order of market orientation, Ireland, 
Germany, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands.  
 
Ireland 
Regional data for studying mobility of quota from 1984 until recent years are not 
available for Ireland. This is because restrictions on quota movement apply to the 
milk purchaser rather than the general location of the individual farmer. However, it is 
widely thought that allowing landless quota transfers only between producers who 
supply to the same purchaser, and the ring-fencing of all disadvantaged areas in 
Ireland in respect of land transfers, have prevented strong shifts towards the South and 
East, where farms are larger and more intensive, and have lower unit costs. This 
suggests that, by preventing the flow of quota to these regions, quota implementation 
rules have helped to prevent some level of negative environmental impacts that would 
otherwise have occurred. 
 
Some data are available for the sub-period 1993/4 to 2000/1, and they are presented in 
Table 7.3. It is striking that, despite the lapse of some years and the increase of 
national quota in 2000/1 due to Agenda 2000, the regional shares have remained 
constant. This confirms the expectation that Ireland’s implementation rules have 
worked very effectively against mobility of quota between regions. 
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Table 7.3 Regional shares of quota, 1993/4 to 2000/1, Ireland 
Percentage Shares 
(%) 
Quota held 
(thousand tons) 1993/4 1996/7 1999/2000 2000/1 
1993/4 2000/1 
Connaught 136.4 134.3 134.0 137.3 2.61 2.58 
Ulster 650.5 638.1 635.5 644.6 12.44 12.13 
Leinster 1,531.0 1,533.5 1,531.9 1,554.4 29.28 29.26 
Munster 2,910.3 2,926.2 2,922.4 2,975.6 55.66 56.02 
Total 5,228.2 5,229.9 5,223.9 5,311.9 100.00 100.00 
Source: DAF (2007) 
 
Germany 
In Germany, quota trading has been constrained to take place within regions. Until 
2006, there were 27 quota regions, creating substantial restrictions on geographical 
movement of quota. Any discernible inter-regional shifts prior to 2007 will be due to 
reallocations from the national reserve. In mid 2007 these regions were amalgamated 
to form two large regions (consisting of the old and the new Länder, respectively), 
with trading by auction within each region. 
 
Figure 7.4 Regional changes in milk production and milk producers, 1983/4- 
2006/7, Germany 
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Source: Based on data provided by the German Authorities in response to DG Agri’s questionnaire.  
 
Regional production data are available for the whole of Germany from 1983/84 and 
different rates of change in production up to 2006/07 are shown in Figure 7.4. 
However, data on the change in producer numbers were available only for the last 13 
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years of that period for the new Länder and several of the old Länder. The figure 
indicates which period the change in producer numbers relates to. 
 
Among the old Länder, most quota changes have been within 3-4 percentage points of 
the 14.8 per cent average reduction for the old Länder as a whole. The three central 
western Länder with the greatest reductions (Hessen, Rhineland-Palatinate, and 
Saarland) are relatively unimportant for agriculture with a modest share of milk 
production. Here, the net rate of decline in producer numbers was steep, which freed 
up a relatively larger share of a limited quota volume for redistribution via the 
national reserve. Otherwise, as expected, the shifts of quota between regions have 
been relatively modest. The rates of decline in production between the old and new 
Länder are not comparable, as quota limits were fixed for the new Länder only at 
reunification in 1990, with the allocation depending on a number of factors. Among 
the old Länder, only Schleswig-Holstein and Bavaria have increased their share of 
total production, whereas among the new Länder, only Saxony and Saxony Anhalt 
have seen their shares of the new Länder total decline.  
 
Compared with the pattern observed in France, it is striking that no regions actually 
gained or maintained quota. This suggests that the policy of quota redistribution from 
the national reserve in France was more proactive in terms of regional policy 
objectives like prioritising demands from less favoured areas than in Germany.  
  
The environmental impacts of the restrictions on quota movement in Germany are not 
clear cut. In some areas of Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony, milk production in 
the early 2000s was taking place at the highest rates seen in Germany (greater than 
four tons per hectare of agricultural land in areas north of Bremen, and between three 
and four tons per hectare in other parts of Lower Saxony and southern Schleswig-
Holstein) (Isermeyer et al., 2006). Moreover, within the old Länder, these two 
northern regions have the largest average herd sizes and are ranked at, or near the top, 
in terms of milk yields, suggesting the use of more intensive farming systems. These 
regions have a low incidence of LFAs (where production methods are generally more 
extensive), and a lower concentration of organic milk production than in Baden-
Württemberg, Bavaria, Hessen and some parts of the new Länder. Elsewhere in 
Germany, the very intensive systems observed in Lower Saxony and Schleswig-
Holstein are found only in parts of southern and south western Bavaria, several areas 
in North Rhine Westphalia and the easternmost part of Baden-Württemberg.  
 
According to the case study expert, while milk production has declined in alpine areas 
in Bavaria (largely LFA-designated), this has not necessarily led to a decline in the 
environmental value of these habitats. Alpine pastures are increasingly used for 
grazing young livestock that have been moved from the valleys to avoid stocking 
density restrictions. This type of grazing is specifically targeted by agri-environment 
support (Bavaria’s KULAP programme for cultivated landscape). There is also, 
however, some anecdotal evidence of both abandonment and the introduction of 
cereal crops in certain areas, particularly where beef production is unprofitable, but it 
has not been possible to obtain empirical evidence to support this as part of this 
evaluation.  
 
During the second part of 2007, when quota trading by auction across all regions of 
the old Länder was introduced, some quota flowed out of the south (Baden-
Alliance Environnement: Evaluation of the Environmental Impacts of Milk Quotas  
Final Deliverable Report – 30/07/2008 
 91
Württemberg and Bavaria lost 37,161 and 22,900 tons, respectively) whilst Lower 
Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein together gained 88,898 tons. These initial market 
forces suggest that, at least in the years immediately preceding 2007, regionalisation 
of quota trade had been preventing a relocation of production from the southern to the 
northern old Länder. However, more recently milk quota has started to flow back 
towards the southern Länder. However, since both areas contain pockets of high 
density and highly intensive dairying, it is impossible to identify any potential 
environmental consequences without a detailed analysis of the source and destination 
of these flows at a much lower level of disaggregation.  
 
Spain 
In 2005/6, four North Western regions – Galicia, Castilla y León, Asturias and 
Cantabria – produced two-thirds of the total milk produced in Spain. Galicia alone 
was responsible for 35 per cent. With Catalonia in the North East and Andalucía in 
the South, these six regions supplied over 84 per cent of Spain’s national production. 
 
Regional data on allocated quota, production or deliveries were not available for 
Spain over a long time period. Therefore, we have looked at regional data on changes 
in dairy cow numbers for 1990 to 2005. Percentage changes in dairy cow numbers 
over this 15-year period are shown in Figure 7.5. There are strong regional differences 
relative to the national average reduction of 37.3 per cent. Note that the number in 
parentheses after the name of the region shows its ranking in terms of dairy cow 
population in 1990. Among high-ranked regions, several have lost relatively fewer 
cows (Galicia, Catalonia, Andalucía) whilst others have lost relatively more cows 
(Castilla y Léon, Asturias, Cantabria).  
 
Figure 7.5 Change in dairy cows, 1990-2005, Spain 
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      Source: Farm Structure Survey. 
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Unfortunately, these data are not a perfect substitute for data on changes in allocated 
quota or deliveries, because of possible regional differences in the rate of growth of 
milk yield per cow. If yields had been growing at the same rate in each region over 
time, and quota allocations remained fixed, then all regions would have had the same 
percentage reduction in cow numbers. However, if yields were growing faster in some 
regions, then cow numbers in those regions would be declining faster even with 
unchanged quota shares. Thus, two phenomena – changes in quota and differential 
yield growth – are confounded in Figure 7.5.  
 
Regional data for both production and cow numbers are available for 2005, from 
which yields in 2005 have been calculated. There is considerable yield variation over 
regions. Extremadura had the lowest average yield (about 4.5 tons per cow), 
suggesting slow yield growth since 1990. It is likely that most of the reduction in 
dairy cow numbers in that region over the period was due to falling production. 
However, Castilla y León and La Rioja had very high average yields (about 3 tons 
above the national average of 6.5 tons per cow), raising the question as to whether 
their sharp loss in dairy cow numbers over the 20-year period was due to rapidly 
rising yields (from, for example, a shift to more intensive farming systems) rather 
than to falling production.  
 
In an attempt to shed further light on this question, we have also looked at data on the 
regional allocation of delivery quota which are available only from 1999/2000 to 
2005/6. Changes in regional allocation over this much shorter time period are shown 
in Figure 7.6. 
Figure 7.6 Regional changes in delivery quota, 1999/2000 to 2005/6, Spain 
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Source: Based on data from the Spanish Ministry for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAPA). 
 
In this most recent period, three regions – Galicia, Murcia and Navarra – had larger 
increases than the national average, and hence gained quota share. However, given the 
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10.8 per cent increase in delivery quota at national level (as part of Agenda 2000), all 
regions except five gained at least some extra quota in absolute terms. Over this 
period, Galicia’s share of total quota increased from 30.8 per cent to 35.2 per cent (an 
extra 443 thousand tons). The national shares of Navarra and Murcia are small – just 3 
per cent and 0.5 per cent, respectively. 
 
The Spanish case study provides some evidence, much of which is anecdotal in 
nature, on the environmental implications of these regional changes. These appear to 
be quite varied with the majority either neutral or negative from an environmental 
perspective. Land released from low-intensity milk production in Extremadura has 
been taken over largely by suckler beef production, which may be a relatively neutral 
or positive change. However, accumulation of quota in Galicia is potentially quite 
negative for the environment. Land is scarce in Galicia, and especially the smaller 
farms have difficulty in expanding their area. The signs of concentration are manifest 
in high stocking rates, a trend away from grazing systems towards indoor systems 
relying on silage and increasing use of purchased feeds. The production system in the 
North West Atlantic regions has traditionally been small-scale, based on grazing and 
mowing (for hay) of permanent grasslands. Over the past twenty years most of these 
grasslands have been improved by reseeding and fertilisation. Maize was always an 
important forage crop in these regions as a grain crop but nowadays it is used more 
for silage. Stocking densities on farms surveyed in Galicia and Navarra increased 
from an average of about 2 LU/ha to 3LU/ha since the early 1990s, and can reach 5 
LU/ha on the most intensive farms. Entirely indoor systems are becoming 
increasingly common, especially for larger holdings. The land area of the holding 
under such systems is primarily for the disposal of slurry, and feeds are purchased 
from off the holding. These may include forage produced on other farms, and 
compounds from feed companies (Spain case study). 
 
According to the Spanish case study, most of the permanent transfer of quota without 
land between 1998 and 2005 was by private sale. Quota could be traded between 
regions only if justified on grounds of either improving the production structures of 
the recipient holding, or extensifying production, in which case the resulting stocking 
density must be at or below 2LU per forage hectare. Inter-regional transfers from the 
national reserve occurred only if demand within the region fell short of quota 
abandoned within the region. It is not easy to understand how the implementation of 
these cautious rules has nevertheless led to an increasing concentration of quota in 
Galicia over this relatively short time period. The question arises as to whether these 
rules were at all constraining on the process of concentration that would have 
occurred in a completely free quota market. Only if this were the case would the 
implementation rules have delayed even more profound concentration and associated 
environmental stress in the North West. It is not possible to answer this question 
definitively from the information available59. 
 
The Spanish case study reports that considerable concentration of production has also 
occurred within regions, with production shifting from more marginal locations (for 
example, the uplands) to more productive lowland and coastal areas, and nearer to 
                                                 
59 See Chapter 8 for discussion of Spanish milk quota rules with explicit and implicit environmental 
objectives. 
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urban centres. Where production has survived in marginal areas, this too has become 
concentrated on the better land. It is not clear whether this occurred during the 1998-
2003 period when quota transfers from LFAs were restricted, or whether it is a more 
recent phenomenon. According to the case study, habitats that have previously been 
maintained by extensive dairy management, particularly within upland areas, are 
either being replaced by grazing (suckler cows, sheep, and horses), abandoned or, as 
is more commonly the case, afforested, the example being given of an increase in 
eucalyptus planting in response to incentives for afforestation. Afforestation with 
eucalyptus in this context leads to the loss of open landscape and habitat, and often 
increases fire risk.  
 
Italy 
In Italy, milk production has traditionally been concentrated along the Po Valley, in 
the regions Piedmont (where the Po rises), Lombardy, Emilia Romagna and Veneto. 
In these areas, the great majority of milk producers use intensive farming systems 
with potentially greater negative environmental consequences than in most other parts 
of Italy. Lombardy, Emilia Romagna and Veneto alone are responsible for two-thirds 
of the milk produced in Italy, and no other region except Piedmont (with about 8 per 
cent of production) produces more than 4 per cent of the national total. These four 
regions always produce over quota, and hence, as well as their predominant share of 
quota, they benefit each year from temporary unused quota from elsewhere in the 
country. The fact that there is always unused quota in most of the other regions is 
perhaps due to the Italian regulation that prohibits a producer from leasing out unused 
quota for more than two consecutive years (in the third year, he cannot lease). 
 
Figure 7.7 Regional changes in milk production and producers, 1993/4-
2006/7, Italy 
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Source: Based on data provided by the Italian Authorities in response to DG Agri’s questionnaire 
Note: Regions are NUTS 1 level with the following exceptions:  a) Emilia Romagna and Veneto are 
disaggregated from North East region (hence N. East (-); b) Lombardy is disaggregated from North 
West Italy (hence N. West Italy (-)).   
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Figure 7.8 Average regional changes in milk output per herd, 1993/4-2006/7, 
Italy 
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Source: Based on data provided by Italy to the European Commission. 
 
There are 20 administrative regions in Italy, and production data are available at that 
level of disaggregation for the last 15 years. However, because of the low importance 
of most of these regions for milk production, a higher level of aggregation is used 
here. Specifically, we adopt a classification based on the five NUTS 1 regions, but 
have taken Emilia Romagna and Veneto out of the North East region, and Lombardy 
out of the North West region, in order to show them separately. The areas that remain 
in these two NUTS 1 regions are shown as North East (-) and North West (-) 
respectively. This results in eight separate regions for Italy. The North West without 
Lombardy consists almost entirely of Piedmont. 
 
Figure 7.7 and Figure 7.8 show the percentage changes in milk production, milk 
producers and output per herd for these eight regions. Two separate figures are used 
because of incompatibility of scales between the two.  
 
Between 1995/6 and 2005/6, Italy’s total quota increased by 804,000 tons (8.3 per 
cent). Figures from the Italian case study report show that Lombardy steadily 
increased its quota holding over the same period, so that by 2005/6 producers in 
Lombardy held 459 thousand tons more quota than in 1995/6 (a 13 per cent increase). 
Quota in the other three Po valley regions also increased but at a somewhat slower 
rate, and this movement appears to have stabilised (Piedmont) or slightly fallen back 
recently (Veneto & Emilia Romagna), to the further benefit of Lombardy. Thus, not 
only is Italy’s milk producing capacity shifting to this highly productive northern 
area, but also its concentration within the area is increasing. There is concern that, 
with drier summers expected due to global warming, such concentration of dairy cows 
will exacerbate competition for water with other agricultural and non-agricultural 
uses, resulting in a falling water table and destabilisation of the ecological balance. 
Figure 7.8 shows that over this 10-year period, average output per herd in Lombardy 
grew by over 350 per cent, a very rapid increase in scale. 
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When dairy farms are classified as extensive or intensive according to whether they 
have fewer or more than 1.4 LU per hectare, it appears from FADN data that, in each 
of the mainland NUTS 1 regions, around 70 per cent or more of holdings are 
intensive. Comparing data for 2000-5 with data for 1990-5, the proportion of farms 
using an intensive indoor system and those using an extensive outdoor system have 
both increased (from 48 per cent to 55 per cent, and from 14 per cent to 17 per cent, 
respectively). The proportion of farms using an intensive outdoor system has 
remained roughly constant, whereas the proportion of those using an extensive indoor 
system has fallen from 22 per cent to 11 per cent (Italy case study). In all four 
categories, there has been a shift away from fodder crops towards the use of 
purchased feedstuffs. Compared with the North, however, there is still more reliance 
on fodder crops in the South and Centre. Average figures for production systems in 
the North East and North West combine the large intensive indoor systems of the Po 
Valley with small extensive farms in LFAs, and do not reflect the full extent of 
intensification in the Po region itself.  
 
The rapid shift of quota to the large intensive farms in the North has been at the 
expense of small, generally more extensive farms in the South and Centre. In order to 
keep production in marginal areas, LFAs have been ring-fenced with respect to quota 
movements, and since 2003 an inner ring-fence has also acted to keep quota within 
mountain LFAs60. As in France, but to a lesser extent, a sizeable proportion of total 
milk production comes from these generally less intensive systems in Italy. 
 
Thus, Italy’s implementation policy has both allowed production to become more 
concentrated in its most productive area, with potentially environmentally damaging 
consequences, whilst at the same time broadly preserving production in the LFAs. 
 
The Netherlands 
Figure 7.9 shows regional changes in percentage terms over the entire quota period at 
the level of the twelve Dutch provinces. Five provinces had above-average falls in 
production, implying losses of quota share. In three regions, by contrast, production 
levels increased and in a fourth, production remained more or less constant. Zeeland 
and Flevoland – the largest gainers in percentage terms – are responsible for very 
small shares of total output and can be disregarded. Moreover, these provinces have a 
very low average density of milk production per square kilometre, so the purely 
regional (as opposed to farm level) concentration seems unlikely to have given rise to 
significant environmental stresses.  
 
                                                 
60 See Chapter 8 for discussion of Italian milk quota rules in relation to implicit environmental 
objectives linked to LFA production.  
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Figure 7.9 Regional changes in milk production, dairy producers and milk 
output per head, 1984/5-2006/7, the Netherlands 
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Source: Based on data provided by the Netherlands to the European Commission. 
Note: Figures show percentage changes in production levels. 
 
The two areas with the highest density of milk production are the predominantly 
agricultural provinces of Friesland and Overijssel, which together were responsible 
for a third of Dutch production in 2006/07. These two regions increased their share of 
national quota, if not their absolute production level. Milk production in these regions 
was 589 and 543 tons per square kilometre, relative to the national average of 328 
tons per square kilometre, in 2006/07, implying 80 or more dairy cows to the square 
kilometre (0.8 dairy cows to the hectare). These figures are indicative only of 
differences between provinces, and should not be interpreted in an absolute sense. A 
more meaningful measure, not available at the time of writing61, would be the total 
number of livestock units per hectare of land used by agriculture.   
 
A major environmental problem in all agricultural areas of the Netherlands is nitrate 
pollution of water courses and ground water, particularly in the South where there is a 
high concentration of intensive livestock production. At first sight, therefore the shift 
of milk production out of the Southern provinces of Limburg and North Brabant, 
where intensive livestock production is also very dense, would appear to have been 
beneficial. However, it has been argued that, given the overall limits on livestock 
slurry disposal imposed by the Dutch manure policy, the exodus of some milk 
production from that region has simply permitted the further expansion of intensive 
pig and poultry production. Given the greater availability of land in the North and 
East, it is likely that the shift of some milk production into this region may have 
                                                 
61 Data indicating number of dairy cows per forage hectare were obtained for the Netherlands at 
national level between 1990 and 2000 (see Table 2.7) but not at regional level.   
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permitted slightly less intensive management practices in these provinces relative to 
the south. 
 
The Netherlands case study shows that there have been reductions in water pollution 
from livestock farming in the Netherlands in recent years. For example, the quantity 
of nitrogen in manure has fallen by 35 per cent since 1995 and phosphate levels, 
measured in kilograms, by 23 per cent. However, this seems to have been attributable 
to the falling number of dairy cattle and more stringent manure policy rather than 
changes in the distribution of milk production. 
 
Clearly, the extent of regional mobility in the Netherlands is considerably less than 
that observed in the UK (England and Wales). However, given the size of the country, 
the very dense pattern of agricultural production and the fact that, land use is 
constantly being optimised as market conditions change, the extent of the changes in 
regional production shares observed over the last 20 years or so is what would be 
expected in such circumstances of a regime with an unconstrained quota transfer 
market. It may have been close to what would have been observed in a no-quota 
situation.  
Other Member States 
Based on available data, regional mobility of production, and therefore quota, has also 
taken place in some other Member States, for example Sweden and Greece, although 
it has not been possible to obtain data which might have enabled an assessment of the 
environmental impacts of this quota mobility.  
 
Regional data on milk production in Sweden, which has relatively free market 
transfers for quota without land62, indicate that between 1995 and 2006 a significant 
amount of redistribution has taken place (see Figure 7.10 below). It is noticeable that 
production in the ring-fenced trading zone in the north of Sweden63 (accounting for 
less than 20 per cent of national production) has declined, while West Sweden and 
Småland, both located within the main trading zone, have been the beneficiaries 
relative to the national average.  
 
                                                 
62 In Sweden there are two trading region with one of these accounting for more than 80 per cent of 
national production. The other trading region is located in the north of Sweden. 
63 Corresponding to the regions of Upper Norrland, Middle Norrland, and most of North Middle 
Sweden (see Figure 7.10). 
Alliance Environnement: Evaluation of the Environmental Impacts of Milk Quotas  
Final Deliverable Report – 30/07/2008 
 99
Figure 7.10 Regional changes in milk deliveries, 1995/6-2006/7, Sweden 
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Source: Based on data provided by Sweden to the European Commission. 
 
Greece also operates a relatively free quota market without regional restrictions on 
quota mobility. The main production regions are Central Macedonia, Thessaly and 
Eastern Macedonia & Thrace, together accounting for approximately three quarters of 
national production. Between 1993/94 and 2006/07 Greece increased national quota 
by 23 per cent. Figure 7.11 shows that there has been a great deal of variation in the 
patterns of regional production over this period. Most, but not all, regions have 
increased milk production but with significant differences between regions. The 
Figure also indicates that over the same period the number of producers has declined 
in all regions, indicating that the underlying trends in restructuring have continued.   
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Figure 7.11 Regional changes in milk production and milk producers, 1993/4-
2006/7, Greece 
-91.2
-45.2
-28.6
15.4 17.2 23.0
35.5 43.7 43.7
49.5
71.8
96.1
175.6
194.7
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
Ion
ian
 Is
Att
ica
W.
 M
ac
ed
on
ia
Cr
ete
Ce
ntr
al 
Ma
ce
do
nia
Gr
ee
ce
S. 
Ae
ge
an
 Is
Th
es
sa
ly
W.
 G
ree
ce
Ep
iru
s
E. 
Ma
ce
do
nia
 &
 Th
rac
e
N.
 Ae
ge
an
 Is
Ce
ntr
al 
Gr
ee
ce
Pe
lop
on
ne
se
ch
an
ge
 p
er
 c
en
t
production producers
 
Source: Based on data provided by Greece to the European Commission. 
 
7.2.3 Summary 
Regarding the first order effects, quota mobility between regions appears to be 
considerably greater in Member States where a relatively free quota market has been 
operating. Regional quota mobility was most pronounced in the UK (England and 
Wales), and there was also substantial mobility in the Netherlands. In Germany, 
where separate quota markets have operated within 27 regions, there was only modest 
mobility between regions, mainly through the national reserve. Mobility was also 
restricted in France, although it is clear that some areas have been prioritised for 
redistribution, resulting in a slightly more dispersed pattern of regional changes than 
in Germany. It has to be borne in mind that in larger countries like the UK and 
France, the scope for inter-regional differences in comparative advantage and so in 
production shifts between regions is greater than in smaller countries like the 
Netherlands.  
 
Despite the restrictions on their transfer markets, there is strong evidence of 
increasing regional concentration in Spain and Italy. However, these two countries 
differ regarding their policies towards marginal areas. In Italy, market transfers out of 
LFAs have not been permitted for some years, and more recently mountainous areas 
within LFAs have been specifically protected in this way as well. This policy is less 
proactive but also more explicit than what appears to have been happening in France, 
but as a result of their policies both countries have succeeded in keeping a significant 
share of production in marginal areas. No such policy was reported for Spain, and it 
appears that production shifts out of marginal, upland areas have had environmentally 
negative impacts as a result, through land abandonment or through the adoption of 
environmentally less benign alternative land uses.  
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In many Member States, the regions that have experienced the largest net loss of 
quota are those where milk is a small element of local agricultural production, 
although there are also exceptions to this rule. 
 
Inevitably, the evidence relating to the second order environmental effects of this 
hypothesis is more impressionistic, and conclusions are not straightforward. For some 
Member States (for example, Sweden), where marked regional mobility trends were 
found, information was lacking to indicate the likely environmental consequences. In 
other Member States, where environmental information was available, it is clear that 
the second order environmental effects need to be addressed at a relatively more 
disaggregated level, and that it would be very difficult to aggregate different, 
somewhat conflicting consequences in different parts of the country to reach an 
overall, national level assessment. However, the discussion has indicated the range of 
different potential consequences that have been triggered by different implementation 
features of quota transferability.   
 
In many Member States, milk production has been stable or fallen over the period and 
those regions gaining share of output will not necessarily have experienced an 
increase in milk production. In most cases, the number of dairy cows will have fallen 
but they will have concentrated on a smaller number of farms. Environmental effects 
arise from concentration at the regional, local and farm level and the regional element 
may not be most significant. In regions gaining share of national output there is a 
potential concern about a growing concentration of pollution but this may be more 
than offset by the influence of environmental regulations, improved management, 
particularly of nutrients, and in some cases better conditions for dairying. 
 
In those regions losing relative share, there are likely to be benefits in terms of 
reduced pollution pressures, although the southern Netherlands presents an interesting 
but exceptional case where declines in dairying may have allowed expansion of other 
intensive livestock production systems. The subsequent management of land where 
dairying has ceased is difficult to determine but crucial for assessing the 
environmental impact. Arable land is one possibility, for example in parts of France 
and Germany, and beef or sheep production is a common alternative in more pastoral 
areas such as Ireland, the west of the UK and parts of southern Germany. Spain was 
one of fewer countries where outright abandonment was reported, albeit anecdotally. 
Both positive and negative outcomes are possible, with the evidence pointing to a 
reduction in pollution load and landscape diversity and loss of biodiversity where 
extensive High Nature Value (HNV) dairy systems – now rare -, are lost.  
 
Some Member States such as France and Italy have succeeded in keeping a sizeable 
share of production in the LFA, where farming tends to be less intensive. This is 
explained further in Chapter 8. Within some LFAs, however, concentration is 
occurring, as illustrated by the Auvergne.  
 
The examples of market-driven quota mobility cited from Italy and Spain suggest 
that, in those countries, economic forces have moved quota and production into areas 
already under environmental stress, and have contributed further to that stress by 
exacerbating concentration. Thus, a high degree of quota mobility can be both 
beneficial and/or harmful for the environment, depending on the characteristics of 
quota-gaining and quota-losing regions.   
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It is not surprising that a simple relationship between degree of quota mobility and 
negative environmental consequences cannot be found, since the regional shifts that 
national policies either restrain, or allow to continue to varying degrees, are driven by 
economic, not environmental, considerations. Whether or not these economic forces 
attract quota to areas of greater or less environmental fragility does not follow a 
predictable pattern, since by definition environmental costs are not reflected in 
farming costs. However, since economic forces recognise more profitable production 
systems, it is likely that quota will be attracted to regions whose combination of agro-
climatic, topographic and structural conditions favour higher-performance production 
systems and these systems themselves may well create more environmental pressures, 
depending on how the farms are managed. 
 
7.3 Hypothesis 2:  Scale increases and intensification  
First order effects 
Restrictions on quota mobility between producers will slow down increases in 
average herd sizes, which is likely to slow down intensification of production 
methods (including higher input use and stocking densities). There may also be 
implications for the degree of specialisation in dairying. 
 
Second order environmental effects 
In general, more intensive production systems are associated with greater 
negative environmental impacts. Therefore, adverse environmental effects that 
are mitigated by regimes that restrict quota mobility between producers include: 
• Greater use of concentrated feeds/silage maize will often have negative 
impacts on the environment, particularly in relation to water 
quality/biodiversity/landscape. 
• More production within indoor systems although the relative environmental 
impacts of indoor versus outdoor systems depend significantly on specific 
features such as provisions for manure management and stocking densities. 
• Changes in breed of dairy cows – from local varieties to more input-
demanding breeds or dual purpose breeds – are likely to have negative 
environmental impacts on soil, air and water and possibly on traditional 
landscape values although they may be beneficial in terms of greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
• Higher stocking densities associated with greater aggregate negative 
environmental impacts unless offset by better management. 
 
For some decades before the imposition of milk quotas, there was a steady upward 
movement in the size distribution of herds, as very small dairy farms either closed 
down while a smaller number of somewhat larger farms grew in size, or were taken 
over by existing farms, which expanded as a result. The economic pressures driving 
such scale increases within agriculture are very strong, for two reasons. First, the 
minimum resource base that allows a producer to survive in commercial farming has 
been continually increasing. Second, the growing sophistication and capital intensity 
of dairy farming has favoured a trend towards specialisation so that, even if the size of 
the total farm business remains the same, farms that remain in dairying are likely to 
have a larger share of the farm’s resources committed to that enterprise, resulting in 
larger herds. With free market transfers of quota between producers, this process is 
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able continue as before, except that there are now financial implications, in the form 
of extra ‘quota costs’ for expanding farmers, and the equivalent of a ‘reward’ for 
giving up quota for the exiting producer. Without a market-driven transfer 
mechanism, however, this process will be arrested, or at least significantly slowed 
down.  
 
Increases in scale are facilitated when quota can be transferred without restrictions 
between producers. In a market situation, the more profitable producers (with lower 
production cost per marginal litre of milk) are willing to pay more to buy a litre of 
quota. The most they will agree to pay is the (expected) difference between their 
marginal production cost and the milk price, capitalised over an appropriate time 
horizon. For unprofitable producers, it will be advantageous to sell some quota for 
this price if it is greater than the margin they make over costs for their marginal litres 
of production (also capitalised over an appropriate time horizon). If this price is 
greater than the average margin they make on all litres, then it will be advantageous 
for them to sell their entire quota and use the proceeds to start some other 
(presumably more profitable) activity.  
 
There is considerable scientific evidence that, in the EU Member States, costs per litre 
(both marginal and average cost) fall quite sharply as herd sizes expand (see for 
example, Mukhtar and Dawson, 1990: Burrell, 1990; Alvarez and Arias, 2003). The 
scale of operation where this trend starts to flatten out varies from country to country, 
and has been increasing over time. Currently, one can situate it somewhere between a 
herd size of 70 to 120 dairy cows (or about 400 to 750 thousand litres per holding). 
This means that in a free quota market, ignoring individual variations due to 
differences in management expertise and farm specific factors, small producers are 
more likely to be quota sellers and larger producers are more likely to be quota 
buyers.  
 
In a free market, we expect to see a continuing increase in average scale of operation. 
Indeed, most small scale quota sellers are likely to cease production altogether, since 
selling only part of their quota would make them even less economically competitive 
than they currently are. This increasing scale phenomenon is expected to occur even 
when quota markets operate only within regions rather than nationwide. We expect it 
to be more pronounced however, in a national market, because quota prices will 
reflect the margins of the most efficient producers anywhere in the country, rather 
than within a single region. Consequently, the quota price offered to potential sellers 
at any given moment is likely to be higher, and to offer a greater incentive to smaller 
producers to sell their quota, than when quota markets are segmented by region.  
 
In a system where quota reallocation is performed administratively, whether or not the 
reallocation promotes scale increases depends on the criteria defining priority groups. 
In France, priority groups included young farmers (new entrants), producers within 
LFAs, and producers with investment plans. Clearly, the first two groups are more 
likely to be relatively small scale operations, even after receiving extra quota. The 
third group may contain both small scale producers and those further along the size 
spectrum. However, given some deliberate targeting towards less competitive 
producers, it is unlikely that quota reallocation to these groups would give the same 
boost to scale increases as is observed in a free quota market.  
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In order to test the idea that the rate of scale increase is related to the degree of market 
orientation, data on the growth in average holding size (measured in terms of quota 
per holding on specialist dairy farms) over the period 1989 to 2005 was analysed for 
the countries of the EU 12. The average scale at the start of the period is included as a 
variable in the regression in order to reflect the fact that, if average herd size was 
already large at the start of the period, percentage changes in scale would be smaller 
than for those countries starting the period with very small herd sizes. In addition, 
Member States were allocated to three groups – those with administrative reallocation 
only or very restricted quota markets (Belgium, France, Ireland, Germany, Ireland, 
Luxembourg and Portugal), those with a somewhat larger degree of market 
orientation (Italy, Spain, Greece, Denmark), and the two Member States at the most 
market-oriented end of the spectrum (the Netherlands and the United Kingdom). The 
last two groups mentioned are distinguished in the regression by two dummy 
variables (D1 and D2). A regression was run in order to quantify how much of the 
difference in the increase of average scale could be explained by the average scale 
already reached at the start of the period, and the degree of market orientation allowed 
by the quota implementation rules of the Member State. The data on average scale 
and the rate of increase in average scale are for specialist dairy farms only, and come 
from the FADN database. The results are given in Table 7.4 
 
Table 7.4 Regression explaining rate of increase in average scale for 12 EU 
Member States 1989-2005 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
t-ratio p-value 
Constant 2.702 0.495 5.46 0.001 
Average quota per 
holding in 1989 
-0.000968 0.00023 -4.26 0.003 
D1 1.428 0.287 4.98 0.001 
D2 1.476 0.563 2.62 0.030 
Number of observations = 12; R2 = 0.858  ; F (3,8) = 16.1 ; p-value for F-test = 0.001 
D1= 1 for Member States with ‘medium’ market orientation, and zero otherwise; D2 = 1 for the two 
most market-oriented Member States, and zero otherwise.   
Note: Analysis is of the EU 15 minus the three Member States which acceded to the EU in 1995, 
namely Austria, Finland and Sweden. 
 
The results show that 86 per cent of the variation in the rates of scale increase 
observed over Member States can be explained in terms of two factors: average scale 
at the start of the period and the degree of market orientation in their rules for quota 
reallocation. All coefficients are highly significant. The negative estimated coefficient 
(of approximately 0.001) on average quota per holding in 1989 shows that, for every 
increase of 100 tons of quota per holding at the beginning of the period, the increase 
in average scale over the full period would be 0.1 (or 10 percentage points) lower. A 
statistical test indicated that the coefficients of D1 and D2 are not significantly 
different from each other. This is interpreted to mean that the full scale effect of 
market orientation is obtained as easily by Member States that allowed only ‘medium’ 
market orientation. In other words, the full effect on farm scale was realised even 
when some restrictions remained, and without going all the way to totally unrestricted 
quota trading in a single national market. When the equation was re-estimated to 
allow the effects of medium and full market orientation to be captured by a single 
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parameter, the common parameter was estimated as1.435 (p=0.000). This means that, 
other things being equal, a certain degree of market orientation boosted the total scale 
increase over the period by about 143 percentage points above the increase that would 
have occurred if transfer mechanisms like those in the ‘non-market’ countries had 
been used. 
 
The results in Table 7.4 are important evidence indicating that administrative 
transfers, or extremely restricted regional markets, have not promoted scale increases 
to the same extent as more market-oriented mechanisms for reallocating quota 
between producers.  
 
Rates of scale increase in different Member States 
Examining the rates of scale increase in different Member States more closely, Table 
7.5 provides information regarding the average scale of dairy units in the EU 15. The 
pivotal size group is defined as the smallest size group that contains more producers in 
2006/07 than in 1993/94. All size groups below this have reduced in numbers since 
1993/94. The smallest size group still expanding is the smallest size group that has 
been gaining producer numbers in recent years. Producers are still moving into this 
size group and those above it, whereas the size groups below it are shrinking. When 
this group is at a higher level in the size distribution than the pivotal size group, it 
means that, although one or more size groups representing a smaller scale expanded 
considerably after 1993/94 and are still larger than their 1993/94 numbers, these 
groups have in recent years begun to decline again as producers move up through the 
size spectrum.  
 
Some features of the patterns highlighted in Table 7.5 include: 
 
• the highest average yields (milk output per dairy cow) are recorded in countries 
with the largest average herd sizes (Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands). The 
UK is the outlier here, which can be explained by its relatively low milk prices 
and agro-climatic conditions favouring more extensive, forage-based systems that 
give lower yields than the very intensive systems favoured in the other three 
countries. 
• the lowest average yields tend to be associated with small average scale or with 
Mediterranean conditions, or both. Ireland is an outlier here, due to its agro-
climatic conditions favouring low-input, grass-based production systems. France 
is also an outlier, which can be partly explained by its relatively high share of 
output produced in LFAs.  
• the pivotal size group and the smallest size group still expanding tend to be 
positively correlated with average herd size. However, there are some interesting 
variations. In Germany and Italy, the pivotal size group (and also, in Italy, the 
smallest size group still expanding) appear to be rather large relative to the overall 
average scale in 2005. This indicates that there is quite a large group of dairy 
herds in lower size groups that are not moving up into higher groups, suggesting 
the development of a bi-modal size structure. 
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Table 7.5 Basic information on scale and increases in scale, Member States, 
EU 15 
Member State Percentage 
increase in 
average 
scale, 1989-
20051 
Pivotal size 
group2 
 
(K tons 
quota) 
Smallest size 
group still 
expanding3 
(K tons 
quota) 
Average 
herd size, 
2005  
 
dairy cows 
per herd 
Average 
milk yield, 
2005 
 
1000kg/ 
head 
Austria 181 n.a. n.a. 84 5.871 
Belgium 67 300-400 300-400 355 5.692 
Denmark 217 1000+ 1000+ 86 8.187 
Finland 137 n.a. 200-300 19 7.825 
France 67 200-300 300-400 365 6.277 
Germany 149 600-700 n.a. 38 6.784 
Greece 213 200-300 200-300 145 5.120 
Ireland 82 200-300 300-450 425 4.820 
Italy 251 500-750 500-750 255 5.824 
Luxembourg 87 n.a. n.a. 18 6.761 
Netherlands 84 500-750 500-750 56 7.338 
Portugal 263 n.a. 200-300 18 6.090 
Spain 340 200-300 300-400 185 6.607 
Sweden n.a. n.a. 500-750 46 8.383 
UK 90 1000+ 1000+ 795 6.972 
Sources: Commission questionnaires. EU Commission, The Agricultural Situation in the European 
Union. 
n.a. – data not available 
1. For Austria, Finland and Sweden, the increase is measured over the period 1995-2005. 
2. Smallest size group (in terms of quota per holding) that is larger in 2006/7 than in 1993/4. 
3. Smallest size group (in terms of quota per holding) that was still growing in numbers in most recent 
years. 
4. Figure for 2001.  5. Figures for 2003. 
The underlying data for this table can be found in Annex 8. 
 
Many factors contribute to the large variation in scale between EU Member States, 
including different philosophies regarding the mechanism for quota transfer, agro-
climatic variations, the profitability of dairy farming, the ownership and output of the 
processing industry and comparative advantage in different types of farming system. 
 
 
Links between scale and intensification of production 
It has to be borne in mind that there are exogenous trends working in favour of more 
intensive production methods, independently of scale increases. It is also true, 
however, that at any given moment in time, and holding constant agro-climatic and 
farm specific factors, the degree of intensity of production is expected to be higher as 
one moves up through the size distribution. This is partly due to substitution of capital 
for labour that occurs as scale increases – the farmer’s effort is spread over increasing 
numbers of litres, but this is accommodated by substitution of farm-grown feed for 
bought in concentrates, and so on. Moreover, as the scale of operation increases, one 
may observe discontinuous switches in technology or farming system that become 
economically viable as the scale of operation increases. Here, we present concrete 
examples of this in several Member States. 
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Table 7.6 and Table 7.7 describe the size distribution of dairy herds in Galicia, and the 
input use at different levels in the herd size distribution. Caution should be exercised 
about identifying trends over time within size groups, as it is uncertain whether the 
annual samples are based on the same sample (if not, variation could be due simply to 
the changing composition of the sample). Moreover, weather conditions are not the 
same from one year to another, and this will introduce some variation. However, 
holding time and sample composition constant and comparing input use in the cross 
section dimension, the increase in yields, concentrate feeding rates and stocking 
densities that occurs as scale increases is striking. This phenomenon is very robust 
over the years.  
 
Output rates and input use in the largest size group relative to those in the smallest 
size group (representing about 20 per cent of herds) are between 50 per cent and 170 
per cent greater. Although input use per litre of milk may not vary so much between 
size groups (given the much higher yields in the higher size groups), input and output 
per hectare are considerably higher for the larger size groups which, other things 
being equal, will be associated with a higher environmental load.  
 
Table 7.6 Size distribution of dairy holdings in Galicia, 2005 
Size class <30 t 30-60 t 60-120 t 120-190 
t 
190-370 
t 
370-750 
t 
750-1500 
t 
>1500 t 
Percent 18.4 10.4 18.9 15.6 19.9 13.9 2.5 0.4 
 
Table 7.7 Input use by size group, Galicia, 1997-2003 
Size class <36 t 36-68 t 68-120 t 120-212 t 212-460 t > 460t 
 Yield, litres/cow 
1997 3743 4302 5042 5844 6853 6976 
2000 3828 4215 4834 5701 6834 8039 
2003 3047 4521 4837 5871 6840 7594 
 Concentrate feed, kg/cow 
1997 1137 1449 1838 2253 2823 3016 
2000 1233 1439 1793 2231 2937 3384 
2003 766 1647 1863 2397 3013 3284 
 Stocking rates, cows/hectare 
1997 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.5 
2000 1.6 1.5 1.7 2.0 2.2 2.7 
2003 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.7 2.0 2.2 
Source: Garrido and Barbeyto Nistal (2005). 
 
In another example, evidence on the yields of producers supplying milk for 
Parmigiano and Grana Padana cheeses (both PDO cheeses produced in northern Italy) 
shows the same increase in intensity of production with farm size. Table 7.8 shows a 
systematic increase in yield along the scale spectrum, indicating a move to more 
intensive farming practices as scale increases. 
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Table 7.8 Milk Yields by farm size, northern Italy (tons/cow)   
Parmigiano Reggiano Grana Padano 
 <200t 200t-500t 500t-800t >800t <200t 200t-500t 500t-800t >800t 
1990 5.21 5.76 6.40 6.73 4.55 5.75 6.38 6.84 
1994 5.25 6.22 6.86 7.31 4.60 6.08 7.02 7.44 
1998 5.51 6.54 7.58 7.80 4.89 6.69 7.66 8.30 
2000 5.76 6.48 7.45 7.95 5.03 6.46 7.74 7.88 
2001 5.86 6.63 7.08 7.79 5.28 6.75 7.52 7.99 
2002 5.87 6.65 7.62 7.80 5.36 6.68 7.54 7.86 
Source: Arfini et al. (2006). Based on FADN data. 
 
One expects to find similar scale intensity differences as size increases in countries 
where there is still considerable quota held by very small herds. By contrast, the UK 
and the Netherlands already had a relatively ‘good’ size structure at the start of the 
quota period. It is therefore likely that, as the scale increases that occurred in these 
Member States were more limited, that this led to more limited changes in the degree 
of intensification within the same location, as shown in Figure 7.13.  
 
Figure 7.12, Figure 7.13 and Figure 7.14 provide systematic and comparable evidence 
for all Member States of the EU 15 (except Luxembourg) on increases in milk yields, 
stocking densities and fertiliser costs per hectare as herd size (here using the proxy of 
farm size measured in European Size Units – ESU) increases. Even when the potential 
intensity indicators are declining over time (as happens, for example, with fertiliser 
costs in Italy and Germany, or stocking densities in the Netherlands and the UK), for 
each given year intensity is higher as we move up the size spectrum. Since the herd 
size group boundaries are more articulated for smaller herd size groups in the FADN 
data presentation, some Member States (Italy, Ireland and Germany) have been able 
to report data for more size classes than Member States with larger-scale herds, which 
have no or sparse representation in the lower size groups. However, regardless of the 
number of groups reported (a minimum of three is needed for a trend to emerge), the 
upward movement of yield and input use as one moves up the size spectrum is very 
clear.  
 
It was not possible to obtain comparable figures for other inputs (such as plant 
protection products, mechanisation and so on) with potential environmental relevance. 
However, evidence of a more anecdotal nature indicates that on average, these inputs 
are also rising with herd size, driven by the same economic logic that is driving the 
variables shown in the graphs.  
 
It must be stressed that scale increases and associated increases in the average degree 
of intensity would have occurred anyway independently of the quota regime. The 
question here is whether different implementation rules of some Member States acted 
to slow down this process, with resulting beneficial effects on the environment 
(relative to the counterfactual). The two Member States with the fewest restrictions on 
market orientation already had the largest or amongst the largest average scale of 
production. Member States where most producers were producing at a relatively small 
scale, and where the scope for scale-induced increases in production intensity was 
greater, tend to have chosen less market-oriented or more restrictive mechanisms for 
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reallocating quota. In the cases where this has not happened (for example, Greece), 
the increases in scale are very large. Although most of these smaller countries have 
shown greater percentage increases in scale over the period than the UK and the 
Netherlands, it must be stressed again that this is because of their much lower-scale 
starting point. Without the restrictions they imposed on quota transfer, it is arguable 
that their scale increases over the period of study – if they had adopted the same 
transfer mechanisms as in the counterfactual – would have been even greater. This 
conclusion is confirmed by the regression equation reported in Table 7.4, which 
shows that when the average scale at the start of the quota period is controlled for, 
then the degree of market orientation had a strong effect on the growth in average 
farm size. 
 
Therefore, there are grounds for concluding that the extent of scale increases and 
accompanying intensification have been slowed down in Member States with more 
restrictions on quota transfer mechanisms. 
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Figure 7.12 Milk yields per cow by economic size class (ESU), specialist dairy, 
1989, 1995, 2005 (FADN) 
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Figure 7.13 Stocking densities by size class (ESU), specialist dairy, 1989, 1995, 
2005 (FADN) 
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
1989 1995 2005 1989 1995 2005 1989 1995 2005 1989 1995 2005
P Portugal ES Spain IRL Ireland IT Italy
LU
/h
a
 0 - <4 ESU  4 - <8 ESU  8 - <16 ESU 16 - <40 ESU 40 - <100 ESU  >= 100 ESU
 
 
 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
19
89
19
95
20
05
19
89
19
95
20
05
19
95
20
05
19
95
20
05
19
89
19
95
20
05
DK Denmark NL The Netherlands SUO Finland SE Sw eden UK U. Kingdom
LU
/h
a
 8 - <16 ESU 16 - <40 ESU 40 - <100 ESU  >= 100 ESU
 
 
 
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
19
89
19
95
20
05
19
89
19
95
20
05
19
89
19
95
20
05
19
95
20
05
19
89
19
95
20
05
B Belgium F France LX Luxembourg OS Austria D Germany
LU
/h
a
 8 - <16 ESU 16 - <40 ESU 40 - <100 ESU  >= 100 ESU
 
Alliance Environnement: Evaluation of the Environmental Impacts of Milk Quotas  
Final Deliverable Report – 30/07/2008 
 112
Figure 7.14 Fertiliser costs per hectare of forage area by size class (ESU), 
specialist dairy, 1989, 1995, 2005 (FADN) 
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Environmental second order effects 
Regarding the environmental consequences, again the conclusions are more 
impressionistic. From the outset, it is important to recognise that increasing scale may 
also have environmentally positive outcomes, alongside negative impacts that are 
more usually associated with increased intensity of production. For example, more 
efficient waste management technologies may become economically viable at larger 
herd sizes, and greenhouse gas emissions may be reduced in some intensive systems. 
Unfortunately, the data needed to examine the extent to which increasing scale has 
stimulated the use of less environmentally damaging technologies are not available. 
 
In general, however, more intensive systems, with their higher rates of inputs and 
outputs per hectare and higher stocking densities, tend to be more harmful for the 
environment than extensive systems. For example:  
 
• More intensive grassland management can result in: 
o increased fertiliser and slurry applications that raise nitrate and phosphate 
levels, which can result in the leaching of nitrates into water bodies and 
can damage the habitats of some ground nesting birds and certain species 
of flora (Figure 7.14 shows that fertiliser use grows with scale); 
o greater loss of species and damage to wetland habitats where drainage is 
improved; 
o decreased plant diversity and possible soil erosion and damage to below-
ground archaeological features as a result of ploughing and re-seeding. 
 
• In some cases, but certainly not all, larger units are associated with increased 
stocking densities which are more likely to cause poaching and soil compaction 
leading to a greater risk of soil erosion (Figure 7.13 shows that stocking density 
tends to increase with scale). 
 
• Movement into greater use of feed regimes reported in Spain and Italy, where 
maize production appears to increase as scale increases. Greater production of 
forage maize will bring with it increased risks of erosion. Land growing maize is 
particularly vulnerable to soil erosion due to the extended period with low ground 
cover and late harvesting, which leaves bare and potentially compacted soil at 
times of high rainfall. With this will come associated pollution of watercourses 
with sediment and nutrients. Associated higher levels of manure applications and 
increased fertiliser and herbicide application will also have negative impacts on 
water quality.  
  
Conclusive evidence of these environmental effects of intensification requires a much 
more disaggregated approach then we have been able to follow here. 
 
7.3.1 Summary 
Analysis of the FADN evidence on input and output intensity in different farm size 
groups provides strong support for the anticipated first order effects under Hypothesis 
2. As for the second order environmental effects, there are strong a priori grounds for 
the hypothesised effects, and considerable anecdotal evidence. Specific, quantitative 
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empirical evidence has not been found at the level of aggregation adopted in this 
study. 
 
7.4 Hypothesis 3: Cessation of production 
First order effects 
In Member States where producers cannot sell their quota separately at a price 
equal to its ‘true’ economic value or where quota can only be sold in the context 
of a farm sale, it is expected that the exit rate from the dairy sector will be lower 
than in Member States where a market price for giving up quota can be earned 
without having to sell the farm. 
 
Second order environmental effects 
• Cessation of intensive dairying systems will generally be environmentally 
beneficial in most cases. 
• Cessation of extensive dairying systems in marginal areas where milk 
production is the sole economically viable land use, is likely to be 
environmentally negative, leading potentially to land abandonment, scrub 
encroachment, loss of biodiversity, and so on. 
 
Payments to producers for the release of quota act as an incentive to give up milk 
production. A quota market is one possibility for producers to sell their quota. It has 
been observed that when a dairy farm is sold with the quota attached, the value of the 
quota is capitalised into the value of the farm as a whole. In some countries and 
periods, the price differential between a farm without quota and a farm with quota has 
been substantial. In countries where a market exists for quota without land, it has been 
possible to confirm that the price differential is approximately equal to the value of 
the quota on the quota market. 
 
Restructuring schemes and quota buy out programmes, where payments against quota 
are funded by government, are an alternative mechanism for permitting producers to 
trade in their quota. It makes little sense for a government to operate such a scheme 
when a market for quota without land is in operation. In that case, government 
payments per litre of quota would have to be at least as great as the value realised on 
the quota market in order to be attractive to producers. Typically, Member States 
operating buy out schemes have fixed the price somewhat lower than that which 
economists have calculated to be the true implicit value of the quota.  
 
In Member States with a free market in tradable quotas, without regional barriers, 
quota will reach its highest value (this has been seen in particular in the Netherlands, 
where quota prices in the early 2000s were five to six times above the purchase price 
of milk). Where the value of quota can only be realised by selling the farm, or at an 
administrative price that does not reflect what is thought to be its true value, then the 
incentive to quit will be reduced. However, since many other factors contribute to the 
exodus of farmers from dairying, a decline in producer numbers will still be observed. 
 
There has been considerable variation in the extent to which, and the way in which, 
Member States have approached this aspect of quota implementation. At the most 
market-oriented end of the spectrum, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands 
participated in the initial EU funded buy out programmes only, and achieved a very 
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low take-up rate. Thereafter, in these two countries, cessation of production has been 
‘funded’ by market transactions. At the other end of the spectrum, restructuring 
programmes have been in continuous operation in France, first in the form of the EU 
funded programmes (which despite a rather low rate of payment had a particularly 
high take-up rate, especially amongst the smallest and most elderly producers), and 
then in the form of nationally funded programmes. Between these two extremes, a 
variety of specific programmes have been operated at different times in different 
Member States (see Table 5.1 in Chapter 5 – methodology).   
 
Table 7.9 Rates of exit of milk producers from dairying, 1983/84-2006/07 
Number of milk producers Percentage change in the number of milk producers (%)  
 
Member State  
1983/84 1993/94 2006/07 1983/84-2006/7 1993/94-2006/7 
Austria1    78,441 45,847  -41.6 
Belgium  47,053 24,272 14,311 -69.6 -41.0 
Denmark  32,679 16,390 5,364 -83.6 -67.3 
Finland  73,766 36,187 14,897 -79.8 -58.8 
France  384,945 162,384 94,332 -75.5 -41.9 
Germany2 383,369 220,679 105,800 -72.4 -52.1 
Greece    27,805 6,294  -77.4 
Ireland  67,981 41,390 21,872 -67.8 -47.2 
Italy    140,878 48,020  -65.9 
Luxembourg  2,226 1,524 923 -58.5 -39.4 
Netherlands3  54,013 43,928 21,172 -60.8 -51.8 
Portugal    87,254 12,461  -85.7 
Spain4    137,330 29,341  -78.6 
Sweden5    17,640 8,369  -52.6 
United Kingdom  50,625 36,709 18,499 -63.5 -49.6 
Source: Member State responses to DG Agriculture questionnaire (2007) 
1 Data for 1993/94 is based on year 1995/96. Figures from presentation on Austrian Milk Sector 
(Lebensministerium 2007).  
2 Data correspond to following years: 1983, 1993, 2003 & 2006.  
3 Data for 1983/84 based on year 1984/85. 
4 Data for 2006/07 based on year 22005/06. Figures from Spanish case study report (COAG, 2006 
based on data from MAPA) 
5 Data for 1993/94 is based on year 1995 (Eurostat).  
  
Table 7.9 summarises the rate of exit of milk producers (measured as the rate of 
disappearance of herds) over the full quota period.  In all the Member States shown in 
the table except Luxembourg, at least 60 per cent of milk producers left the dairy 
sector during the period 1983/84-2006/7. It is noticeable that the UK and the 
Netherlands (plus Luxembourg) show the slowest rate of decline. However, it would 
be wrong to link this result wholly, or even partly, to their high degree of market 
orientation. This result is undoubtedly due to the fact that at the start of the period, 
these two Member States had by far the largest average herd sizes, and the lowest 
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proportion of small, unprofitable herds. The majority of milk producers in these 
Member States at the start of the period were ‘professional’ dairy farmers, with 
considerable investment in dairying and oriented towards the commercial market. 
This contrasts sharply with many other Member States, where many farms, small and 
not so small, kept small dairy herds for the purpose of providing milk for household 
and on-farm use, and where there were also many elderly farmers with small 
unprofitable herds and no successor (especially in Italy). One expects a much greater 
shake-out of producers in these conditions. The lower rate of decline in the UK and 
the Netherlands is probably the net effect of two opposing factors – the high prices 
earned in the quota market (which would tend to stimulate cessation) and the much 
lower proportion of marginal dairy units i.e. most farms were commercially viable 
(which would tend to depress cessation rates below those observed elsewhere). 
  
Table 7.9 shows the net reductions in the number of dairy producers between 1983/84 
and 2006/07. The timing of these exits is potentially interesting. Although in France 
and Ireland cessation schemes continued throughout the 1990s, a relatively small 
proportion of producers (less than 50 per cent) ceased production between 1993/94 
and 2006/07. This is also true of Belgium, but information is not currently to hand 
regarding whether or not Belgium also continued with such programmes over the 
1990s. By contrast in a number of other Member States,, between 70 and 90 per cent 
of producers ceased dairy production  from 1993/94 onwards including Portugal, 
Spain, and Greece. One interpretation of these figures is that the second feature of the 
restructuring schemes, namely the redistribution of quota to priority groups including 
young farmers and new entrants, was relatively successful in France and Ireland in 
helping to offset other factors which, left to themselves, might have caused a higher 
net rate of exit in the second part of the period. This suggests that the allocations they 
received helped make them relatively viable and thus less prone to exit dairy 
production. 
 
The environmental significance of a producer’s decision to give up dairying depends 
on the destination of the released quota and the subsequent use of the land on which 
dairying was carried out. When the quota is sold with the farm, and the new owner 
continues with dairy production, there is probably the smallest potential 
environmental effect. However, since the purchaser will probably have borrowed to 
finance the purchase and may be under some financial pressure in the early years, he 
faces an incentive to exploit the new investment more intensively compared with 
long-established producers. If the quota is sold without land in a national market, 
there may well be some regional redistribution, with the potential effects that have 
already been discussed earlier in this chapter. When abandoned or bought out quota 
has been reallocated (as in France, Italy, Ireland, Spain), the potential environmental 
effects will depend on (a) the source of the quota to be reallocated and (b) the specific 
categories and locations of producers that are targeted by the reallocation. For 
example, if the quota to be reallocated has been given up as the result of a producer 
buyout, a considerable share of the quota is likely to come from smaller marginal 
dairy farms. A significant proportion of these are likely to have been operated by 
older farmers without successors using low input production systems. Many will have 
been relatively extensive but with limited investment in manure management. The 
disappearance of these dairy farms from their typical locations could result in a 
variety of alternative forms of land management. These range from arable production, 
intensive beef using dairy buildings, through to more outdoor beef production, 
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predominantly outdoor sheep, afforestation in some areas, or outright abandonment. 
Most land used for dairying is of a better quality than average extensive grazing land 
so abandonment will usually occur only in special circumstances, for example, on 
very small holdings where beef production may be unprofitable. The environmental 
impact of the cessation of dairying depends on the alternative management regime but 
data on this are not available at present.    
 
For example, the Spanish case study shows that many farms within marginal areas, 
mainly upland areas, have ceased milk production. In some cases, this has been 
replaced by other forms of grazing (for example, suckler cattle, sheep, horses), in 
other cases land has become abandoned, but more commonly it has been afforested, 
particularly with eucalyptus, with subsequent negative environmental impacts as 
referred to under Hypothesis 1.  
 
Regarding the recipients of the reallocated quota, unless the targeted groups are 
specifically oriented towards more environmentally friendly forms of farming, it is 
unlikely that there will be an environmental gain from the reallocation except with 
regard to manure management which often is poor on smaller farms with a shortage of 
investment capital. In general terms it may be advantageous when the recipients are 
relatively small producers because of the link between scale and intensity noted in 
Hypothesis 2. In Member States that operate ring-fencing for their administrative 
reallocation (for example France and Italy), environmental effects resulting from 
transfers to intensive production regions will not occur. However, even in these cases, 
the identity of the recipients, as well as the amount of quota that is allocated to 
recipients, can affect the way the quota will be used. In France, the beneficiaries of 
this type of reallocation of quota have tended to be young farmers, and farmers with 
development plans. It is unlikely that young farmers would want to pursue milk 
production using the same production systems as the marginal farmers who have been 
bought out. They are more likely to seek to establish themselves on the bottom rung 
of the mainstream commercial dairying ladder in their area and to expand as quickly 
as possible to a more profitable scale, in order to intensify. Similarly, it is to be 
expected that farmers with development plans aim to modify their production system, 
most probably involving some form of intensification – but manure and waste 
management may be improved considerably with more modern equipment and a fresh 
outlook. 
 
In other cases, the disappearance of the herd also means disappearance of the farm, 
with the land going into non-agricultural use (leisure enterprises such as golf courses 
or nature parks, house construction, road building and so on). This has been more than 
an isolated phenomenon in densely populated areas such as the Netherlands and South 
Eastern England, and in the peri-urban belt around cities. The net environmental 
effects of such developments can only be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Of 
course, it is likely that in these cases, cessation of agricultural activity and the 
resulting transfer of land use would have occurred anyway, regardless of any 
incentives to release milk quota, given the large price differentials between 
agricultural land and land for development.  
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7.4.1 Summary 
Many variables influence the rate of exit of producers from dairying, and the rate of 
disappearance of dairy herds. These include differences between Member States in the 
socio economic variables that drive the decision to quit, macro economic conditions, 
and the general educational and skill level of the farming population. The share of 
small, uneconomic dairy herds at the start of the quota period has also been a very 
important factor, together with the extent to which governments pursued active 
priority based allocations as described in Chapter 3, or allowed quota prices to reach 
their potential maximum in free, national quota markets. There are not enough 
observations here, relative to the number of potential factors influencing the decision 
to exit, to attempt a regression (as was done to test Hypothesis 4). Therefore, the 
discussion regarding the first order effects of the hypothesis must remain 
inconclusive. 
 
Without any real evidence for the first order effects, our methodology indicates that it 
is not worthwhile to investigate the second link, if the aim is to try and find a causal 
chain between differences in quota implementation rules and environmental 
consequences. However, the question of the environmental consequences when a 
dairy farm ceases operation or a dairy farmer leaves the sector, is interesting in its 
own right and demands a more rigorous investigation with appropriate research 
methods.  
7.5 Hypothesis 4: Constraints and incentives with respect to input use 
First order effects 
Where constraints or incentives regarding inputs are attached to rules for quota 
allocation or transfer, producers’ decisions regarding input use will be 
influenced against or in favour of these inputs, or producers already using little 
or more of these inputs will gain quota share relative to others. 
 
Second order environmental effects 
The relative levels and proportions of various inputs used, and substitution 
between inputs, are not environmentally neutral, and have a variety of potential 
environmental impacts.  
 
Member States have attached various constraints and incentives to their rules for 
quota allocation and transfer. For example, one of the priority groups for 
administrative transfers of quota in France is producers with investment plans. This 
can create positive incentives to upgrade fixed investment on the farm. Over time, as 
producers with investment plans are favoured, the general level of investment in the 
sector should increase, particularly at those levels in the herd size distribution where 
producers are most keen to expand their dairy enterprise. By contrast, when quota 
expansion has to proceed via the quota market, on-farm investment competes with 
market purchases of quota for financial resources, which may lead indirectly to a 
lower level of on-farm investment amongst quota purchasers. Since the latest 
generation of fixed equipment and infrastructure often leads to higher input 
efficiency, or is designed specifically to respect more environmentally friendly 
standards, particularly for manure management, there is the potential for differential 
environmental consequences. 
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Another priority group for redistribution, in France and Ireland, is young farmers, 
who are often new entrants to the dairy sector. Although the targeting of this group 
may have been motivated more by considerations of social justice and income 
redistribution than by concerns for input quality, it is nevertheless true that a young 
producer who is recently trained and motivated to succeed is likely to adopt a fresh, 
and potentially more efficient, approach to management and labour use than the 
elderly retiring producer whom he replaces. Given the ageing population of farm 
operators in the EU, the renewal of the farming profession from the younger age 
groups is perceived as a priority in some parts of the EU. In addition, it might be 
argued that the new entrant generation of producers is likely to be more 
environmentally aware than older generations, who faced quite different challenges 
during their formative years in farming. At the same time, however, younger 
producers are also more likely to adopt more intensive systems and to give up more 
traditional methods of production, some of which, such as hay making, are beneficial 
environmentally.  
 
When quota is transferred via the market, young producers and new entrants tend to 
be at a disadvantage because of the extra capital outlay involved. Quota will flow 
towards those who are willing and able to pay the highest price. These purchasers will 
be established farmers with a sound financial position, or investors who are expanding 
the size of the activity they control as a profit-making concern. The combination of 
these two effects – encouragement of younger farmers in France and Ireland, and 
financial deterrents for younger farmers in the most market-oriented Member States – 
may be sufficient to cause a discernible difference in the age distributions of dairy 
farmers between these two cases. This discussion also raises questions (where we 
have no definitive evidence) concerning the relative quality of the management, and 
attitudes to the environment, of these two types of producer.  
 
Other examples of input constraints and incentives built into implementation rules 
involve attaching conditions on stocking densities to farms buying quota, or fixing a 
quota/land maximum for transfers of quota with land. This latter rule is considered 
further in Chapter 8. 
 
Given the types of incentives and constraints used, and their specific targeting of 
quota transfers, two crucial questions arise in relation this hypothesis. First, since 
input related incentives have been applied only either to those producers who 
transferred or received quota (a minority group), or to the units of quota actually 
transferred (typically a small proportion of total quota in use), has their aggregate 
effect been large enough quantitatively to show up in the statistics for the sector?  
Second, have the behavioural changes that these incentives and constraints may have 
influenced actually produced any environmental effects, even if only at the micro-
level?  
 
First order effects 
It has been difficult to obtain empirical evidence on the extent to which these 
additional constraints or incentives have had a significant effect on producers’ input 
decisions, or altered outcomes in a way that can be measured at sector level. The only 
relevant sectoral information that it has been possible to find, in relation to first order 
effects, concerns the age distribution of milk producers, and this evidence is reported 
in Table 7.10.  
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The main points of interest emerging from this table are: 
 
• In virtually all Member States, the age distribution is younger for specialist milk 
producers than for producers on all holdings at EU level. 
• Ten years after the start of the quota regime, Luxembourg, Germany, Finland 
and France had the greatest proportion of specialist dairy producers under the 
age of 45 (49.5, 46.0, 45.9 and 45.1 per cent respectively). The share of this age 
group increased quite steeply over the period between the 1985 and 1995 
surveys. Moreover, this was not because of an accelerated wastage from the 
group aged over 65, since the shares in this age group are roughly similar in the 
two surveys. This suggests that the policy in France of targeting younger 
producers may well have played a role.  
• By contrast, the proportion of producers in the lowest age groups in the two 
most market-oriented Member States, the UK and the Netherlands, is relatively 
low (27 and 28 per cent, respectively) in 1995, and the share of specialist dairy 
farmers under 45 years of age actually fell between the two surveys. In fact, by 
1995, the proportions of producers in the lowest age group in the Netherlands 
and the UK were no higher than for all types of agricultural holding at EU level. 
This is prima facie evidence that the market-oriented approach was operating as 
a barrier to entry for young producers in these countries. However, the share of 
young dairy farmers in the Mediterranean countries (Spain, Italy, Greece and 
Portugal) was as low or lower, indicating that national factors influencing the 
age distribution of farmers as a whole may play as important role as sectoral 
policies in explaining these figures. 
• The 2005 survey indicates that UK remains an outlier with only 22.2 per cent of 
specialist dairy producers under 45 years old. Sweden has the second lowest 
share of young producers (23.1 per cent) whilst the Netherlands and Ireland are 
much closer to the EU average (38.6 per cent), with 37.4 per cent and 36.9 per 
cent respectively. Greece, Austria, France and Germany have the greatest 
proportion of farmers under 45 years old, with 47.0, 46.0, 43.3 and 43.1 per cent 
respectively. 
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Table 7.10 Percentage of specialist dairy holders in different age groups, 1985, 1995 and 2005 for EU 10/EU 15 
 1985 Survey 1995 Survey 2005 Survey 
Age of holder (years) <45 45-54 55-64 ≥65 <35 35-44 45-54 55-64 ≥65 < 35 35-44 45-54 55-64 ≥65 
All holdings 
EU 10/151 23.1 26.9 29.3 20.7 7.9 15.2 21.7 27.4 27.8 5.5 15.9 22.2 23.6 32.7 
Specialist dairy 
EU 10/151 30.1 32.0 29.2 8.6 15.1 23.0 25.5 26.3 10.2 10.4 28.2 31.0 21.7 8.7 
Austria     18.9 25.3 24.2 22.6 9.0 13.3 32.7 30.7 15.9 7.4 
Belgium 35.1 34.2 26.6 4.1 21.0 22.6 23.6 26.7 6.2 9.6 29.6 28.5 23.5 8.7 
Denmark 35.7 30.9 25.7 7.8 10.0 22.7 29.6 28.1 9.4 10.3 30.8 28.2 21.9 8.8 
Finland     19.0 26.9 32.0 18.0 4.1 9.7 28.3 34.3 24.3 3.4 
Germany 35.8 36.1 24.4 3.7 19.8 26.2 23.3 27.1 3.6 10.6 32.5 32.8 20.2 3.9 
Greece 15.8 31.7 30.2 22.3 6.6 14.7 22.9 32.9 22.6 18.1 28.8 22.4 16.7 13.5 
Spain     10.1 16.8 24.4 32.2 16.5 9.0 23.0 31.6 26.4 10.0 
France 28.9 31.8 32.9 6.5 18.7 26.4 28.4 22.1 4.3 15.1 28.3 33.4 19.8 3.4 
Ireland 29.8 26.6 28.4 15.2 15.4 20.9 24.5 24.8 14.5 11.6 25.4 26.6 23.0 13.4 
Italy 19.5 29.4 33.3 17.7 10.4 17.4 21.5 29.9 20.8 8.9 26.3 27.9 19.1 17.8 
Luxembourg 39.9 30.4 20.5 9.1 15.3 34.2 24.3 18.9 7.2 8.7 27.5 40.6 15.9 7.2 
Netherlands 30.7 31.5 29.6 8.2 7.4 20.8 28.2 30.1 13.4 6.4 31.1 29.5 23.9 9.2 
Portugal     11.6 20.2 25.4 25.4 17.3 8.0 20.7 27.7 26.1 17.4 
Sweden     10.7 25.6 30.2 23.2 10.2 5.5 17.6 26.5 29.4 21.0 
United Kingdom 31.4 28.4 28.8 11.3 6.5 20.1 28.2 27.8 17.4 3.6 18.7 28.3 29.5 19.9 
Source: Eurostat, Farm Structure Survey. 
1   European Community (EU) 10 in 1985, European Union (EU) 15 in 1995 and 2005. 
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These data suggest that, after 20 years of milk quotas, changes in the age distribution 
of dairy farmers due to different national rules for quota transfer and allocation are 
inextricably combined with national patterns of age distribution for farmers as a 
whole, and no clear pattern is discernible that could be attributed to quota 
implementation rules. Whilst these differences in the evolution of the age distribution 
of dairy farmers could have environmental consequences, for example because of 
differences in input intensity or choice of waste management system, this cannot not 
be pursued further.  
 
7.5.1 Summary 
The evidence relating to this hypothesis presented above is very sparse, and no 
empirically supported conclusions can be drawn.  
 
As already predicted when specifying this hypothesis, it has been difficult to obtain 
empirical evidence on the extent to which Member States’ specific rules have had a 
significant effect on producers’ input decisions, and the consequences for the 
environment have proved impossible to pin down from the data sources available to 
this study.  
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8 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF QUOTA MEASURES WITH 
ENVIRONMENTAL OBJECTIVES 
Evaluation Question 2 
To what extent did measures relating to the allocation and transfer of milk quota, 
for which the national legislation provides for the objective of environmental 
protection or enhancement, contribute to achieving positive environmental effects? 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the extent to which measures relating to the allocation and 
transfer of milk quota, for which national legislation explicitly or implicitly sets an 
environmental protection or enhancement objective, contribute to achieving positive 
environmental effects at the European, Member State and farm levels.  
 
The analysis considers in particular the measures for specific transfers of quota taken 
in the context of national or regional restructuring programmes. These measures are 
referred to in Council Regulation (EC) 1234/2007 (Article 75) and the two preceding 
Regulations64 which mention ‘improving the environment’ as a possible objective for 
restructuring programmes. The measures include inter alia: 
 
• compensation for producers who abandon milk production - Article 75 1(a); 
• provision for the retention of milk quota by producers who transfer land with a 
view to improving the environment - Article 75 1(d); and 
• provision for producers to transfer quota without also transferring land to allow 
for the extensification of production - Article 75 1(f). 
 
The issue of (environmental) effectiveness is particularly relevant for these kinds of 
measures. It should be noted that Article 75 1(e), which refers to objective criteria for 
determining the regions or milk collection areas within which permanent transfers of 
quota without land can take place (for example, milk purchaser areas, LFAs, etc), 
only refers to the aim of ‘improving the structure of milk production’ in the legislative 
text, and not ‘improving the environment’.  
 
In this study, implicit environmental objectives are also considered to be relevant. It is 
important to note that the primary objectives of such measures are not explicitly 
environmental, although their subsidiary objectives may be. On the contrary, the 
primary objectives will be driven by other factors including socio-economic 
objectives linked to farm income and rural population. Nonetheless measures included 
within this chapter have the potential for positive environmental impacts, even if these 
will tend to be indirect in relation to objectives.  
 
Since the farmed landscape in many LFAs is valuable in environmental terms it might 
be reasonable to assume that, where national rules distinguish between producers in 
LFAs and non-LFAs in terms of quota allocation and transfer, there is an implicit 
                                                 
64 Article 18 of Council Regulation (EC) 1788/2003 and Article 8 of Council Regulation (EEC) 
3950/92. 
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environmental objective in allocating or ring-fencing quota to LFAs, even if the 
primary objective lying behind such rules is economic or socio-economic65.  
 
In practice, however, the reality of any environmental objective behind LFA-related 
quota rules will vary between Member States. In a number of Member States (for 
example France and Italy), the objective of ring-fencing quota to LFAs has been 
specifically to maintain farming activity and the rural population within these 
marginal areas. As a result of this, caution must be exercised in attributing any 
environmental basis to such quota regimes, let alone any intended environmental 
effects. For the purposes of this evaluation question, we assume that LFA related rules 
may have an implicit environmental objective in some Member States and explore the 
effects accordingly.  
 
In this chapter the counterfactual is taken as the situation without those quota 
allocation and transfer measures considered to have explicit or implicit environmental 
objectives. However, in line with the counterfactual scenario outlined in Chapter 5, 
comparisons are also made between Member States taking account of the continuum 
ranging from the interventionist to minimalist approach to quota management.   
 
The central question of the effectiveness of any environmentally focussed quota 
measures is addressed through two hypotheses. This chapter examines the evidence 
for each hypothesis in turn, where appropriate building on analysis already undertaken 
as part of Evaluation Question 1.  
 
8.2 Overview of measures with explicit or implicit environmental objectives  
A summary of the measures with explicit or implicit environmental objectives is set 
out below. These take account of the responses of national authorities in case study 
countries to the DG Agriculture survey of national milk quota regimes in 2007. 
Measures with explicit environmental objectives 
Of the seven Member States for which case studies have been undertaken, only Spain 
has an explicit environmental objective in its milk quota legislation. This and the 
associated measures are outlined below. 
 
‘Improving the environment’ appeared as an objective of the Spanish milk quota 
regime in 1994, although the precise meaning of this objective is not explained. The 
reference appears to echo the wording in EU legislation but there are no related 
measures or text referred to in the Spanish legislation (Guy Beaufoy, Pers. Comm. 
19.11.07). Then in 1998, extensifying dairy production was given as one possible 
justification for applicants wishing to transfer quota between regions without land (in 
this case the resulting stocking density was required to be at or below 2 LU per forage 
hectare), with the other justification being that applicants could improve production 
structures.  
 
                                                 
65 This is in line with the economic or socio-economic basis for the designation of LFAs which can 
also take into account natural handicaps.   
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A review of responses to the Commission’s survey has not identified any other 
Member State having milk quota regimes or measures with explicit environmental 
objectives.  
Measures with implicit environmental objectives  
Several Member States appear to have measures which may have implicit 
environmental objectives as part of their milk quota regime.  
 
A number of Member States - France, Italy, Ireland, Spain, Germany and UK - 
currently have, or have had, rules regarding the transfer of quota between regions 
which seek to maintain a territorial distribution of milk production. However these 
generally appear to be socio-economic in purpose and can only be construed at best as 
having implicit environmental objectives. As indicated previously, the EU legislation 
for determining regional bases for transfers of quota -  Council Regulation (EC) No 
1234/2007 Article 75 1(e) – only refers to ‘improving the structure of milk 
production’ not ‘improving the environment’.  
 
A few Member States - Belgium, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands - 
have rules referring to a maximum amount of quota that can be transferred with land, 
expressed in kg or litres per hectare of land which can be used for milk production. 
However, none of these countries appears to have explicit environmental objectives 
for their milk quota regimes as such. 
 
A summary of milk quota measures with (possibly) implicit environmental objectives 
is set out in Table 8.1 below. 
Alliance Environnement: Evaluation of the Environmental Impacts of Milk Quotas  
Final Deliverable Report – 30/07/2008 
 126
Table 8.1 Milk quota measures with (possibly) implicit environmental objectives by Member State 
Member State Implicit environmental objective or measure 
BE Belgium’s milk quota regime stipulates that a maximum of 20,000 litres quota/ ha is able to be transferred with 
land. In addition, both the entire farm belonging to the producer receiving the transfer and the transferred land 
itself must lie within a 30km zone surrounding the production unit to which the quota that is to be transferred 
belonged on 31 March/1 April 2002 (Walloon/ Flanders). Both elements could be construed as having implicit 
environmental objectives. Note, however, we are not aware of environmental objectives being cited by the 
government for Belgium’s milk quota regime. 
 
DE Germany’s milk quota regime has had some relatively minor components in the past which one could consider to 
be implicitly environmental. These included: preferential allocation of milk quota (from the national reserve) to 
smaller farms or in favour of mountain areas in certain regions (e.g. Baden Württemberg); the possibility of 
granting compensation to farmers who voluntarily abandon all or part of their milk production (Article 75 1(a)); 
and small amounts of quota allocated in favour of farms which manage grassland used by wild geese and LFAs in 
North Rhine-Westphalia. None of these measures still exists today. The regional basis for the transfer of quota 
without land could also be regarded as implicitly environmental (e.g. maintaining dairy production in regions 
with LFAs and/or high landscape value). In general, Germany follows the principle that the milk quota system 
should not be overloaded with environmental or structural policy objectives, as these are better targeted by 
specific agri-environmental and structural policies which are implemented via numerous programmes.   
 
ES Aside from the explicit environmental elements already referred to, Spain’s milk quota regime included a LFA 
rule (from 1988 to 2003) which could be regarded as implicitly environmental. Where quota was transferred 
between administrative regions, transfers from within the LFA of a region could not result in a decline of total 
quota within the area of more than 1.5 per cent in any one year. Where quota was transferred within an 
administrative region, this restriction did not apply. New legislation was introduced in 2003 dropping the 
reference to the LFA rule.   
 
FI Finland’s milk quota regime stipulates that a maximum of 12,000 litres quota/ha is able to be transferred.  In 
addition, quota is allocated to three groups, one of which is organic producers and/or producers with indigenous 
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Member State Implicit environmental objective or measure 
breeds. Both elements could be construed as having implicit environmental objectives. Note, however, we are not 
aware of environmental objectives being cited by the government for Finland’ milk quota regime. 
 
FR France’s milk quota regime includes territorial development objectives, which could be seen as being implicitly 
environmental. These favour the preservation of the territorial distribution of dairy activities as it was in the early 
1980s, thus seeking to protect more economically fragile rural areas from agricultural decline or further 
specialisation with respect to dairying. Specific caution is reserved for LFAs, in particular mountain areas, which 
have been the object of quota redistribution and less quota reduction than other areas.  In order to benefit from 
allocations from the national reserve, farmers must comply with the relevant environmental legislation/standards 
with particular reference being made to: 
– Nitrate Directive (<170 N kg  per ha), 
– PMPOA (programme aimed at limiting agricultural pollution), 
– Norms applying to buildings where cattle are housed, 
– Regional specificities (norms on water quality in Poitou-Charente for example). 
 
IE Ireland’s milk quota regime includes the objectives of sustaining a balanced spread of milk production and 
processing throughout the country and favouring small scale producers, many of which are in the LFAs. These 
could be seen as implicit environmental objectives.  Relevant milk quota rules include: 
– Milk purchaser based quota management 
– Ring fencing provisions within LFAs for land and quota transfers 
– Restructuring, temporary leasing and unused quota rules in favour of small and medium sized producers  
The main objectives behind these rules and the regime as a whole are economic and socio-economic. 
 
IT Italy’s milk quota regime includes an objective of preserving production in LFAs and mountain areas. Prior to 
2003, milk quota could only be transferred within the same region or homogeneous area (i.e. LFA, mountain or 
plain). After 2003, the transfer of quota outside regions was permitted (up to 70 per cent of the reference 
quantity) although milk quota in LFA and mountain areas could still only be transferred to other farmers within 
these areas. Similar rules applied to temporary transfers, in terms of only permitting transfers between farmers in 
homogeneous areas (after 2004), and the operation of the national reserve which prioritised LFA and mountain 
Alliance Environnement: Evaluation of the Environmental Impacts of Milk Quotas  
Final Deliverable Report – 30/07/2008 
 128
Member State Implicit environmental objective or measure 
areas. The redistribution of unused quotas also favoured LFA and mountain dairy producers. Permanent or 
temporary transfers were also subject to a maximum limit of 30,000 kg quota/ha UAA (only producers with less 
than 30,000 kg/ha can buy or rent additional quota and, after the acquisition of additional quota, producers cannot 
exceed this limit). These objectives and elements could be viewed as implicitly environmental.  
 
LU Luxembourg’s milk quota regime stipulates that following a purchase of quota without land, the producer can 
have a maximum of 12,000 kg quota/ ha.  This could be construed as having an implicit environmental objective; 
however we are not aware of any environmental objective being cited by the government for Luxembourg’s milk 
quota regime. 
 
NL The Netherlands’ milk quota regime stipulates that a maximum of 20,000 kg quota/ ha is able to be transferred 
with land (unless the average exceeds this in which case the average applies). Also, since 2006, quota can only be 
sold and bought without land if the average amount (including the bought quota) does not exceed 20,000kg/ha. 
These measures could be regarded as implicitly environmental. However, discussions with officials at the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality about the foundations for the limit of 20,000 kg milk per ha 
have not been able to clarify the basis for the 20,000 kg/ha limit (Co Daatselaar, Pers. Comm. 21.11.07). One 
explanation is that in 1986, 1 ha was just enough to be self-supporting for roughage in the case of 3 cows with the 
average production per cow at that time (about 6,500 kg) and no young stock or other grazing cattle.  
 
PT  Portugal’s milk quota regime stipulates that transfers without land may only take place if the receiving farm is not 
located in an environmentally vulnerable area (specifically NVZ) unless certain conditions are complied with. 
Similarly national reserve rules seek to minimise production in environmentally vulnerable areas. These could be 
construed as having (at least) an implicit environmental objective although we are not aware of environmental 
objectives being cited by the government for Portugal’s milk quota regime. 
 
UK The UK’s milk quota regime includes the ring fencing of quota in the Scottish Islands. This could be construed as 
expressing an implicit environmental objective. However its primary objective is socio-economic, to prevent milk 
production from running down in these isolated areas. 
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8.3 Hypothesis 5: Milk quota regimes with explicit environmental objectives 
 
Where Member State milk quota regimes have explicit environmental objectives, 
then less dairying or more extensive dairying is expected to occur in certain 
regions of those Member States, relative to the counterfactual. 
 
As indicated previously, Spain is the only case study Member State with any explicit 
environmental objective in its milk quota legislation. Furthermore we have not come 
across any other national milk quota regimes with explicit environmental objectives 
or measures. 
   
In Spain, the environmental element of the 1994 legislation can be discounted as 
there are no related measures or text in the legislation to support the environmental 
objective cited.  
 
The 1998 legislation sets out two possible justifications for applicants wishing to 
transfer quota without land between regions. One is the improvement of the 
production structure of the recipient holding, the other is the extensification of 
production. In the case of the latter, the applicant’s resulting stocking density after 
quota transfer must be at or below 2 LU per forage ha. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that the vast majority of applicants (if not all applicants) used the improvement of the 
production structure as their justification for quota transfers between regions (Guy 
Beaufoy, Pers. Comm. 19.11.07). This is for the simple reason that this avoided the 
need to comply with the maximum stocking density associated with the 
extensification justification (which may have affected some producers). Even if 
producers had opted for the extensification justification, this would have only 
achieved relatively limited extensification (2 LU/ha is still fairly intensive). A further 
point to note is that the optional stocking density condition only applied to a small 
proportion of overall quota transfers. Transfers of quota without land between regions 
comprised only around 10 per cent of total transfers of quota without land (most were 
within regions). 
 
In summary, in Spain the environmental element of the 1994 legislation appears to 
have had no impact and the 1998 measure is likely to have had little or no effect in 
terms of extensifying production.  We are able to conclude that only one Member 
State had any explicit environmental objective to its milk quota regime and the 
relevant measures had little or no impact in terms of reducing or extensifying 
dairying. 
 
Given the absence of structural or farm level impacts, the environmental 
consequences of this legislation are likely to have been very limited or negligible. In 
other words, the only Member State milk quota regime with an explicit environmental 
objective does not appear to have been effective in delivering any environmental 
benefits of note.  
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8.4 Hypothesis 6: Milk quota regimes with implicit environmental objectives 
First order effects 
Where Member States have milk quota measures with implicit environmental 
objectives relating to the LFA, then milk production, dairy cows and dairy farms 
are expected to have been maintained in LFAs and/or other priority areas at a 
higher level than otherwise. Where these objectives relate to limits on milk 
production, levels of production are expected to be maintained or reduced. 
 
There are six Member States with milk quota measures targeted at either the whole or 
part of the LFAs – France, Italy, Ireland, Spain, Germany and the UK. 
 
In France, the rules for quota management effectively sought to freeze the geographic 
distribution of dairy production by Département as it was in 1983. Although the milk 
quota regime does not specifically target LFAs, the effect is that dairy production has 
been sustained in these mountainous zones or less competitive areas (see also Section 
7.4). Depending on the farm management and other factors this is likely to have 
contributed to the maintenance of traditional landscapes, and pastoral habitats, and the 
preservation of an important part of dairy production under mainly pastoral practices  
 
The distribution of dairy holdings and milk production by LFA and non-LFA is 
shown in Table 8.2. This illustrates the significant share of dairy holdings located in 
the LFA and the relatively modest proportion of production derived from dairy farms 
in Mountain LFAs.    
Table 8.2 Distribution of dairy holdings and milk quotas in LFA and non-
LFA in France in 2005 
Area Share of dairy holdings (%) 
Share of national milk 
quota (%) 
Mountain LFA 19 13 
Other LFA  17 17 
Non-LFA 64 70 
Source: Breeding Institute 
 
Over the period 1984/85 to 2004/05, the proportion of national milk production 
delivered within Mountain LFAs increased from 10.4 per cent to 13.5 per cent, in 
total amounting to a 16.5 per cent increase in quota, see Table 8.3. While comparable 
data does not exist for the full period for other LFAs, there are similar positive trends 
for quota in these areas over the past decade.  
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Table 8.3 Distribution of milk quota (1000 tons) in France per type of region 
 1984/85 1994/95 1995/96 2004/05 
 Percentage 
change (%)   
1984/05 – 
2004/05 
 Percentage 
change (%)   
1995/06 - 
2004/05 
       
Mountain LFA 2,665,926 3,086,872 2,978,731 3,105,209 16.5  4.2  
Other LFA 3,831,592 3,975,769 3.8  
Non-LFA 
22,957,301 20,472,825 
16,073,179 15,971,367 
-13.1  
-0.6  
Total France 25,623,227 23,559,697 22,883,502 23,052,345 -10.0  0.7  
Mountain LFA / 
 Total France (%) 10.4  13.1  13.0  13.5    
  Other LFA /  
Total France (%) n/a n/a 16.7  17.2    
Source: ONILAIT (Année laitière 2004) 
 
In terms of the number of specialist dairy holdings, there was a slower decline in 
mountainous zones (-20 per cent) compared to non-LFA areas (-40 per cent) over 
1990-99 (Ruas, J.F. 2002). This evidence of a slower rate of reduction in the number 
of dairy farms in both Mountain and Other LFAs, relative to non-LFAs, can be 
compared with results although the differences are not great from FADN for the 
period 1995-2004, for the seven case study Member States. This also points to 
differences in the rate of decline although the differences especially between 
Mountain LFA and non-LFA dairy farms are not great (-28 per cent compared to -32 
per cent), see Table 8.4 below (caution must be exercised with FADN data due to the 
changing sample from year to year). 
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Table 8.4 Indication of change in number of LFA and non-LFA dairy farms in case study Member States over 1995-2004 based on 
data drawn from FADN 
 
LFA dairy 
farms France Germany Ireland Italy Netherlands Spain UK 
Mountain LFA 
dairy farms -7622 -28% n/a n/a n/a n/a -10169 -29% n/a n/a -11513 -56% n/a n/a 
Other LFA 
dairy farms -4208 -21% -43416 -42% -7528 -33% n.d. n.d. n/a n/a -11971 -45% -3746 -29% 
Non-LFA dairy 
farms -28817 -32% -26373 -45% -8953 -54% -13152 -39% -11438 -33% -10115 -71% -8019 -38% 
n/a = not applicable 
n.d. = no data available 
N.B Because FADN data is based on a changing sample of participating farms rather than a comprehensive survey it provides only an indicative 
picture of changing numbers of dairy farms.  
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In broad terms mountainous and non-LFA areas hold different dairy farming systems. 
Mountainous holdings are generally grass-based, small, and specialised (or mixed 
with meat production) with lower stocking densities. Non-LFA holdings on the other 
hand are mainly silage and cereal feed based, reasonably large, and often diversified 
(with pig, poultry or cereals production). 
 
Changes in the proportion of dairy farms with different stocking densities over the 
period 1995-2004 are shown in Figure 8.1, using FADN data. This shows an increase 
in the proportion of more lightly stocked (<1.4 LU/ha) dairy farms in all three 
categories, Mountain LFA, Other LFA and non-LFA.   
 
Figure 8.1 Number of dairy farms in France by LFA status and stocking rate, 
1995-2004 
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Source: FADN 
Note: the reservations about using FADN time series data noted in Table 8.4 apply here too. 
 
In summary, in France, there has been a proportionate increase in the amount of milk 
produced in Mountain LFAs compared to non-LFA areas, a slower decline in the 
number of dairy farms in Mountain LFAs compared to non-LFA areas and an increase 
in the proportion of lightly stocked dairy farms both inside and outside LFA areas.   
 
Without the territorial approach to milk quota, it is likely that previous trends would 
have continued, namely the migration of production to Western regions and away 
from areas with a comparative disadvantage for dairying (such as the LFAs with low 
dairy cow density, small farms, low milk value etc). 
 
In Italy, the quota regime has sought to maintain milk production both within 
administrative regions but also within Mountain and Other LFAs. While the aim was 
primarily social, an implicit environmental objective can be construed.  
 
The distribution of milk production and milk quota by LFA and non-LFA in Italy is 
shown in Table 8.5. Milk production in LFAs, especially mountain areas, has 
generally been under quota compared to non-LFA areas.    
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Table 8.5 Distribution of milk production and milk quotas in LFA and non-
LFA in Italy in 2006/07 
Area Share of milk production (%)  
Share national milk 
quota (%) 
Mountain LFA 17.5 18.6 
Other LFA  5.2 5.3 
Non-LFA 77.3 76.2 
Source: ISMEA - Osservatorio Latte  
 
Although milk production has increased in LFAs, milk output per Livestock Unit is 
still lower in LFAs than non-LFAs due to the presence of more extensive, outdoor 
systems and the greater specialisation and more intensive, indoor production systems 
in non-LFAs.  
 
The reduction in the number of dairy farms in Italy over the period 1995-2004 as 
suggested by FADN data is shown in Table 8.4. This suggests that Mountain LFA 
dairy farm numbers decreased by 29 per cent compared to 39 per cent for non-LFA 
dairy farms with no FADN data for ‘Other LFA’ farms.   
 
The case study illustrates recent trends in the total number of dairy farms and milk 
production in the Mountain and Other LFA. This shows the decline in the number of 
dairy farms in both types of LFA and the increase in milk production on Mountain 
LFA farms (see Figure 8.2 and Figure 8.3).  
 
Figure 8.2 Number of dairy farms in Italian Mountain and in Other LFAs 
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Source: AGEA. 
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Figure 8.3 Milk production in Italian Mountain and in Other LFAs 
Milk (000 tons)
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Source: AGEA. 
 
The case study also identifies the following trends in farming systems:  
• An increase in the proportion of outdoor systems of dairy production in LFAs 
(from 40 per cent in 1990-95 to 50 per cent in 2000-05) and, to a lesser extent,  
non-LFAs (from 1.5 per cent in 1990-95 to 4 per cent in 2000-05);  
• A greater increase in the proportion of outdoor systems in Mountain LFAs  (from 
40 per cent in 1990-95 to 53 per cent in 2000-05) compared to Other LFAs (from 
21 per cent in 1990-95 to 26 per cent in 2000-05);  
• An  increase in the proportion of all systems using feedstuffs as opposed to fodder 
crops, both in LFAs (from 11 per cent in 1990-95 to 41 per cent in 2000-05) and 
non-LFAs (from 16 per cent in 1990-95 to 50 per cent in 2000-05); 
• A stronger process of concentration and intensification (farms with more than 1.4 
LU/ha) occurring on farms in Mountain LFAs compared to farms in other LFAs.  
 
FADN data support the final one of these points regarding the trend of relatively rapid 
concentration and intensification trend in Mountain LFAs. Figure 8.4 shows an 
increase in the proportion of more intensive (>1.4 LU/ha) dairy farms in Mountain 
LFAs during 1995-2004. There are no 2004 data for ‘Other’ LFA farms.  
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Figure 8.4 Number of dairy farms in Italy by LFA status and stocking rate, 
1995-2004 
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Source: FADN  
Note: the reservations about using FADN time series data noted in Table 8.4 apply here too. 
 
According to the case study authors, the milk quota regime in Italy has had a positive 
impact in maintaining production in LFAs, especially thanks to the temporary 
redistribution of unused quota and, to a lesser extent, to the permanent transfer of 
quota without land and the temporary transfer of quota (see also Section 7.4). 
 
In Ireland, milk quota is allocated and managed at the milk purchaser level. This 
equates to loosely defined geographic areas (although the number of milk purchasers 
has reduced by a series of amalgamations over the years, resulting in fewer, larger 
areas). Initially land and quota sales were relatively free, however ring fencing 
provisions introduced in 1995 restricted the loss of milk quota out of LFAs. Quota 
transfers without land have been operated by milk purchasing co-ops via restructuring 
schemes or programmes and more recently by the Milk Quota Trading Scheme, small 
scale producers being one of the priority categories. Temporary leasing and the 
redistribution of unused milk quota are also operated at milk purchaser level, again 
with small scale producers being prioritised.  
 
By restricting quota transfers to within milk purchasing areas, the regional distribution 
of milk quota and milk production/processing has been conserved to a large degree. 
This includes the maintenance of milk quota and milk production/processing in LFAs 
(which comprise around 75 per cent of Ireland’s agricultural land). The prioritisation 
of small-scale producers via restructuring and other schemes has also benefited LFA 
dairy farmers, as they have a smaller average herd size compared to dairy farms 
outside the LFA. In some LFAs, the structure of dairying has been developing and 
quota has been more readily available in recent years. In other areas, dairy production 
was already well established and the supply of quota was limited.  
 
The reduction in the number of different types of dairy farm in Ireland over the period 
1995-2004 is indicated by FADN data (important caveats noted above). This suggests 
that LFA dairy farms have decreased by 33 per cent compared to 54 per cent for non-
LFA dairy farms, see Table 8.4.  
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Changes in the proportion of dairy farms with different stocking densities over the 
period 1995-2004 are shown in Figure 8.5. This suggests a significant increase in the 
proportion of more intensive (>1.4 LU/ha) dairy farms in the LFA, although this must 
be seen in the context of overall intensity. Average milk yields have also increased, 
but are still low relative to the EU average. 
 
Figure 8.5 Number of dairy farms in Ireland by LFA status and stocking 
rate, 1995-2004 
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Source: FADN 
Note: the reservations about using FADN time series data noted in Table 8.4 apply here too. 
 
Without the allocation and management of quota at milk purchaser level, and to some 
extent the priorities set for reallocation of quota, there would have been greater 
restructuring nationally. A regional shift in production away from the North and West 
to the more advantaged dairying areas of the South and East could have been 
expected.  
  
In Spain, a mechanism introduced in 1998 to slow the exodus of quota from the LFA 
applied only to quota being transferred out of the administrative region, and not to 
transfers out of the LFA within the same region. In other words, the mechanism seems 
to have been intended to slow the movement of quota between regions, rather than to 
keep quota specifically within the LFA. As indicated previously, only the minority of 
quota transfers in Spain took place between regions (22,000 tons out of a total of 
132,000 tons (17 per cent) transferred without land in 2002/3) so the LFA mechanism 
is only likely to have had limited impact. The national Constitutional Tribunal drew 
attention to the incoherence of this mechanism, and it was abolished in 2003.  
 
Unfortunately, data is not available to show the amount of quota and number of farms 
potentially affected by the LFA mechanism.  
 
In Germany, the elements of the milk quota regime that could be regarded as 
implicitly environmental include: the preferential allocation of milk quota to smaller 
farms or farms in mountain areas in some Länder; the granting of compensation to 
farmers who voluntarily abandon all or part of their milk production; and small 
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amounts of quota allocated in favour of farms which manage grassland used by wild 
geese and in LFAs in North Rhine-Westphalia. The regional basis for quota trading in 
Germany (1993-2007) could also be construed, potentially, as being implicitly 
environmental (for example by maintaining dairy production in those Länder with 
alpine pastures or Länder with a high proportion of LFA). ‘Maintaining the 
landscape’ and ‘preventing the migration of milk production from unfavourable 
locations’ were cited as policy objectives of the milk quota rules by ministry experts 
interviewed as part of the case study. In general, however, Germany follows the 
principle that the milk quota system should not be overloaded with environmental or 
structural policy objectives, as these are better targeted by specific agri-environmental 
and structural policies which are implemented via numerous programmes.  
 
The preferential allocation of milk quota (from the national reserve) to smaller farms 
or in favour of mountain areas was carried out in some Länder (for example, in Baden 
Württemberg, but not in Bavaria) in the first years of the milk quota regime, 
However, the administrative implementation proved to be difficult, and this 
programme was soon given up because of administrative problems. According to the 
experts interviewed as part of the case study, key factors in the decisions not to use 
preferential allocations on a wider scale were a) problems in finding objective criteria 
which would withstand legal scrutiny as well as being acceptable to stakeholders; and 
b) the low confidence of dairy farmers in administrative allocations (resulting from 
bad experiences with hardship cases during the first years of the milk quota regime).  
 
The possibility of granting compensation to farmers who voluntarily abandon all or 
part of their milk production (Article 75 1(a)) was used only during the first years of 
the milk quota system. Quota allocated to the national reserve through this process 
was mainly used to reduce the national excess quota, with a small share being used to 
support farms in particularly difficult situations. 
 
Länder were permitted to distribute reference quantities to producers according to 
objective criteria. However, only one Land made use of this possibility, North Rhine-
Westphalia. Small amounts of quota were allocated in favour of farms which manage 
grassland used by wild geese and in LFAs and the latter was abandoned in 2005. 
 
There is no data on the economic or structural impacts of these measures however it is 
likely that the impacts are relatively minor in the overall context.  
 
The impacts of the regional basis for quota trading in Germany are explored in 
Section 7.2. Milk production has declined across the country with no apparent 
significant difference between regions with LFAs or high value landscapes and 
regions without. Furthermore milk quota allocations from the national reserve did not 
have a marked regional bias. Within certain regions however, there has been a 
significant relocation of production (e.g. in Bavaria milk production has become 
increasingly concentrated in areas with a high share of permanent grassland; 
reductions have primarily taken place in arable areas).  Greater relocation might have 
occurred without the regional basis for quota trading.   
 
In the Netherlands, the exact rationale behind the 20,000 kg/ha maximum limit on 
the amount of quota able to be transferred with land since 1986 is unclear.  However, 
assuming that the rationale is at least partly ‘environmental’, the fact remains that the 
20,000 kg/ha limit is intensive even by the standards of dairy farming in the 
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Netherlands. Figure 8.6 below highlights the relationship between nitrogen surpluses 
(kg per hectare)66 and dairy farming intensity (milk production in kg per hectare) in 
the mid-1990s in the Netherlands. The graph shows both a) that there is a relatively 
weak correlation between the two variables; and b) that the great majority of farms 
were producing at below the 20,000 kg/ha threshold specified in the Netherlands.  
 
Figure 8.6 Dairy production intensity against N-surpluses (1996/97)  
 
Source: LEI 
 
The ceiling of 20,000 kg of quota transferred for one hectare of land has tended to be 
taken as the ‘rule of thumb’ for the exchange of milk quota with land in the 
Netherlands. Usually this has involved transferees taking on a lease of one hectare (or 
the relevant fraction of this) for one year, using that land for milk production and 
then, at the end of the period, giving up the lease and releasing the land back to the 
transferor for whatever purpose he desires (often arable). The net result is that the 
transferee receives an extra 20,000 kg quota to add to his existing quota holding on an 
unchanged farm area and the transferor gets his land back for his own use (Co 
Daatselaar, Pers. Comm. 19.11.07).  
 
Both the intensive level of production associated with the maximum limit and the 
requirement for only a temporary land holding suggest that the measure will not have 
been effective in terms of limiting the level of intensification or promoting any other 
substantial environmental benefit.  
                                                 
66 Nitrogen and other mineral surpluses are captured by the MINAS system introduced in the 
Netherlands to address nutrient management on farms and hence assist with compliance with the 
Nitrates Directive. MINAS is a ‘farm-gate balance approach’ that calculates the difference between 
nutrients entering and leaving the farm ‘through the farm gate’. Only nitrogen and phosphorus 
entering (input) and leaving (output) the farm through the farm gate is taken into account, while the 
farm itself is considered as a ‘black box’. The difference between inputs and outputs is referred to as 
the farm surplus and is assumed to be lost to the environment. Mineral surpluses are considered as 
the best available indicators for farmers in relation to water and soil quality and provide a good 
means of quantifying some of the main environmental pressures arising from dairying. The case 
study suggests that the milk quota regime contributed to lower surpluses in the first years of its 
existence but by restraining production in later years other legislation mainly concerning manure and 
minerals nutrient took over this role. 
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In the UK, there is little data on the economic or structural impacts of ring-fencing 
quota to the Scottish Islands which affects only a very small proportion of national 
production. Colman (1998) indicates that ring-fencing has kept quota prices low 
(favouring expanding and new producers) and both milk production and processing 
has been maintained (with production in the Southern Isles under quota and Shetland 
production over quota over the period 1994/5-1996/7). Rationalisation has occurred 
with the number of milk producers declining in the islands, as elsewhere in the UK, 
with many producers increasing the scale of their operations.   
 
8.4.1 Summary of farm level impacts 
• In France, Italy and Ireland, measures designed to conserve the regional 
distribution of milk production have helped to sustain dairy farming in LFAs 
although other factors also will have played a part, including the profitability of 
local cheese production in some regions. An increasing proportion of national 
output in France and Italy has been produced in LFAs, with the increases highest 
in Mountain LFAs. Without such measures, some milk production would have 
migrated to better endowed dairying areas, those with a comparative advantage in 
terms of dairy cow stocking density, grassland productivity, proximity to 
processing plants etc. 
• There has been a slower decline in the number of dairy farms in the LFA 
compared to non-LFA dairy farms. In France, the decline in the number of dairy 
farms in Mountain LFAs appears to have been more rapid than that in other LFAs. 
• The proportion of more intensive dairy farms (>1.4 LU/ha) in LFAs has increased 
between 1995 and 2004 in both Italy and Ireland but not in France. Milk output 
per LU has increased in both LFAs and non-LFAs in Italy, although productivity 
is still lower in LFAs due to the presence of more extensive, outdoor systems 
compared with generally more intensive, indoor production systems in non-LFAs.  
• Measures intended to favour small scale producers have also tended to benefit 
LFA dairy farmers. LFA dairy farms are generally smaller, and in Mountain areas 
often more extensive, compared to non-LFA dairy farms. 
• In Spain, the mechanism in place between 1998 and 2003 which was intended to 
slow the exodus of quota from LFAs is likely to have had limited impact as it only 
applied to the minority of quota transfers which took place between administrative 
regions.     
• The regional basis for quota trading in Germany could be construed as having an 
implicitly environmental objective and greater relocation of production may have 
occurred without this system.  Other measures that might be considered implicitly 
environmental, such as aid for LFA producers, have been implemented on a 
sufficient scale to have significant economic impacts. 
• In the Netherlands, the measure imposing a limit on quota transfers (in terms of 
amount of quota that can be transferred per hectare) is unlikely to have been 
effective in environmental terms. The majority of farms fall below the 
20,000kg/hectare threshold which is intensive even by the Netherlands’ standards. 
Furthermore the limit could be circumvented by acquiring temporary land 
holdings. 
• In the UK there is little or no data on the structural and farm-level effects of 
measures with implicit environmental objectives. 
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Where implemented, milk quota measures with implicit environmental objectives, 
based on the allocation or ring-fencing of quota to LFAs do appear to have helped 
support milk production and dairy farming in those areas relative to what might have 
occurred under more liberal regimes. It should be noted however that dairy farms in 
these areas are also likely to have benefited from a range of other support measures 
including LFA and agri-environment scheme payments and investment aid. The 
environmental consequences of maintaining milk production in the LFA are less clear, 
however. This aspect is explored below. 
 
Second order environmental effects 
Where milk quota measures with implicit environmental objectives have led to 
reduced production or the maintenance of dairying in LFAs and/or other 
priority areas, then a range of environmental benefits (e.g. biodiversity, 
landscape etc) is expected to have been maintained.  
 
In France, the case study authors conclude that by helping to conserve the 
geographical distribution of milk production over the territory, the milk quota regime 
has had positive environmental effects in terms of soils, biodiversity and the 
maintenance of pastoral landscapes. Dairy production has provided an economic 
rationale for the maintenance of important areas of grasslands, and cattle grazing in 
the LFA. The regime has also helped to maintain the regional specificities of dairy 
farming systems and dispersed employment, albeit on a declining number of farms. 
Furthermore, a range of adverse environmental impacts associated with the 
geographic concentration of dairy production in the most productive dairying areas 
have been reduced (see previous chapter). A rigorous examination of the precise role 
of dairying in contributing to environmental outcomes requires more knowledge of 
the counterfactual, particularly the management of farmland if dairying was not 
continued. The possibilities are several and include beef or sheep grazing (generally 
more extensive than dairying), arable production on more fertile soils, afforestation, 
especially on steeper land, or abandonment. These different options have diverse 
environmental profiles which are site specific to a significant degree.  
 
In Italy, most of the same arguments apply. According to the case study authors, the 
milk quota system has had an overall positive environmental impact with respect to 
farms located in Mountain and Other LFAs. The milk quota system is considered to 
have contributed to maintaining livestock levels in the less productive and marginal 
areas of the country with likely positive environmental effects in terms of soil (soil 
fertility and organic matter favoured by the presence of permanent meadows and 
pasture and continued management by extensive livestock systems) and biodiversity 
and landscape (positively influenced by the presence of permanent meadows and 
pasture). Again however, greater knowledge of the counterfactual is required to be 
sure of these environmental effects. The actual milk production practices adopted on 
LFA farms reflect a variety of influences, including the physical restraints on 
production, structural and economic factors, the requirements of any specialised local 
products such as distinctive local cheeses, and policy interventions such as agri-
environment measures, investment aid, etc. The milk quota rules influence the 
distribution of production rather than the management practice, as in France. 
Consequently, the environmental impact of the milk quota system on dairy farming in 
LFAs should not be overstated. 
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In Ireland, the main environmental impacts of the milk quota system in LFAs include 
biodiversity and landscape benefits arising from a greater diversity of land use. 
However, disbenefits have also occurred in certain locations as a result of higher 
stocking rates, more intensive grassland management and loss of landscape features 
relative to the counterfactual. Extensive beef and sheep grazing is the main alternative 
land use in Ireland’s LFAs. Within the LFAs land abandonment is not uncommon. 
Water pollution risks are likely to have been higher on certain farms and in clusters of 
farms (around milk processing facilities, for example) due to the number of dairy 
cows sustained and the more intensive grassland management on dairy farms relative 
to other grazing systems. Some soil compaction and erosion may also have occurred 
on certain farms in less productive areas, where cow numbers have increased and 
stocking rates have risen, all in relatively high rainfall areas. Conversely, water 
pollution risks are likely to have been lower in more productive regions (the South 
and East) than they might have been under a freer regime.   
 
In Spain, there is no data on the environmental impacts of the LFA mechanism. As 
the mechanism only covered the minority of quota transfers which occurred between 
regions, and then only a proportion of these (those which led to a greater than 1.5 per 
cent reduction in quota in the area), the environmental impacts are not expected to 
have been significant.  In other words, quota mobility is unlikely to have been 
impeded much by the LFA mechanism, and production shifts out of marginal, upland 
areas will have continued unabated. There will have been negative impacts as a result 
of land abandonment or the adoption of environmentally less benign land uses (see 
Section 7.3) but benefits where less intensive grazing was introduced.  
 
In Germany, there is no data on the environmental impacts of those milk quota 
measures that could be regarded as having implicit environmental objectives. The 
limited implementation of these measures suggests that the environmental impacts 
were relatively minor in the overall context. The exception is the regional basis of 
quota trading which operated from 1993 to 2007. This is likely to have slowed the 
process of geographic concentration in the dairy sector across the country, with 
environmental implications including reduced nutrient loading in certain locations. 
There is however no data to quantify this. 
 
In the Netherlands, the 20,000kg/hectare limit on quota transfers is likely to have had 
limited environmental effects as indicated previously.   
 
In the UK, there is no data on the environmental impacts of ring-fencing quota to the 
Scottish Islands.  However, it is likely that dairy farming will have been sustained, 
maintaining a more varied livestock base (alongside beef cattle and sheep) than might 
otherwise have been the case.  
 
8.4.2 Summary of environmental impacts 
• In all Member States a clear picture of the alternative forms of land management 
likely to take place on farmland withdrawing from dairy production is essential in 
order to allow an analysis of the environmental impact of quota retention in the 
LFA. 
• In France and Italy, the contribution of the quota rules to maintaining the regional 
distribution of milk production, including milk production in LFAs, is likely to 
have had positive environmental impacts in terms of soils, biodiversity and 
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pastoral landscapes by maintaining important areas of grasslands, open spaces and 
cattle grazing.  However, there has been some intensification of production and 
there is little information on the alternative land rules in the absence of dairying. 
• In Ireland, similar benefits arise, but disbenefits may have also occurred in certain 
locations arising from higher stocking rates, more intensive grassland 
management and loss of landscape features than might otherwise have occurred 
(under beef and sheep enterprises).  
• The environmental impacts of milk quotas per se can be overstated for the LFAs 
given the already extensive nature of dairy farming in these areas and the range of 
other measures supporting dairying in LFAs and influencing the forms of 
management adopted. 
• The measures intended to conserve the regional distribution of milk production 
also have the positive effect of reducing adverse environmental impacts arising 
from the geographic concentration of dairy production in the most productive 
dairying areas, such as water pollution, soil deterioration and loss of biodiversity 
and traditional landscapes. 
• The environmental impacts of measures with implicit environmental objectives in 
Spain, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK are likely to have been relatively 
minor due to their limited implementation and/or farm level impacts. However 
there is a lack of data relating to these measures. 
 
We are able to conclude from the above, that milk quota measures with implicit 
environmental objectives, by supporting dairy farming in LFAs, may have maintained 
a number of environmental benefits relating to the management of soils, pastoral 
landscapes and biodiversity.  However some environmental disbenefits affecting 
biodiversity, landscape features and water quality are also likely to have occurred in 
areas including parts of the West of Ireland where dairying has intensified in certain 
locations fuelled by the ready availability of quota. Again, it should be noted that 
appropriate land management will also have been supported by agri-environment and 
similar schemes operating in these sensitive areas. 
  
8.5 Conclusions 
It appears that only one Member State, Spain, had an explicit environmental objective 
in its milk quota regime. However, the environmental element of the 1994 legislation 
appears to have had no impact and the 1998 measure is likely to have had little or no 
effect in terms of extensifying production. Therefore, very limited environmental 
benefits would appear to have been delivered.  
 
A number of Member States, including France, Italy, Ireland, Spain, Germany, the 
Netherlands and the UK have had milk quota measures which one could construe as 
having implicit environmental objectives. These measures include quota and transfer 
rules which distinguish between LFA and non-LFA dairy farms. Based on the limited 
evidence available, the measures appear to have helped support milk production and 
dairy farming in LFAs relative to what might have occurred under a more liberal 
regime. The main environmental effect has been to maintain grazing systems in these 
areas, although there is considerable uncertainty about the forms of land management 
that would be employed in the absence of dairying. 
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9 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
9.1 Conclusions 
9.1.1 National Milk Quota Regimes 
The imposition of a quota system on EU milk producers from 1984 has had the effect 
of limiting production close to the quota level in subsequent years, with some 
variations between Member States. By restraining the rise in production that would 
have occurred without quota in response to EU milk price levels, the quota system as 
a whole had a significant environmental impact. Air and water pollution were lower 
than they would have been in the absence of quota, for example (Alliance 
Environnement 2007).  
 
The system prevented transfers of quota between Member States in sharp contrast to 
the regional redistribution of production that has been occurring in the US in the 
absence of parallel restraints on the movement of production between States. The 
relative rigidity of quota distribution between Member States has held back 
production in some regions and inhibited a greater level of specialisation at the 
European scale. This will have had both positive and negative environmental effects. 
 
In the present study, the focus is on the operation of the milk quota system at the 
national level. Member States manage the system by establishing rules that must 
comply with a legal framework laid down in EU regulations. The national measures 
are concerned particularly with the transfer of quota between producers, whether 
temporary or permanent. These rules vary significantly between Member States and 
have changed over time. In most cases the tendency has been to move towards a more 
market based set of rules with fewer administrative interventions in the distribution of 
quota. There are exceptions to this rule but it is clear that the ten new Member States 
joining the Community in 2004 have adapted a relatively liberal and less 
interventionist approach than several of the EU 15.   
 
Several aspects of national regimes can be identified as at least potentially significant 
in terms of possible environmental consequences. These are:  
 
• Any formal environmental objectives embodied in national legislation. 
Implicit environmental objectives are also potentially significant; 
• Rules governing the permanent transfer of milk quota with land, which may 
include constraints of environmental relevance, for example, maintaining 
production in the LFA or limiting the volume of quota that can be transferred 
per forage hectare; 
• Rules governing quota transfer without land; 
• Rules covering temporary transfer of milk quota; 
• Redistribution of unused quota; 
• Management of the national reserve, allocation of quota from the national 
reserve and the use of siphons to feed the national reserve; 
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9.1.2 Explicit and Implicit Objectives 
In practice, it was found that only one Member State, Spain, had explicit 
environmental objectives in its national legislation with relatively limited measures to 
support these objectives. In some Member States there are measures with implicit 
environmental objectives. In France, Ireland and Italy for example, there are quota 
transfer rules that distinguish between producers inside and outside the LFA, either 
generally or at the regional level, although these rules have primarily been introduced 
for socio-economic rather than environmental reasons. Several Member States, 
including Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy have 
limits on the quantity of quota that can be transferred without land. Typically these 
are set at rather a high level – 20,000 litres in some cases and 30,000kg in Italy 
 
9.1.3 Characterising National Regimes 
Given the lack of explicit environmental objectives, much of the study is devoted to 
the analysis of measures with primarily economic rather than environmental goals. 
Broadly, national regimes can be categorised along a spectrum, ranging from those 
that are predominantly market based in their regulation of quota transfer, such as the 
Netherlands and the UK through to those that are more interventionist, with a greater 
role for administrative action in the transfer of quota, build up of a national reserve 
and other matters. France is an example of this group, as is Ireland, though less so 
than previously, whereas Spain has become more interventionist in recent years.  
 
We have assumed that, at the most market-oriented end of the spectrum, trends in 
location of production and in the structure of the sector are the least distorted from 
what they would have been without the quota scheme at all. Therefore, trends in 
Member States that are characterised as ‘unrestrictive’ serve as a ‘minimum 
intervention’ counterfactual with which Member States situated at other points of the 
continuum can be compared. 
 
9.1.4 Identifying Environmental Impacts 
In practice, there is little empirical evidence available to establish the precise 
environmental outcomes attributable to the milk quota rules and so it has been 
necessary to rely on logical reasoning and rather indirect evidence in most cases. A 
series of hypotheses have been developed and tested to produce a clear structure for 
this reasoning. 
 
Environmental effects will arise from factors such as changes in the overall number of 
cows, production methods used, particularly in relation to grazing and type of feed, 
the intensity of production, and the character of the location in which production takes 
place. Where milk production ceases, the subsequent land use is also relevant.  The 
more intensive the production system, the greater the negative environmental impacts 
usually will be on biodiversity and landscape but this relationship does not necessarily 
hold for other parameters, such as greenhouse gas emissions, where the management 
of the farm and investment in appropriate equipment are important variables. The 
maintenance of grazing on semi-natural grassland is the principal environmental 
benefit of dairying. However, proving causality between observed environmental 
effects and the different ways in which Member States have implemented the milk 
quota system and observed environmental effects is not straightforward. 
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9.1.5 Quota Mobility and Concentration 
Changes in the regional distribution of milk production have occurred in all Member 
States, irrespective of the quota regime or whether the overall trend in output has been 
rising or, in several cases, falling. As would be expected, evidence from the seven 
case study countries, shows that greater mobility has occurred in those Member States 
that permit national markets in transferable quota to operate.  
 
This leads to two distinct but related effects: 
 
• Transfer of production between regions, to the benefit of more competitive 
regions, a process expected to have environmental implications. 
• In some Member States, such as Spain, a tendency for production to 
concentrate over time in a smaller number of regions, leading to a significantly 
reduced level of dairying in others.  
 
Greater regional concentration does not always result in higher production in those 
regions that have gained a larger share of national output. In several cases absolute 
levels of production have declined, along with larger falls in the number of farms and 
dairy cattle. Environmental effects arise from the combination of concentration and 
other structural changes. 
 
Below the regional level there is an active process of concentration occurring at the 
more local level and amongst farms as the number of producers declines. 
 
Identifying concentration effects in the available data is not straightforward, since 
concentration phenomena that are quite acute in particular localities may not be 
picked up in data compiled at the level of a large region – and are likely to be less 
affected by quota rules.   
 
It appears that a greater degree of quota mobility between producers leads to larger 
herd sizes, which is likely to promote intensification of production methods (input 
use, milk production per hectare, stocking densities).   
• The highest average yields (milk output per dairy cow) generally are recorded 
in countries with the largest average herd sizes (Denmark, Sweden, and the 
Netherlands). The UK is the outlier here.  
• The lowest average yields tend to be associated with small average scale or 
with Mediterranean conditions, or both, although neither Ireland nor France 
entirely fit this trend.  
• Other things being equal, moderate or full market orientation boosted the rate 
of scale increase by about 143 percentage points above the rate that would 
have occurred over the 25 year period to 2005 if transfer mechanisms like 
those in the ‘non-market’ countries had been used. 
• Administrative transfers, or extremely restricted regional markets, have not 
promoted scale increases to the same extent as more market-oriented 
mechanisms for reallocating quota between producers.  
• Different national philosophies regarding the mechanism for quota transfer are 
one of the factors determining the current size structure and its environmental 
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consequences. However, the starting level of scale was also a very important 
determinant.  
 
While there are exogenous trends developing over time in favour of more intensive 
production methods, independently of scale increases, scale still appears a significant 
driver of management decisions.  
 
Interregional transfers by contrast can be either (a) beneficial environmentally, for 
example, where production moves to better managed farms or more appropriate 
production regions, such as those rare cases where it moves out of Nitrate Vulnerable 
Zones; or (b) more problematic, for example, where more traditional upland pastures 
are abandoned or landscape diversity is reduced in predominantly arable areas. 
 
9.1.6 Environmental Objectives 
The explicit environmental objective in the Spanish milk quota regime was related to 
measures targeted at extensification of production and production in LFAs. However, 
it does not seem to have been effective in either reducing or extensifying dairying in 
these regions and no environmental benefits of note appear to have been delivered.  
 
Based on the limited evidence available, quota measures aimed at retaining dairying 
in the LFA in several Member States, including France and Italy, appear to have 
contributed to achieving this outcome relative to what might have occurred under a 
more liberal regime.  
 
More data is needed to assess the environmental implications but there is likely to 
have been: 
 
• More variation in production patterns in the LFA than otherwise, which may 
have led to landscape benefits in a number of areas. 
• Maintenance of some environmentally valuable grazing systems – although it 
is unclear how far this would occur by other means, such as through beef 
production, if dairying was abandoned. 
• Less production in regions where more intensive forms of management 
predominate, but some intensification on LFA farms. 
• Prevention of some abandonment of land in LFAs, although this is not clear, 
given the role of other policy drivers and market factors, and the 
environmental profile of alternative land uses to dairying needs more 
examination. 
 
9.1.7 Broader Environmental Impacts 
Other environmental impacts arise more from the economic effects of the quota 
regime than the explicit objectives. The study found little direct relationship between 
milk quota rules and environmental impacts. These depend upon the structural 
changes that are influenced by the way in which milk quota rules have been designed 
and implemented and will depend also on the type of farm management in place. 
Environmental impacts are, therefore, necessarily location specific. Generalised 
statements are not easy to make and often hide a wide range of differing outcomes on 
the ground, both positive and negative. Changes at farm level may have negative 
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impacts on one factor, such as biodiversity, but positive impacts on others, such as 
greenhouse gas emissions. The differing effects need to be individually and 
systematically assessed. It is not possible to trade one environmental issue off against 
another. 
 
The evidence would suggest that a more liberal milk quota regime tends to allow for a 
greater degree of structural change to take place in terms of regional mobility of 
quota, concentration of production, change in scale of production etc. This suggests 
that the more restrictive, less market-oriented implementation regimes, by reducing 
quota mobility, curbed the potential environmental impact (both positive and 
negative) of structural changes. In particular, more restrictive regimes, by 
constraining regional mobility, are likely to have prevented the transfer of 
environmental impacts from one region to another. The underlying driving force 
behind these structural changes has not been the quota regime itself, but rather market 
and technological forces common to all Member States. Differences in quota 
implementation rules have altered the pace (or, marginally, the bias) of these trends 
but the quota regime itself has not been a leading driver in most cases. The retention 
of quota in the LFA in some Member States  is a notable exception. 
 
The most common restrictive rule, a ceiling on the quantity of quota transferred per 
hectare, generally has been set at too high a level to constrain transfers to more 
intensive production systems, as illustrated in the Netherlands.  
 
National quota regimes are only one of a number of factors influencing dairy farm 
management. Others include market requirements; the Nitrate Directive and other 
environmental legislation; agri-environment and LFA payments; and PDO 
designations, which may include environmental conditions placed on production, for 
example as seen in parts of France and Italy. Due to the added value received through 
the production of, for example, cheeses, these PDOs are likely to have more of an 
impact on production systems than the milk quota regime in certain localities. 
 
9.2 Recommendations  
 
In principle, it is to be expected that, if the milk quota system comes to an end by 
2015, as proposed by the European Commission, trends towards greater regional 
concentration of milk production will gather pace. In some Member States, this might 
involve a significant net loss of dairying from the LFA (with potential for both 
positive and negative environmental impacts) although the economic dynamics of the 
sector in such a scenario lie beyond the scope of this study. On the evidence of the 
case studies, LFA production appears likely to remain profitable in a number of 
locations in some Member States, particularly where natural handicaps are not too 
severe or where producers are able to capture a premium linked to a particular market. 
 
It is recommended that in Member States where there is a concern about the potential 
loss of milk production in the future detailed studies be undertaken of the likely 
viability of continued production, particularly in more extensively farmed regions. 
These need to take account of market and price developments as well as policy 
scenarios. Insofar as a decline in production is predicted, the impacts on land 
management need to be identified, taking account of alternative farming systems that 
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might take over. If a loss of grazing in areas of high landscape or biodiversity value is 
expected then remedial measures should be developed to meet environmental goals 
and commitments. Such measures could potentially take a number of different forms 
and the options include: 
 
• Pillar II rural development measures targeted at dairy systems associated with 
the delivery of biodiversity and landscape benefits, for example through agri-
environment schemes; and 
• Targeting of direct payments from Pillar I resources at such dairy systems 
through Article 69 of Regulation 1782/2003 or its successor following the 
CAP Health Check. 
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ANNEXES 
Annex 1 Production of cows’ milk in the EU 25 (2005) 
Share of production in 
EU 15 (%) Member 
State 
Production of 
cows' milk, 
thousand tons 
Percentage of 
production in EU 
25 (%) 
EU 15 
Member 
States 
Case study 
Member 
States 
EU 25   142,560 100.0    
EU 15 120,617 84.6 100.0  
Austria  3,114 2.2 2.6  
Belgium  3,005 2.1 2.5  
Cyprus     147 0.1    
Czech 
Republic  2,813 2.0    
Denmark  4,587 3.2 3.8  
Estonia     670 0.5    
Finland  2,433 1.7 2.0  
France  24,675 17.3 20.5 20.5
Germany  28,453 20.0 23.6 23.6
Greece     768 0.5 0.6  
Hungary  1,929 1.4    
Ireland  5,100 3.6 4.2 4.2
Italy  10,975 7.7 9.1 9.1
Latvia     807 0.6    
Lithuania  1,854 1.3    
Luxembourg     268 0.2 0.2  
Malta     41 0.0 0.0  
Netherlands  10,845 7.6 9.0 9.0
Poland  11,923 8.4    
Portugal  2,061 1.4 1.7  
Slovenia     659 0.5    
Slovakia  1,100 0.8    
Spain  6,553 4.6 5.4 5.4
Sweden  3,206 2.2 2.7  
United 
Kingdom  14,574 10.2 12.1 12.1
Source: Agriculture in the European Union (2007)  
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Annex 2 Regional dairy production characteristics in seven Member 
  States (1990-2005) 
1990 1995 2000 2005 
Member 
State/region 
Share 
of 
cows 
(%) 
Share of 
holdings 
(%)  
Cows 
per 
holding 
Share 
of 
cows 
(%) 
Share of 
holdings 
(%) 
Cows 
per 
holding 
Share 
of 
cows 
(%) 
Share of 
holdings 
(%) 
Cows 
per 
holding 
Share 
of 
cows 
(%) 
Share of 
holdings 
(%) 
Cows 
per 
holding 
Germany 100 100 22 100 100 25 100 100 31 100 100 38 
Baden-
Württemberg 9 15 13 10 15 16 9 15 20 9 13 27 
Bavaria 30 42 15 30 43 18 31 44 21 30 47 25 
Lower 
Saxony 16 15 23 16 15 29 17 15 35 17 14 46 
North Rhine 
Westphalia 9 10 19 9 10 24 9 9 30 9 9 41 
Ireland 100 100 27 100 100 31 100 100 37 100 100 45 
Border, 
Midlands and 
Western 
      24 31 28 24 28 38 
Southern and 
Eastern       76 69 41 76 72 48 
Spain 100 100 8 100 100 11 100 100 16 100 100 24 
Galicia 30 41 6 34 48 8 36 51 11 39 51 18 
France 100 100 23 100 100 29 100 100 33 100 100 37 
Lower 
Normandy 12 11 27 14 11 33 12 10 38 12 10 43 
Pays de la 
Loire 13 12 25 14 12 30 13 12 35 13 13 39 
Brittany 18 18 24 21 18 30 19 18 34 19 18 39 
Rhône-Alpes 7 10 16 8 10 21 7 10 25 7 9 30 
Auvergne 7 7 21 7 8 24 7 8 28 7 8 32 
Italy 100 100 13 100 100 19 100 100 23 100 100 30 
Lombardy 27 12 28 35 14 42 30 15 46 28 16 53 
Veneto 11 14 10 11 12 16 10 13 19 9 10 27 
Emilia-
Romagna 14 9 21 15 8 31 15 9 36 15 9 47 
Campania 5 11 6 8 15 9 8 12 17 11 11 31 
Netherlands 100 100 40 100 100 46 100 100 47 100 100 61 
North 27 22 48 27 22 54 28 23 57 30 25 74 
East 34 41 34 35 40 39 34 39 41 33 37 54 
West 18 20 37 18 20 42 19 20 44 19 21 55 
South 21 17 47 20 18 52 19 18 51 18 17 64 
United 
Kingdom 100 100 64 100 100 67 100 100 73 100 100 78 
South West 
England 25 22 73 25 21 78 24 21 82 23 22 83 
Wales 11 14 52 11 14 55 12 14 62 13 13 75 
Scotland 9 7 79 9 8 79 9 7 88 10 7 103 
Northern 
Ireland 10 15 41 11 16 45 12 17 54 14 17 66 
Source: Adapted and updated from OECD (2004). All data from Eurostat except data for German 
regions in 1990 & 1995 from OECD based on Eurostat.  
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Annex 3 Summary of rules67 for transfer of quota with land (including rural leases) in the EU 25  
Conditions relating to quota transfers Member 
State 
 
Limit on quantity of quota transferred (QL) 
Regional restrictions on transfer (R) 
Quota use after purchase (QU) 
Priority groups (PG) 
Siphon (S) 
Leasing arrangements (LA) 
AT No significant restrictions. 
BE 
(QL) Maximum 20,000 litres per forage hectare 
(QU) (PG) Obligation to produce for 9 years unless transfer to family member (1st or 2nd degree, or in-laws with renewed obligation)  
(S) (PG) Compulsory sale to quota fund of 40% of quota for accumulation of quota only (relatives exempt). Not for new farms (‘first installation’). 
Quota transfers over the per hectare limit result in 90% transfer of excess quota to national reserve (Wallonia). 
 (R) No transfers between Wallonia and Flanders. Transfer must be to holding within 30km zone (exception for close relatives & spouses). 
DE 
Transfer of whole farm or parts of it including (PG) inheritance and successors. 
(R) Limited to Länder until 2007. Government districts in Bavaria and Baden Württemberg.   
(QL) Initially limit of 5,000kg/ha, 12,000 kg/ha from 1990. No limit since 1993. 
(S) 30% siphon on transfers above 350,000 tons. No siphon since 1993. 
(LA) ‘Old land lease contracts’ from before 1984 linked to quota ownership and transfer. 
DK (QL) Maximum 10,000 litres/ha until 2002. Since 2002 no limit. (S) (PG) 50% deduction of quota to national reserve. 
EL (QL) Minimum 5 tons per transaction unless transferor’s total quota <5 tons   (S) (PG) 5% of quota per transaction goes to national reserve (family transactions exempted). 
ES (S) Quota not transferred with entire holding goes to the national reserve. No significant restrictions on transfers of quota with land. 
FI 
(QL) Maximum of 12,000 litres/ha. Transfers must be accompanied by 2/3 of holding’s arable land. If sold to several buyers then arable land divided 
proportionally.  
(R) (PG) Distance between buyer’s and seller’s holdings not more than 60km (exception for married couple or successors). 
(LA) Arable land can be leased as part of transfer but 6 year agreement necessary. Lessee has first option on purchasing quota used for >4 years sold to 
                                                 
67 Information in Annexes 3-7 is drawn from a number of sources including case studies in seven Member States, information provided by DG Agri in response to a 
questionnaire circulated to national authorities and publicly available literature. Insofar as it is possible, information relates to the entire evaluation period of this study. 
However, in some cases it has only been possible to obtain information in regards to the recent situation rather than to the entire evaluation period.  
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Conditions relating to quota transfers Member 
State 
 
Limit on quantity of quota transferred (QL) 
Regional restrictions on transfer (R) 
Quota use after purchase (QU) 
Priority groups (PG) 
Siphon (S) 
Leasing arrangements (LA) 
administration by quota owner. 
FR 
(S) (PG) Transfers subject to ‘clawback’ (siphon) to national reserve – regional rules vary.  
Since 1995 10% siphon is normal. Additional siphon between 0 and 40% for larger farms (typical thresholds >200,000 or >300,000 litres). No siphon for 
transfer of entire holding to a farmer who had no quota, transfers within LFAs, and transfers relative to the constitution of a special form of agricultural holding 
(GAEC).  
Before 1995 100% siphon for transfers <20 ha; 50% siphon for transfers to producers whose quota exceeds a threshold (fixed by the regulation and >200,000 
litres quota). 
(R) Milk quotas transfers outside the Département are highly limited. Only 20% of the reserved quotas can potentially be attributed outside the Département 
they come from ("arrêté" of November, 10th. 1994) 
IE 
(PG) Since 2000 mainly family transfers, sale of land or renewal of lease created before 2000  
(PG) (S) (LA) ‘Clawback’ (siphon) of up to 20% of quota transferred discontinued in 2000. 10% ‘clawback’ from 1995 until 2000 on all new ‘land and quota’ 
leases. Family and some other transactions excluded from ‘clawback’. 
(R) Since 1995 ‘ring-fencing’ of production in LFAs within 48km of original holding.  
(LA) Long term ‘land and quota lease’ common in late 1980s and 1990s. Quota often sold to lessee after expiry of lease. Since 1999 such quota could only be 
sold with land. New ‘third party’ land and quota lease prohibited since 2000. 
IT (QL) For partial transfers, land transferred must be in proportion to quota. No significant restrictions. 
LU  Since 2000 transfers of quota have not been allowed except where entire holding is transferred and remains as a distinct unit. 
NL 
(QL) (PG) Since 1986 maximum 20,000 kg/ha (100,000 kg/ha limit in 1984). In 1985 quota transferred in proportion to area. No 20,000 kg/ha limit for 
transfers within families. 
(LA) Since 1989 producer can rent land with quota for at least a year. After this period quota is transferred to the producer who has rented the land. 
PT (S) (R) 7.5% of transaction to national reserve except for transfers from Nitrate Vulnerable Zones to non-designated zones. (R) Preference given to transfers to holdings outside of Nitrate Vulnerable Zones 
SV  (LA) No specific entitlement by lessees to purchase quota at end of agreement unless agreed by producers. (QL) Specific amount of quota per hectare per transaction. 
UK 
(QL) Transfers of quota should not usually exceed 20,000 litres/ha  
(LA) When a new tenancy is granted on land attached to quota, the quota must be transferred to new occupiers unless tenancy is less than: 8 months 
(Scotland), 10 months (England and Wales) or 12 months (Northern Ireland).  
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Conditions relating to quota transfers Member 
State 
 
Limit on quantity of quota transferred (QL) 
Regional restrictions on transfer (R) 
Quota use after purchase (QU) 
Priority groups (PG) 
Siphon (S) 
Leasing arrangements (LA) 
(R) ‘Ring-fencing’ of quota in Scottish Islands. Until 1994 transfers not allowed between 5 Milk Marketing Boards (MMBs). 
(QU) Once transferred, normal rules of apportionment apply to transferee.  
CY No quota transfers with land in practice. Quota sold without land  
CZ No quota transfers with land in practice. Quota sold without land. 
EE (QU) Transferor must have quota for 12 months prior to transfer (except in case of force majeure). (LA) Quota can be leased with land - no specific conditions. 
HU (QU) Quota cannot be transferred for 2 quota years.  (LA) Quota can be leased with land - no specific conditions 
LT 
Quota transfer must take place within 3 months of taking over dairy holding. 
(QL) National standard for quota transfers is 10 tons per hectare. 
(QU Transferor cannot obtain quota from national reserve, or transfers. 
LV Quota linked to producer (or herd). No quota transfers with land.  (PG) Future rules to permit transfer of quota with land due to ‘early retirement’.  
MT No significant conditions. Milk quota is not attached to the holding (land) in Malta. 
PL No significant conditions. 
(LA) If a holding is leased the right to the quota passes to the lessee for the duration of the contract. 
SI (QL) Specific amount of quota per hectare per transaction is 15 tons. 
SK Transfer of quota takes place with transfer of dairy cattle. Quota transfers to new producer with land or change of farm ownership.  
QU) Transferred quota cannot be sold during following quota year. Transferor cannot acquire additional quota during following quota year.  
(QL) Quota leases with farm and dairy cows are possible for long term leases (>1 year). 
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Annex 4 Summary of rules for permanent transfer of quota without land in the EU 25 
Transaction Method Geographical restrictions Other conditions relating to quota transfers Member 
State Market price (M) 
Administrative price (A) 
Administrative transfer (AT) 
Central Quota Exchange (QE) 
Private sale (PS) 
Regional level (R) 
Purchaser level (P) 
Less Favoured Areas (LFA) 
Limit on quantity of quota transferred (QL) 
Quota use after purchase (QU) 
Priority groups (PG) 
Siphon to national reserve (S) 
AT 
(M) Market price  No regional restrictions since 1996. 
(R) Exception – restrictions on alpine 
pasture quota  
 
BE 
(A) Administrative price for 40% 
(AT) Quota purchased by administration 
allocated to other producers in same area. 
(M) Market price for remaining 60% of quota. 
In Flanders market transfers until 1996.  
(R) No transfers between Wallonia and 
Flanders. Within Cadre (W) 30 km zone (F) 
 
(QL) Maximum 20,000 litres/ha (Flanders).  
No limit on quota transfers; depends on available quota and 
number of producers (Wallonia). In general, no purchases 
possible beyond 800,000 kg (Flanders) 90% siphon to NR on 
amounts over 800,000 kg (Wallonia). Exemptions in certain 
circumstances. 
(PG) Preference (50% of quota) given to young producers 
(<35 years old) (Wallonia), (<40 years old) (Flanders) 
DE 
(M) Transfers without land since 1993 
(QE) Market price via regional quota exchange 
since 2000 (3 selling dates). 
(R) Länder, Regierungsbezirke in Lower 
Saxony (1993-96), Bavaria and Baden 
Württemberg. Quota trade in new Länder 
not allowed until 2000. 
2 trading regions since 2007 (‘West and 
‘East’) 
(PG) Since 2000 direct transfers outside quota exchanges only 
between registered life partners e.g. spouses 
(S) Siphon of 5-15% to national reserve for unsuccessful bids 
on quota exchange 2000-2002. 
DK 
 (M) (QE) National quota exchange since 1997. 
Since 2005 4 annual exchanges, previously 2. 
(A) (AT) National restructuring scheme 1989-
1997 
None. (S) 1% deduction to national reserve 
(QL) limit of 300,000 kg for one man farms (stopped in 2005) 
EL 
(M) (PS) Negotiations between buyers and 
sellers. Transfers permitted until 31st January in 
quota year. 
None. (S) 5% deduction to national reserve 
(QL) Minimum transaction of 5 tons 
ES 
(M) (PS) Private transfers 1994-2005 (1 
transfer per quota year by 1st October). 
(A) (AT) administrative transfers since 2005  
(R) Since 1998 transfers between regions to 
improve production structures or extensify 
production (until 2003 <2LU/forage ha) 
(PG) Before 2003 transfers within regions subject to 
conditions (e.g. full-time producers, young farmers, LFA 
holdings, etc)  
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Transaction Method Geographical restrictions Other conditions relating to quota transfers Member 
State Market price (M) 
Administrative price (A) 
Administrative transfer (AT) 
Central Quota Exchange (QE) 
Private sale (PS) 
Regional level (R) 
Purchaser level (P) 
Less Favoured Areas (LFA) 
Limit on quantity of quota transferred (QL) 
Quota use after purchase (QU) 
Priority groups (PG) 
Siphon to national reserve (S) 
(LFA) 1998-2003 transfers out of LFA into 
another administrative region not allowed 
to result in decline >1.5% of region’s total 
quota. 
(QL) Minimum 50,000 kg per transaction (or entire holding) 
(QU) Producers who purchase quota without land cannot 
transfers quota out for 3-5 years. 
FI 
(A) (AT) 50% of quota sold to administration 
(at national price). Twice per year. 
(M) (PS) 50% free trade of quota at regional 
market price. Authorities to be notified by end 
of Feb. 
 
(R) 7 trading areas 
 
(QL) Up to 12,000 litres/ha (excess quota transferred to 
national reserve). 
(PG) 3 groups of producers: producers with a) free production 
capacity,  b) ‘other’ producers (e.g. organic, rare breeds) and c) 
investing producers <65 years old  (50% of quota available to 
groups a & b) 
(QL) Minimum of 15,000 litres. 
(LT) Free trade: transactions < 78,000 litres limited to one 
producer. Transactions >117,000 to no more than 3 producers. 
FR 
(AT) Abandonment programmes (ACAL68) 
compensate farmers who cease dairy 
production. Quota redistributed from national 
reserve according to regional priorities. 
No transfers without land between producers 
until 2006  
(AT) (A) Since 2006 producers can sell quota 
to administration for sale to other producers 
(except Bretagne). Price determined by 
administration 
(R) Since 1994 up to 20% of national 
reserve quota can move between 
Départements (little used in practice). 
No producer transfers between 
Départements (or very little because the 
quotas were tightly linked to land until 
2006). 
 
 (PG) ACAL – objective criteria for allocation set at regional 
level (Département) for targeting at specific groups of farmers 
(e.g. young farmers, hardship cases, small producers, other 
producers) 
(PG) Since 2006 Office de l’Elevage defines groups of farmers 
for transfers without land.  
 
IE 
(A) Restructuring Schemes - main mechanism 
for acquiring quota (2000-2006).  
(QE) Milk Quota Trading Scheme since 
(P) Milk purchaser level – geographic 
extent varies across country.  
  
Restructuring Schemes: 
(PG) Priority groups: successors, producers with lost lease 
entitlements, young (<35 years) or new farmers, or producers 
                                                 
68 Aide à la Cessation de l'Activité Laitière. 
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Transaction Method Geographical restrictions Other conditions relating to quota transfers Member 
State Market price (M) 
Administrative price (A) 
Administrative transfer (AT) 
Central Quota Exchange (QE) 
Private sale (PS) 
Regional level (R) 
Purchaser level (P) 
Less Favoured Areas (LFA) 
Limit on quantity of quota transferred (QL) 
Quota use after purchase (QU) 
Priority groups (PG) 
Siphon to national reserve (S) 
2007/08. (A) 30% of quota sold to priority pool 
at max €0.12/litre and (M) 70% in quota 
exchange at market price. Two stages per year. 
with <350,000 litres.  
Milk Quota Trading Scheme: 
(QL) Since 2007/08 transaction limit of 60,000 litres per 
producer. 80,000 litres in 2008/09. 
(PG) 30% allocated to priority groups.  
IT 
(M) (PS) Transfers without land since 1992.  
(A) (AT) Abandonment programmes 
(R) 1992-2003 no transfers between 
regions or autonomous provinces.  
Since 2003 no transfers out of  mountain 
areas; no transfers from LFA to lowland 
holdings (except within Sicily & Sardinia);  
(QL) Limit of 30 tons of quota per ha of UAA. 
Since 2003 transfers out of region limited to 70% of holdings 
quota in 2003/04. Island regions limited to 50%. 
LU 
(M) Market price. Since 2000/01  (PG) (S) 15% to national reserve but not for 1st degree 
relatives or spouses, where entire holding is transferred. 
(QL) Limit of 12,000 kg/ha of forage surface 
NL 
(M) (PS) Transfers of quota without land since 
2006.  
 
None (QL) Limit of 10% of buyer’s quota unless buyer can prove he 
has less than 20,000 kg/ha (no limit). 
(QU) No sale of purchased quota for 3 years. 
PT (M) (PS) Market price, private sale. (R) Restrictions on transfers to Nitrate Vulnerable Zones. 
(S) (PG) 7.5% siphon to national reserve except family 
transfers or in case of rules for limited producer companies. 
SV 
(M) (PS) Market price, private sale since 2000. (R) Two regions. Only direct sales quota 
may be transferred between regions. 
(QL) For purchases >300,000kg holding must have 
<16,000kg/ha of arable land (previously 12,000) or at least 1 
cow per 10,000 kg quota (recent requirement). 
UK 
(M) (PS) Market price, private sale. 
Since 1992. Main method of quota transfer 
since 2002 (simplification of requirements). 
(R) Ring-fencing of Scottish Islands. No 
restrictions in rest of UK.  
Before 1994 transfers within but not 
between 5 Milk Marketing Boards 
(MMBs). 
 
Requirement to demonstrate improvement to structure of milk 
production on holding. Easing of administrative requirements 
in 2002.  
(QU) Apportionment of transferred quota to be agreed by all 
parties with a legal interest in quota. 
(QL) Recommended limit per hectare of 20,000 litres/ha. 
CY (M) (PS) Market price None (S) 5% deduction to national reserve.  
CZ (M) (PS) Producer to producer transactions. None (S) 15% deduction to national reserve 
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Transaction Method Geographical restrictions Other conditions relating to quota transfers Member 
State Market price (M) 
Administrative price (A) 
Administrative transfer (AT) 
Central Quota Exchange (QE) 
Private sale (PS) 
Regional level (R) 
Purchaser level (P) 
Less Favoured Areas (LFA) 
Limit on quantity of quota transferred (QL) 
Quota use after purchase (QU) 
Priority groups (PG) 
Siphon to national reserve (S) 
EE 
(PS) Since 2006/07 quota transfers with cows. 
No direct price. 
None (QU) Transferor must have had quota for 12 months before 
transfer. 
(QL) (S) Quota transferred per cow is maximum 85% of 
average milk yield per cow. Any additional quota goes to 
national reserve. 
HU (M) (PS) Since 2005/06  Producer to producer transactions. 
None (QL) Amount of quota to be transferred linked to number of 
registered cows. 
LT 
(M) (PS) Private producer to producer 
transactions. 
(M) (QE) Since 2007/08 central quota 
exchange. 
None (QL) Limit of 10 tons/ha. 
(PG) Quota transfers allowed a) between family, b) for dairy 
farm restructuring c) inheritance and divorce. 
(S) (PG) 5% to national reserve except family transfers, 
inheritance, or to existing business partners (including co-ops). 
(QL) Transfer of quota with cows (stricter rules from 2007) 
LV 
(M) (PS) Producer to producer transactions. 
(A) (AT) Producers can sell all or part of their 
quota to national reserve. 
 (QU) Quota allocated from national reserve may not be 
transferred during same quota year. 
Quota leasing and quota donation (no payment) abolished in 
2006. 
MT (M) None Transfer applications administered by Milk Reference Quantity Competent Authority. 
PL (M) Market price (R) Transfers at level of Agricultural 
Market Agency branch. 
(S) 5 % siphon to national reserve 
(QU) Transferor not eligible for national reserve allocations 
for 5 years. 
SI (M) (PS) Producer to producer transactions. None Transferor must produce documentation to show improvement 
to dairy production.  
 (QL) Minimum 1000 kg transfer. 
 (S) Siphon on transfers within regions (5-10%) and between 
regions (25-30%). Exceptions for mountain areas and LFA.   
SK  (PS) Transfers of quota linked to transfer of 
cows and milk yield. 
None (S) No siphon unless insufficient cows to quota.  
(PG) Reallocation of quotas linked to quota size. 
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Annex 5 Summary of rules for temporary transfer of quota without land in the EU 25 
Temporary transfers of 
quota 
Geographical restrictions 
 
Other conditions relating to quota transfers Member 
State 
Market determined (M) 
Administrative (A) 
 
Regional level (R) 
Purchaser level (P) 
Less Favoured Areas (LFA) 
Limit on quantity of quota transferred (QL) 
Priority groups (PG) 
Force majeure (FM) 
 
AT 
(M) None  
Except restrictions in (LFA) alpine 
pastures 
(QL) Maximum 2 years. In second year only 30% (was (50%). Then 2 year 
waiting period 
(QL) Maximum 100,000kg per holding until 2005/06 (50,000kg in 2006/07, 
30,000kg in 2007/08 
BE 
Not permitted in Flanders 
since 2007 (except for  force 
majeure) 
(M) producer to producer 
transactions (Wallonia) 
 
 
(R) Transfers within cadre (W) (QL) Before 2007/08 up to 20,000 litres (Flanders).  
(QL) Transfers  up to 20,000 litres (Wallonia) 
(FM) in Flanders 
DE 
Temporary transfers without 
land since 1993 
Temporary transfers limited 
since 2000 
 (R) Since 1993 21 trading regions 
(Länder or Regierungsbezirke) 
(P) since 2000 
 (PG) this relates to land leases.  
(FM) Since 2001 short term leasing only in cases of animal epidemics or force 
majeure   
DK None   
EL None   
ES 
(M) Temporary transfers 
from 1994. Regional 
authorisation required. 
 
(R) Transfers can be limited between 
different regions 
Since 1998 authorised transfers between 
regions permitted 
(QL) Since 1998 minimum transfer of 5,000 kg 
(QL) (FM) A producer cannot lease out >25% of quota held for more than 2 
successive years except increase in force majeure. 
FI 
Since 2006/07. 
(M) Private producer to 
producer transactions 
(R) Within area (7).  (QL) Minimum transfer is 10,000 litres. Maximum 12,000 litres per arable ha after 
transfer. 
(QU) Producers cannot lease out quota in consecutive years. 
(QU) From 2007/08 quota bought for ‘investing support’ may be leased out for up 
to 3 consecutive years. 
FR None   
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Temporary transfers of 
quota 
Geographical restrictions 
 
Other conditions relating to quota transfers Member 
State 
Market determined (M) 
Administrative (A) 
 
Regional level (R) 
Purchaser level (P) 
Less Favoured Areas (LFA) 
Limit on quantity of quota transferred (QL) 
Priority groups (PG) 
Force majeure (FM) 
 
IE 
(A) Temporary Leasing 
Scheme (administrative 
price). 
(P) Milk purchaser level, however 
provision for national pool 
Allocations twice a year. 
(PG) Priority categories for successors, producers who have lost land and quota 
leases and producers with <350,000 litres (producers with more quota receive 
reduced allocation). 
(FM) Entire quota may be leased only in cases of force majeure. 
IT 
Temporary transfers allowed 
since 1993 (deadline 30th 
November) 
(M) 
(R) Since 2004 temporary transfers must 
take place between active producers 
located in ‘homogenous’ areas (except 
Sardinia).  
(QU) Since 1993 quota can be leased for 1 quota year and agreement only 
renewed once. After 2 consecutive years no leasing allowed in third year.  
(QU) Since 2003 temporary transfer of  unused quota by active producers limited 
to current quota year 
LU None   
NL 
(M) Producer to producer 
private transactions since 
1987/88 
(P) Purchaser level until 1996 (QL) Minimum 10,000 kg per transaction. Since 2004 no leasing out of all of 
quota (max 30% of quota). 
(QU) No leasing in after leasing out quota and vice versa.  
PT (M) Producer to producer private transactions 
 (QL) Transferor can lease out up to 10% of quota on mainland and 30% in Azores 
SV None   
UK 
(M) Since 1986/87. 
Producer to producer private 
transactions 
(R) ‘Ring fencing’ in Scottish Island. 
Before 1994 no temporary transfers 
between 5 Milk Marketing Boards. 
Last date for transfers of unused quota initially 31st July, then 31st September, 31st 
December now 31st March.  
(QU) Since 2002 not possible to lease out all quota in same year. 
(QL) Until 2002 no limit on renewal of temporary transfer to same producer in 
consecutive years. Since 2002 temporary transfer must be different producer. 
CY None   
CZ None   
EE None   
HU (M) Producer to producer private transactions 
None (QL) Up to 30% of producer’s quota can be leased out for that quota year. 
LT 
(M) Producer to producer 
private transactions since 
2007/08 
None (QL) (PG) At least 1.5 tons of quota but not more than 30% of a holding’s quota 
to be leased unless producers members of same co-op production (<70%) or force 
majeure (100%).  
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Temporary transfers of 
quota 
Geographical restrictions 
 
Other conditions relating to quota transfers Member 
State 
Market determined (M) 
Administrative (A) 
 
Regional level (R) 
Purchaser level (P) 
Less Favoured Areas (LFA) 
Limit on quantity of quota transferred (QL) 
Priority groups (PG) 
Force majeure (FM) 
 
 (FM) Transferor cannot obtain additional quota in same quota year except for 
force majeure. 
Transferor cannot renew lease during following quota year or sell it. 
LV 
None since October 2006. 
(M) Before then producer to 
producer private 
transactions. 
No information (QL) At least 1000 kg for delivery quota, 500 kg for direct sales quota 
MT (M) None Transfer applications administered by Milk Reference Quantity Competent Authority. 
PL (M) Market transfers by 31 
January 
No information (QU) Temporary transfers no longer than 3 consecutive years 
SI None   
SK None   
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Annex 6 Summary of rules for temporary redistribution of unused quota in the EU 15 
Member 
State 
Distribution of unused quota for calculation of the levy 
National level (N), Purchaser level (P)  
AT 1. Linear reallocation to all eligible producers 2. In proportion to size of eligible producer’s excess deliveries 
BE 
(N) National level 
In proportion to eligible producer’s quota  
Maximum 15,000 litres per holding 
DE (P) Purchaser level then national level (before 2000 at regional level purchaser, regional then national level) From 2006/07 limit of 10% of holding’s quota on purchaser level allocation. 
DK  (N) National level In proportion to eligible producer’s quota 
EL 
(N) National level 
1. In proportion to size of eligible producer’s quota 
2. In proportion to size of eligible producer’s excess deliveries 
ES 
(P) Until 2005/06 Purchaser level then national level 
(N)  Since 2005/06 national level 
1. In proportion to size of eligible producer’s quota  
2. Fixed criteria without reference to quota. 
FI (N) National level In proportion to size of eligible producer’s excess deliveries 
FR 
(P) 1. Purchaser level during the quota year  
-general limit of 10% per producer but up to 20% in recent years, no priority groups 
(N) 2. National level at the end of the quota year - focused on small producers 
IE 
 (P) Purchaser level then national level ‘flexi-milk’ – preference given to small producers 
In proportion to size of eligible producer’s quota (two categories) 
2. Common allocation to all eligible producers within each category 
IT 
 (N) National level 
Advance of levy is deducted and paid by purchasers monthly on basis of producers’ overruns. Allocations of unused quota made at the end of quota year 
according to criteria that preserve quota allocated to mountain areas and LFAs and give priority to both producers that have undergone a cut in the quota ‘b’ of 
their individual quantity (that is the difference between the quota referred to the theoretical reference period (1988-89, quota ‘a’) and the one referred to the 
actual reference period (1991-92) and young producers. 
LU  (P) Purchaser level then national level In proportion to size of eligible producer’s quota 
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Member 
State 
Distribution of unused quota for calculation of the levy 
National level (N), Purchaser level (P)  
NL (P) Purchaser level then national level In proportion to size of eligible producer’s excess quota 
PT (P) Purchaser level then national level In proportion to size of eligible producer’s quota 
SV 
(N) National level 
In proportion to size of eligible producer’s quota.  
(N.B. National quota never exceeded so no reallocation has been necessary) 
UK 
(N) National level (at producer level until 2004) 
1. Unused quota is allocated to producers with herd restrictions. 
2. In proportion to size of eligible producer’s excess deliveries. 
CY (P) Purchaser level then national level In proportion to size of eligible producer’s quota 
CZ (N) National level Common allocation to all eligible producers 
EE (N) National level In proportion to size of eligible producer’s excess deliveries 
HU (N) National level In proportion to size of eligible producer’s excess deliveries 
LT (N) National level Criteria for allocation of unused quota is common for all eligible producers  
LV (N) National level Common allocation criteria to all eligible producers 
MT No information on criteria. Reference Quantity not exceeded at national level.  
PL No information 
SI (N) National level 
In proportion to size of eligible producer’s excess deliveries 
SK (N) National level 
In proportion to size of eligible producer’s quota 
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Annex 7 Summary of national reserve management in the EU 25 
Member 
State 
Buying Schemes (Abandonment 
programmes, restructuring schemes, 
early retirement schemes) 
Quota holders partial 
inactivity Article 72 
(2)  
Siphon to national reserve National Reserve Allocations 
Quota use after allocation (QU)  
Priority Groups (PG) 
New Producers (NP) 
AT 
No information Confiscation of 
unused quota if 
production <70% (was 
50%) after 2 years 
None Linear allocations to all eligible producers based 
on quota size.  
Minimum 50kg per farmer. 
(QU) No sale of quota in year of allocation. 
Allocated quota not tradable for specified 
period. No temporary transfers. 
BE 
No information No information No information Linear allocations to all producers based on 
quota size. 
 
DE 
Early retirement schemes between 1984 
and 1991. 
No related programmes since 2000. 
Article 72 (2) not 
implemented 
30% siphon on transfers above 
350,000 tons until 1993.  
5-15% siphon on unsuccessful quota 
exchange bids 2000-2002 
National reserve quota made available free of 
charge to quota exchanges to meet excess 
demand.  
Länder have option to distribute quota according 
to objective criteria but only applied in North 
Rhine-Westphalia.  
DK 
EU abandonment schemes 1986-1992. 
National restructuring scheme 1989-1997 
Article 72 (2) not 
implemented 
50% siphon (permanent transfer with 
land)  
1% siphon (quota exchange transfers) 
(PG) Young producers (22-41 years old) 
(NP) New producers receive allocations from 
national reserve. 
(QU) National reserve allocations returned if 
sold or transferred.  
EL 
Early retirement schemes Confiscation of 
unused quota if 
production <70% after 
1 year 
5% siphon (permanent transfers with 
or without land)  
Objective criteria depend on circumstances. 
(NP) New producers receive allocations from 
national reserve. 
(QU) National reserve allocations not 
transferred for 3 years (exceptions for early 
retirement programme, transfers to relatives or 
entire transfer to member of same legal entity).  
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Member 
State 
Buying Schemes (Abandonment 
programmes, restructuring schemes, 
early retirement schemes) 
Quota holders partial 
inactivity Article 72 
(2)  
Siphon to national reserve National Reserve Allocations 
Quota use after allocation (QU)  
Priority Groups (PG) 
New Producers (NP) 
ES 
Abandonment programmes since 1991. 
Since 2003 National Quota Fund and 
National Quota Bank redistribute quota 
from abandonment programmes.  
Significant increase in quota transferred 
from 2005 (due to restrictions on private 
transactions) 
Confiscation of 
unused quota if 
production <70% 
(75% pre-2003) 
From 2003 15-20% siphon (transfers 
between regions, optional within 
regions). 
Free quota allocated to producers on points 
system agreed in each region.  
Since 2005 National Quota Fund buys unwanted 
quota to sell to producers for fixed price.  
National reserve allocations cannot be 
transferred to another producer. 
FI 
None  Article 72 (2) not 
implemented 
None Quota distributed at regional level in proportion 
to existing quota. (PG) 50% of allocations to 
producers with free capacity and other producers 
(e.g. organic or rare breed). <50% to investing 
producers.  
(QU) National reserve allocations not 
transferred for 3 years. 
FR 
Abandonment programmes (ACAL) 
compensate farmers who cease dairy 
production since start of quota regime. 
Originally financed by EU then at national 
and regional level. Compensation favours 
smaller farmers (tiered payments). Rates 
varied  
 
Confiscation of 
unused quota if 
production <70%  - 
(appeals possible at 
regional level) 
10% siphon as a general rule but with 
regional variation. Additional siphon 
(0-40%) possible depending on quota 
size.   
No siphon for purchase of whole 
farms by farmers without quota, for 
transfers within LFAs, and for 
transfers relative to the constitution 
of a special form of agricultural 
holdings (GAEC). 
National reserve managed at regional level 
(Département) since 1991 (previously at level of 
‘collect zone’) 
Since mid-1990s 20% of national reserve 
managed at national level but limited regional 
redistribution in practice. 
(PG) Quota allocations to priority groups first: 
young farmers, farmers in financial difficulties, 
small producers, farmers in mountainous areas. 
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Member 
State 
Buying Schemes (Abandonment 
programmes, restructuring schemes, 
early retirement schemes) 
Quota holders partial 
inactivity Article 72 
(2)  
Siphon to national reserve National Reserve Allocations 
Quota use after allocation (QU)  
Priority Groups (PG) 
New Producers (NP) 
IE 
Restructuring Schemes (2000-2006). 
 
Confiscation of 
unused quota if 
production <70%  
No siphon since late 1990s  
Up to 20% ‘clawback’ until late 
1990s (not transfers with land 
between close relatives and some 
other transactions).  
. 
Objective criteria based on recommendations of 
Milk Quota Appeals Tribunal.  
(PG) Priority given to small scale farmers but 
range of factors taken into account. 
E.g. current quota size, commitment to dairying, 
off-farm income, size of holding, family 
circumstances, previous allocations, exceptional 
circumstances. 
IT 
Abandonment programmes. Confiscation of 
unused quota if 
production <70% for 1 
year (not force 
majeure) 
Until 2003 10-15% siphon on quota 
transfers based on quota transferred. 
Quota retained in region of origin up to level of 
excess production in previous year. Additional 
quota divided between regions and allocated 
according to producer’s supply record previous 
3 years. Allocation criteria include young 
producers and limiting overproduction.  
 (NP) New producers receive allocations from 
national reserve. 
LU 
None Article 72 (2) not 
implemented 
15% siphon on transfers without land 
(not between  close relatives) 
Allocations made according to objective criteria 
including: 
(PG) Young producers, structural 
improvements, development plans, hardship 
cases. 
NL 
None Confiscation of 
unused quota if 
production <70% for 2 
years 
None Linear allocations to all producers based on 
quota size 
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Member 
State 
Buying Schemes (Abandonment 
programmes, restructuring schemes, 
early retirement schemes) 
Quota holders partial 
inactivity Article 72 
(2)  
Siphon to national reserve National Reserve Allocations 
Quota use after allocation (QU)  
Priority Groups (PG) 
New Producers (NP) 
PT 
None Confiscation of 
unused quota if 
production <70% for 1 
year 
7.5% siphon (except transfers out of 
NVZs (with land) or transfers to 
family members or certain transfers 
to limited companies (without land). 
Objective criteria: (PG) producer’s age, 
producer’s existing quota size, producer’s 
location in specific areas or producers in 
exceptional circumstances. 
(NP) New producers receive allocations from 
national reserve. 
(QU) Allocated quoted cannot be sold for 4 
years. 
(PG) Priority outside NVZs and to holdings 
with ‘sustainable economic levels’. 
SV 
None Article 72 (2) not 
implemented 
None Linear allocations to all producers based on 
quota size. 
(NP) New producers receive allocations from 
national reserve. 
Producers can apply for direct sale quota based 
on future sales.  
UK 
None Article 72 (2) not 
implemented 
None Linear allocations to all producers based on net 
quota at end of year (previous allocations on 
basis of permanent quota). 
CY 
None Article 72 (2) not 
implemented 
5% siphon (permanent transfers) Objective criteria: (PG) producer’s age, 
producer’s existing quota (<400,000 litres), 
producer’s supply record in previous 3 years 
(>90% used), sale of quota in last 3 years, 
producers location in specific area 
(Limassol/Paphos) 
 (NP) New producers receive allocations from 
national reserve. 
(QU) Allocated quota cannot be sold for 5 year 
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Member 
State 
Buying Schemes (Abandonment 
programmes, restructuring schemes, 
early retirement schemes) 
Quota holders partial 
inactivity Article 72 
(2)  
Siphon to national reserve National Reserve Allocations 
Quota use after allocation (QU)  
Priority Groups (PG) 
New Producers (NP) 
CZ 
None Confiscation of 
unused quota if 
production <70%  
15% siphon (permanent transfers) Producer’s supply record in current year relative 
to quota. 
(NP) New producers receive allocations from 
national reserve. 
EE 
None Confiscation of 50% 
unused quota if 
production <70%  
Siphon on quota above 85% of the 
average yield per transferred cow. 
Producer’s supply record in previous year 
(>90% quota used). 
(QU) No allocation if producer has transferred 
out quota during last year. 
HU 
None Confiscation of 
unused quota if 
production <70%  
None Producer’s supply record in previous year 
relative to quota 
LT 
None  Confiscation of 
unused quota if 
production <70% 
quota for 1 year 
Until 2007/08 5 % siphon (except 
family transfers, inheritance or 
between members of a co-op or 
holding) 
Common allocation criteria unless there is a lack 
of quota in the national reserve. 
(NP) New producers receive allocations from 
national reserve 
(QU) Allocated quota return top the national 
reserve if quota is transferred within 2 years  
LV 
Abandonment programme Confiscation of quota 
if production <70% 
quota 
1% siphon (transfers without land) Producer’s supply record in current year (>70% 
quota used) 
Allocations 3 times during year (1 June, 1 Sept, 
1 Dec) 
(NP) New producers receive allocations from 
national reserve. 
(QU) Allocated quota cannot be sold during 
same quota year 
MT No information    
PL None Confiscation of quota 
if production <70% 
quota 
5% siphon (permanent transfers 
without land)  
National reserve quota used:  in response to 
successful appeals against initial allocations; to 
limit potential for national quota overrun; and to 
producers developing their milk production. 
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Member 
State 
Buying Schemes (Abandonment 
programmes, restructuring schemes, 
early retirement schemes) 
Quota holders partial 
inactivity Article 72 
(2)  
Siphon to national reserve National Reserve Allocations 
Quota use after allocation (QU)  
Priority Groups (PG) 
New Producers (NP) 
SI None Unused quota can be 
confiscated to national 
reserve if production 
<70% quota 
5-10% siphon (transfers within 
regions) 
25-30% siphon (transfers between 
regions) 
Exceptions/lower rates for given to 
mountain areas and LFA. 
2005/06  allocations to establish base level for 
milk production 
From 2006/07: Producer’s supply record in 
previous year relative to quota; Producers who 
bought quota on the market, linear allocation to 
all producers based on quota size.  
(QU) Allocated quota cannot be transferred for 
5 years. 
SK None Unused quota can be 
confiscated to national 
reserve if production 
<70% quota over 1 
year period 
Siphon applied if quota transferred is 
greater than number of dairy cows 
(up to 5,500 kg per cow or average 
yield of transferor in previous quota 
year if higher). 
1. Producers whose quota was confiscated due 
to inactivity but resume production. 2. (NP) 
New producers (up to 50,000 kg each) 3. 
Producers can apply for additional quota (<15% 
of individual quota held) 
(QU) Allocated quota not transferred during 
following quota year. 
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Annex 8 Size distribution of dairy farmers according to amount of quota 
held 
Source:  Data provided to the European Commission by Members States. 
 
These data have been used to calculate columns 2 and 3 Table 7.5. 
 
 
 Number of producers by size of quota holding 
 Spain Portugal  Ireland 
Quota 
(tons) 
1993/4 2003/4 2006/7 2003/4 2006/7 Quota 
(tons) 
1993/4 2003/4 2006/7 
1000+ 197 512 717 142 165     
750-1000 138 389 522 80 110     
500-750 385 1,059 1,331 258 355     
400-500 323 938 1,088 289 342 450+ 757 1,204 1,508 
300-400 667 1,700 1,844 527 651 300-450 1,263 2,780 3,660 
200-300 1,664 3,696 3,539 1,097 1,200 200-300 5,433 6,654 6,542 
100-200 7,562 8,891 6,708 2,817 2,363 100-200 11,626 9,123 6,712 
50-100 16,882 8,424 5,355 2,743 1,950 0-100 22,311 5,451 3,620 
0-50 111,091 16,001 7,512 9,663 5,325     
Total 138,909 41,610 28,616 17,616 12,461 Total 41,390 25,212 22,042 
 
 
 
 
 Number of producers by size of quota holding 
 United Kingdom Netherlands 
Quota 
(tons) 
1983/4 1993/4 2003/4 2006/7 1993/4 2003/4 2006/7 
1000+ 4,763 263 862 1,544 
750-1000 
967 860 6,573 
2,387 624 1,693 2,396 
500-750 3,571 3,161 6,005 6,291 
400-500 
5,215 4,100 
1,749 3,856 4,020 3,050 
300-400 
6,474 
8,972 4,459 1,942 6,777 3,870 2,617 
200-300 22,450 8,299 2,604 2,007 8,642 3,669 2,274 
100-200 12,800 8,370 2,285 1,504 10,261 4,092 2,034 
50-100 5,134 3,185 816 377 5,745 2,304 662 
0-50 2,800 1,808 716 199 4,599 1,874 304 
Total 50,625 36,709 21,553 18,499 43,928 28,389 21,172 
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 Number of producers by size of quota holding 
 Italy Belgium Sweden 
Quota 
(tons) 
1993/4 2003/4 2006/7 1993/4 2003/4 2006/7 2003/4 2006/7 
1000+ 1,089 1,762 2,091 385 549 
750-1000 872 1,143 1,209 342 410 
500-750 1,862 2,102 2,183 
282 795 1,190 
1,002 1,036 
400-500 1,467 1,483 1,437 314 862 1,009 849 808 
300-400 2,489 2,395 2,142 1,269 1,746 1,765 1,336 1,183 
200-300 4,893 4,117 3,570 2,892 2,808 2,404 2,018 1,547 
100-200 13,959 9,477 7,743 5,891 4,851 3,951 2,473 1,784 
50-100 20,705 10,915 8,504 6,280 2,758 1,631 985 656 
0-50 93,542 26,804 19,141 8,268 1,876 1,120 637 396 
Total 140,878 60,198 48,020 25,196 15,590 13,070 10,027 8,369 
 
 
 Number of producers by size of quota holding 
 France  Germany 
Quota 
(tons) 
1993/4 2003/4 2006/7 Quota 
(tons) 
1983 1994 2005 
    1000+ 1,532 
    700-1000 
3,201 1,789 
3,368 
    600-700 410 1,608 6,220 
400+ 8,764 11,494 
300-400 12,111 13,568 300-600 3,818 14,182 12,888 
200-300 
32,638 
28,630 27,340 200-300 4,383 34,883 23,507 
100-200 58,405 36,080 27,812 
60-100 30,920 11,247 7,153 
0-60 49,816 11,139 6,966 
0-200 385,686 157,040 62,856 
Total 171,778 107,971 94,332 Total 397,498 209,422 110,371 
 
 
 Number of producers by size of quota holding 
 Greece Finland Denmark 
Quota 
(tons) 
1993/4 2003/4 2006/7 2003/4 2006/7 1983/4 1993/4 2003/4 2006/7 
1000+ 8 47 84 7 28 1,038 1,844 
750-1000 14 24 53 14 41 1,260 862 
500-750 29 91 178 121 260 
983 1,372 
1,684 892 
400-500 18 126 150 236 364 1,107 1,548 790 418 
300-400 71 200 246 614 846 2,070 2,894 881 426 
200-300 166 402 418 2,208 2,362 6,010 4,221 837 452 
100-200 751 870 715 7,085 5,511 10,703 4,283 609 334 
50-100 1,576 1,217 916 5,001 3,229 7,349 1,526 197 105 
0-50 25,172 5,692 3,534 3,115 2,256 4,457 546 36 31 
Total 27,805 8,669 6,294 18,401 14,897 32,679 16,390 7,332 5,364 
 
